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Abstract: The study of spatial cognition has provided considerable insight into how animals (including humans) navigate on the horizontal
plane. However, the real world is three-dimensional, having a complex topography including both horizontal and vertical features, which
presents additional challenges for representation and navigation. The present article reviews the emerging behavioral and neurobiological
literature on spatial cognition in non-horizontal environments. We suggest that three-dimensional spaces are represented in a quasiplanar fashion, with space in the plane of locomotion being computed separately and represented differently from space in the
orthogonal axis – a representational structure we have termed “bicoded.” We argue that the mammalian spatial representation in
surface-travelling animals comprises a mosaic of these locally planar fragments, rather than a fully integrated volumetric map. More
generally, this may be true even for species that can move freely in all three dimensions, such as birds and ﬁsh. We outline the
evidence supporting this view, together with the adaptive advantages of such a scheme.
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1. Introduction
Behavioural and neurobiological studies of spatial cognition
have provided considerable insight into how animals
(including humans) navigate through the world, establishing that a variety of strategies, subserved by different
neural systems, can be used in order to plan and execute
trajectories through large-scale, navigable space. This
work, which has mostly been done in simpliﬁed, laboratory-based environments, has deﬁned a number of sub-processes such as landmark recognition, heading
determination, odometry (distance-measuring), and
context recognition, all of which interact in the construction
and use of spatial representations. The neural circuitry
underlying these processes has in many cases been identiﬁed, and it now appears that the basics of navigation are
reasonably well understood.
The real world, however, is neither simple nor twodimensional, and the addition of vertical space to the two
horizontal dimensions adds a number of new problems
for a navigator to solve. For one thing, moving against
gravity imposes additional energy costs. Also, moving in a
© Cambridge University Press 2013
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volumetric space is computationally complicated, because
of the increased size of the representation needed, and
because rotations in three dimensions interact. It remains
an open question how the brain has solved these problems,
and whether the same principles of spatial encoding
operate in all three dimensions or whether the vertical
dimension is treated differently.
Studies of how animals and humans navigate in environments with a vertical component are slowly proliferating,
and it is timely to review the gathering evidence and
offer a theoretical interpretation of the ﬁndings to date.
In the ﬁrst part of the article, we review the current
literature on animal and human orientation and locomotion
in three-dimensional spaces, highlighting key factors that
contribute to and inﬂuence navigation in such spaces.
The second part summarizes neurobiological studies of
the encoding of three-dimensional space. The third and
ﬁnal part integrates the experimental evidence to put
forward a hypothesis concerning three-dimensional
spatial encoding – the bicoded model – in which we
propose that in encoding 3D spaces, the mammalian
brain constructs mosaics of connected surface-referenced
523
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maps. The advantages and limitations of such a quasi-planar
encoding scheme are explored.
2. Theoretical considerations
Before reviewing the behavioural and neurobiological aspects
of three-dimensional navigation it is useful to establish a
theoretical framework for the discussion, which will be developed in more detail in the last part of this article. The study of
navigation needs to be distinguished from the study of spatial
perception per se, in which a subject may or may not be
moving through the space. Additionally, it is also important
to distinguish between space that is encoded egocentrically
(i.e., relative to the subject) versus space that is encoded allocentrically (independently of the subject – i.e., relative to the
world). The focus of the present article is on the allocentric
encoding of the space that is being moved through, which
probably relies on different (albeit interconnected) neural
systems from the encoding of egocentric space.
An animal that is trying to navigate in 3D space needs to
know three things – how it is positioned, how it is oriented,
and in what direction it is moving. Further, all these things
require a reference frame: a world-anchored space-deﬁning framework with respect to which position, orientation,
and movement can be speciﬁed. There also needs to be
some kind of metric coordinate system – that is, a signal
that speciﬁes distances and directions with respect to this
reference frame. The core question for animal navigation,
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therefore, concerns what the reference frame might be
and how the coordinate system encodes distances and
directions within the frame.
The majority of studies of navigation, at least within neurobiology, have up until now taken place in laboratory settings, using restricted environments such as mazes, which
are characterized both by being planar (i.e., two-dimensional) and by being horizontal. The real world differs in
both of these respects. First, it is often not planar – air and
water, for example, allow movement in any direction and
so are volumetric. In this article, therefore, we will divide
three-dimensional environments into those that are locally
planar surfaces, which allow movement only in a direction
tangential to the surface, and those that are volumetric
spaces (air, water, space, and virtual reality), in which movement (or virtual movement) in any direction is unconstrained. Second, even if real environments might be
(locally) planar, the planes may not necessarily be horizontal.
These factors are important in thinking about how subjects
encode and navigate through complex spaces.
What does the vertical dimension add to the problem of
navigation? At ﬁrst glance, not much: The vertical dimension provides a set of directions one can move in, like any
other dimension, and it could be that the principles that
have been elucidated for navigation in two dimensions
extend straightforwardly to three. In fact, however, the vertical dimension makes the problem of navigation considerably more complex, for a number of reasons. First, the
space to be represented is much larger, since a volume is
larger than a plane by a power of 3/2. Second, the directional information to be encoded is more complex,
because there are three planes of orientation instead of
just one. Furthermore, rotations in orthogonal planes
interact such that sequences of rotations have different outcomes depending on the order in which they are executed
(i.e., they are non-commutative), which adds to processing
complexity. Third, the vertical dimension is characterized
by gravity, and by consequences of gravity such as hydrostatic or atmospheric pressure, which add both information
and effort to the computations involved. And ﬁnally, there
are navigationally relevant cues available for the horizontal
plane that are absent in the vertical: for example, the position of the sun and stars, or the geomagnetic ﬁeld.
The internal spatial representation that the brain constructs for use in large-scale navigation is often referred
to as a “cognitive map” (O’Keefe & Nadel 1978). The cognitive map is a supramodal representation that arises from
the collective activity of neurons in a network of brain areas
that process incoming sensory information and abstract
higher-order spatial characteristics such as distance and
direction. In thinking about whether cognitive maps are
three-dimensional, it is useful to consider the various 3D
mapping schemes that are possible.
Figure 1 shows three different hypothetical ways of
mapping spaces, which differ in the degree to which they
incorporate a representation of the vertical dimension. In
Figure 1a, the metric fabric of the map – the grid –
follows the topography but does not itself contain any topographical information: the map is locally ﬂat. Such a surface
is called, in mathematics, a manifold, which is a space that is
locally Euclidean – that is, for any point in the space, its
immediate neighbours will be related to it by the usual
rules of geometry, even if more-distant points are related
in a non-Euclidean way. For example, the surface of a
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Figure 1. Different kinds of three-dimensional encoding. (a) A surface map, with no information about elevation. (b) An extracted ﬂat
map in which the horizontal coordinates have been generated, by trigonometric inference, from hilly terrain in (a). (c) A bicoded map,
which is metric in the horizontal dimension and uses a non-metric scale (i.e., shading) in the vertical (upper panel = bird’s eye view of the
terrain, lower panel = cross-section at the level of the dotted line). (d) A volumetric map, which is metric in all three dimensions, like this
map of dark matter in the universe.

sphere is a manifold, because a very small triangle on its
surface will be Euclidean (its interior angles add up to
180 degrees) but a large triangle will be Riemannian (the
sum of its interior angles exceeds 180 degrees). Given a
small enough navigator and large enough surface undulations, the ground is therefore a manifold. For the purposes
of the discussion that follows, we will call a map that follows
the topography and is locally Euclidean a surface map. A
surface map in its simplest form does not, for a given
location, encode information about whether the location
is on a hill or in a valley.2 Although such a map accurately
represents the surface distance a navigator would need to
travel over undulating terrain, because it does not contain
information about height (or elevation) above a reference
plane it would fail to allow calculation of the extra effort
involved in moving over the undulations, and nor would
the calculation of shortcuts be accurate.
A variant of the surface map is the extracted ﬂat map
shown in Figure 1b. Here, distances and directions are
encoded relative to the horizontal plane, rather than to
the terrain surface. For a ﬂat environment, a surface map
equates to an extracted ﬂat map. For hilly terrain, in
order to determine its position in x-y coordinates, the navigator needs to process the slope to determine, trigonometrically, the equivalent horizontal distance. To generate
such a map it is therefore necessary to have some processing of information from the vertical dimension (i.e.,
slope with respect to position and direction), and so this
is a more complex process than for a purely surface map.
There is evidence, discussed later, that some insects can in
fact extract horizontal distance from hilly terrain, although
whether this can be used to generate a map remains moot.
In Figure 1c, the map now does include a speciﬁc representation of elevation, but the encoding method is different from that of the horizontal distances. Hence, we have
termed this a bicoded map. In a bicoded map, vertical

distance is represented by some non-spatial variable – in
this case, colour. Provided with information about x-y coordinates, together with the non-spatial variable, navigators
could work out where they were in three-dimensional
space, but would not have metric information (i.e., quantitative information about distance) about the vertical component of this position unless they also had a key (some
way of mapping the non-spatial variable to distances).
Lacking a key, navigators could still know whether they
were on a hill or in a valley, but could not calculate efﬁcient
shortcuts because they could not make the trigonometric
calculations that included the vertical component. Such a
map could be used for long-range navigation over undulating terrain, but determining the most energy-efﬁcient
route would be complicated because this would require
chaining together segments having different gradients
(and therefore energetic costs), as opposed to simply computing a shortest-distance route. Although the representational scheme described here is an artiﬁcial one used by
human geographers, later on we will make the point that
an analogous scheme – use of a non-metric variable to
encode one of the dimensions in a three-dimensional
map – may operate in the neural systems that support
spatial representation.
Finally, the volumetric map shown in Figure 1d could be
used for navigation in a volumetric space. Here, all three
dimensions use the same metric encoding scheme, and
the shortest distance between any two points can be calculated straightforwardly using trigonometry (or some neural
equivalent), with – on Earth – elevation being simply the
distance in the dimension perpendicular to gravity.
However, calculating energy costs over an undulating
surface would still be complicated, for the same reasons
as above – that is, energy expenditure would have to be
continuously integrated over the course of the planned
journey in order to allow comparisons of alternate routes.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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The questions concerning the brain’s map of space, then,
are: What encoding scheme does it use for navigation either
over undulating surfaces or in volumetric spaces? Is the
vertical dimension encoded in the same way as the two
horizontal ones, as in the volumetric map? Is it ignored
entirely, as in a surface map, or is it encoded, but in a different way from the horizontal dimensions, as in the bicoded
map? These questions motivate the following analysis of
experimental data and will be returned to in the ﬁnal
section, where we will suggest that a bicoded map is the
most likely encoding scheme, at least in mammals, and
perhaps even including those that can swim or ﬂy.
3. Behavioural studies in three dimensions
A key question to be answered concerning the representation of three-dimensional space is how information
from the vertical dimension is incorporated into the
spatial representation. We will therefore now review experimental studies that have explored the use of information
from the vertical dimension in humans and other animals,
beginning with an examination of how cues from the vertical dimension may be processed, before moving on to how
these cues may be used in self-localization and navigation.
The discussion is organized as follows, based on a logical
progression through complexity of the representation of
the third (usually vertical) dimension:
Processing of verticality cues
Navigation on a sloping surface
Navigation in multilayer environments
Navigation in a volumetric space

3.1. Processing of verticality cues

Processing of cues arising from the vertical dimension is a
faculty possessed by members of most phyla, and it takes
many forms. One of the simplest is detection of the vertical
axis itself, using a variety of mechanisms that mostly rely on
gravity, or on cues related to gravity, such as hydrostatic
pressure or light gradients. This information provides a
potential orienting cue which is useful not only in static
situations but also for navigation in three-dimensional
space. Additionally, within the vertical dimension itself
gravity differentiates down from up and thus polarizes
the vertical axis. Consequently, animals are always oriented
relative to this axis, even though they can become disoriented relative to the horizontal axes. The importance of
the gravity signal as an orienting cue is evident in
reduced or zero-gravity environments, which appear to
be highly disorienting for humans: Astronauts report difﬁculty in orienting themselves in three-dimensional space
when ﬂoating in an unfamiliar orientation (Oman 2007).
The vertical axis, once determined, can then be used as a
reference frame for the encoding of metric information in
the domains of both direction and distance. The technical
terms for dynamic rotations relative to the vertical axis
are pitch, roll, and yaw, corresponding to rotations in the
sagittal, coronal, and horizontal planes, respectively
(Fig. 2A). Note that there is potential for confusion, as
these rotational terms tend to be used in an egocentric
(body-centered) frame of reference, in which the planes
526
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of rotation move with the subject. The static terms used
to describe the resulting orientation (or attitude) of the
subject are elevation, bank, and azimuth (Fig. 2B), which
respectively describe: (1) the angle that the front-back
(antero-posterior) axis of the subject makes with earth-horizontal (elevation); (2) the angle that the transverse axis of
the subject makes with earth-horizontal (bank); and (3)
the angle that the antero-posterior axis of the subject
makes with some reference direction, usually geographical
North (azimuth). Tilt is the angle between the dorsoventral cranial axis and the gravitational vertical.
The other metric category, in addition to direction, is distance, which in the vertical dimension is called height – or
(more precisely) elevation, when it refers to distance from
a reference plane (e.g., ground or water level) in an
upward direction, and depth when it refers to distance in
a downward direction. Determination of elevation/depth
is a special case of the general problem of odometry (distance-measuring).
There is scant information about the extent to which
animals encode information about elevation. A potential
source of such information could be studies of aquatic
animals, which are exposed to particularly salient cues
from the vertical dimension due to the hydrostatic pressure
gradient. Many ﬁsh are able to detect this gradient via their
swim bladders, which are air-ﬁlled sacs that can be inﬂated
or deﬂated to allow the ﬁsh to maintain neutral buoyancy.
Holbrook and Burt de Perera (2011a) have argued that
changes in vertical position would also, for a constant gas
volume, change the pressure in the bladder and thus
provide a potential signal for relative change in height.
Whether ﬁsh can actually use this information for vertical
self-localization remains to be determined, however.
The energy costs of moving vertically in water also add
navigationally relevant information. These costs can vary
across species (Webber et al. 2000); hence, one might
expect that the vertical dimension would be more salient
in some aquatic animals than in others. Thermal gradients,
which are larger in the vertical dimension, could also
provide extra information concerning depth, as well as
imposing differential energetic costs in maintaining
thermal homeostasis at different depths (Brill et al. 2012;
Carey 1992).
Interestingly, although ﬁsh can process information
about depth, Holbrook and Burt de Perera (2009) found
that they appear to separate this from the processing of
horizontal information. Whereas banded tetras learned
the vertical and horizontal components of a trajectory
equally quickly, the ﬁsh tended to use the two components
independently, suggesting a separation either during learning, storage, or recall, or at the time of use of the information. When the two dimensions were in conﬂict, the
ﬁsh preferred the vertical dimension (Fig. 3), possibly
due to the hydrostatic pressure gradient.
Several behavioural studies support the use of elevation
information in judging the vertical position of a goal. For
instance, rufous hummingbirds can distinguish ﬂowers on
the basis of their relative heights above ground (Henderson
et al. 2001; 2006), and stingless bees can communicate the
elevation as well as the distance and direction to a food
source (Nieh & Roubik 1998; Nieh et al. 2003). Interestingly, honeybees do not appear to communicate elevation
(Dacke & Srinivasan 2007; Esch & Burns 1995). Rats are
also able to use elevation information in goal localization,
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Figure 2. (a) Terminology describing rotations in the three cardinal planes. (b) Terminology describing static orientation (or “attitude”)
in each of the three planes.

and – like the ﬁsh in the Holbrook and Burt de Perera
(2009) study – appear to separate horizontal and vertical
components when they do so. For example, Grobéty &
Schenk (1992a) found that in a lattice maze (Fig. 4A),
rats learned to locate the elevation of a food item more
quickly than they learned its horizontal coordinates,
suggesting that elevation may provide an additional, more
salient spatial cue, perhaps because of its added energy
cost, or because of arousal/anxiety.
Jovalekic et al. (2011) also found a vertical/horizontal
processing separation in rats, but in the opposite direction
from Grobéty and Schenk, suggesting a task dependence
on how processing is undertaken. Rats were trained on a
vertical climbing wall (studded with protruding pegs to
provide footholds; Fig. 4B) to shuttle back and forth
between a start and goal location. When a barrier was
inserted into the maze, to force a detour, the rats overwhelmingly preferred, in both directions, the route in which the
horizontal leg occurred ﬁrst and the vertical leg second.
Likewise, on a three-dimensional lattice similar to the
one used by Grobéty and Schenk, the rats preferred the
shallow-steep route to the steep-shallow route around a
barrier. However, the task in Jovalekic et al.’s study differed
from that faced by Grobéty and Schenk’s rats in that in the
latter, both the starting location and the goal were well
learned by the time the obstacle was introduced. It may
be that elevation potentiates initial learning, but that in a
well-learned situation the animals prefer to solve the horizontal component ﬁrst, perhaps due to an inclination to
delay the more costly part of a journey.
Humans can estimate their own elevation, but with only
a modest degree of accuracy. Garling et al. (1990) found
that subjects were able to judge, from memory, which
one of pairs of familiar landmarks in their hometown has

a higher elevation, indicating that information about
elevation is both observed and stored in the brain. It is
not clear how this information was acquired, although
there were suggestions that the process may be based
partly on encoding heuristics, such as encoding the steepest
and therefore most salient portions of routes ﬁrst, as
opposed to encoding precise metric information. Notwithstanding the salience of the vertical dimension, processing
of the vertical dimension in humans appears poor (Montello & Pick 1993; Pick & Rieser 1982; Tlauka et al. 2007).
As with the ﬁsh and rodent studies above, a dissociation
between vertical and horizontal processing was seen in a
human study, in which landmarks arranged in a 3-by-3
grid within a building were grouped by most participants
into (vertical) column representations, and by fewer participants into (horizontal) row representations (Büchner et al.
2007). Most participants’ navigation strategies were consistent with their mental representations; as a result, when
locating the given target landmark, a greater proportion
of participants chose a horizontal-vertical route. The
authors suggested that these results might have been
reversed in a building that was taller than it was wide,
unlike the building in their study. However, given the
results from the rats of Jovalekic et al. (2011), in which
the climbing wall dimensions were equal, it is also possible
that this behaviour reﬂects an innate preference for
horizontal-ﬁrst routes.
In conclusion, then, studies of both human and nonhuman animals ﬁnd that there is clear evidence of the use
of elevation information in spatial computations, and also
for differential processing of information from vertical
versus horizontal dimensions. The processing differences
between the two dimensions may result from differential
experience, differential costs associated with the respective
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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dimensions, or differences in how these dimensions are
encoded neurally.
Next, we turn to the issue of how the change in height
with respect to change in distance – that is, the slope of
the terrain – may be used in spatial cognition and navigation. This is a more complex computation than simple
elevation, but its value lies in the potential for adding
energy and effort to the utility calculations of a journey.

3.2. Navigation on a sloping surface

Figure 3. The experiment by Holbrook and Burt de Perera
(2009). (a) Line diagram of the choice maze (taken from the
original article, with permission), in which ﬁsh were released
into a tunnel and had to choose one of the exit arms to obtain a
reward. (b) The conﬂict experiment of that study, in which the
ﬁsh were trained with the arms at an angle, so that one arm
pointed up and to the left and the other arm pointed down and
to the right. During testing, the arms were rotated about
the axis of the entrance tunnel so that one arm had the same
vertical orientation but a different left-right position, and one
had the same horizontal (left-right) position but a different
vertical level. (c) Analysis of the choices showed that the ﬁsh
greatly preferred the arm having the same vertical level.
Redrawn from the original.
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Surfaces extending into the vertical dimension locally form
either slopes or vertical surfaces, and globally form undulating or crevassed terrain. Slopes have the potential to provide
several kinds of information to a navigating animal (Restat
et al. 2004), acting, for instance, as a landmark (e.g., a hill
visible from a distance) or as a local organizing feature of
the environment providing directional information.
Additionally, as described earlier, the added vertical component afforded by slopes is both salient and costly, as
upward locomotion requires greater effort than horizontal
locomotion, and an extremely steep slope could be hazardous to traverse. As a result, it is reasonable to assume that
slopes might inﬂuence navigation in several ways.
A number of invertebrates, including desert ants and
ﬁddler crabs, appear able to detect slopes, sometimes
with a high degree of accuracy (at least 12 degrees for
the desert ant; Wintergerst & Ronacher 2012). It is still
unknown how these animals perform their slope detection,
which in the ant does not appear to rely on energy consumption (Schäfer & Wehner 1993), sky polarization cues
(Hess et al. 2009), or proprioceptive cues from joint
angles (Seidl & Wehner 2008). The degree to which
slope is used in ant navigation has been under considerable
investigation in recent years, making use of the ability of
these animals to “home” (ﬁnd their way back to the nest)
using a process known as path integration (see Etienne &
Jeffery 2004; Walls & Layne 2009; Wehner 2003) in
which position is constantly updated during an excursion
away from a starting point such as a nest.
Foraging ants will home after ﬁnding food, and the direction and distance of their return journey provide a convenient readout of the homing vector operative at the
start of this journey. Wohlgemuth et al. (2001) investigated
homing in desert ants and found that they could compensate for undulating terrain traversed on an outbound
journey by homing, across ﬂat terrain, the horizontally
equivalent distance back to the nest, indicating that they
had processed the undulations and could extract the corresponding ground distance. Likewise, ﬁddler crabs searched
for their home burrows at the appropriate ground distance
as opposed to the actual travelled distance (Walls & Layne
2009). Whether such encoding of slope is relative to earthhorizontal (i.e., the plane deﬁned by gravity) or whether it
simply relates the two surfaces (the undulating outbound
one and the ﬂat return one), remains to be determined.
However, despite the ability of Cataglyphis to extract
ground distance, Grah et al. (2007) found that the ants
did not appear to encode speciﬁc aspects of the undulating
trajectory in their representations of the journey, as ants
trained on outbound sloping surfaces will select homing
routes that have slopes even when these are inappropriate
(e.g., if the two outbound slopes had cancelled out, leaving
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Figure 4. Rodent studies of vertical processing. (a) Schematic of the lattice maze of Grobéty and Schenk (1992a), together with a closeup photograph of a rat in the maze (inset). (b) Schematic and photograph of the pegboard maze used in the experiments of Jovalekic et al.
(2011) and, as described later, by Hayman et al. (2011). In the Jovalekic et al. experiment, rats learned to shuttle directly back and forth
between start and goal locations, as indicated in the diagram on the right. On test trials, a barrier (black bar) was inserted across the usual
route, forcing the rats to detour. The great majority of rats preferred the routes indicated by the arrows, which had the horizontal leg ﬁrst
and the vertical leg second.

the ant at the same elevation as the nest with no need to
ascend or descend). Thus, ants do not appear to incorporate elevation into their route memory; their internal maps
seem essentially ﬂat.
The ability of humans to estimate the slope of surfaces has
been the subject of considerable investigation. Gibson and
Cornsweet (1952) noted that geographical slant, which is
the angle a sloping surface makes with the horizontal plane,
is to be distinguished from optical slant, which is the angle
the surface makes with the gaze direction. This is important
because a surface appears to an observer to possess a relatively constant slope regardless of viewing distance, even
though the angle the slope makes with the eye changes
(Fig. 5A). The observer must somehow be able to compensate for the varying gaze angle in order to maintain perceptual
slope constancy, presumably by using information about the
angle of the head and eyes with respect to the body.
However, despite perceptual slope constancy, perceptual
slope accuracy is highly impaired – people tend to greatly
overestimate the steepness of hills (Kammann 1967), typically judging a 5-degree hill to be 20 degrees, and a 30degree hill to be almost 60 degrees (Profﬁtt et al. 1995).
This mis-estimation of slope has been linked to the wellestablished tendency of people to underestimate depth in
the direction of gaze (Loomis et al. 1992): If subjects perceive distances along the line of sight to be foreshortened,
then they would perceive the horizontal component of the
slope to be less than it really is for a given vertical distance,
and thus the gradient to be steeper than it is. However, this
explanation fails to account for why subjects looking downhill also perceive the hill as too steep (Profﬁtt et al. 1995).
Furthermore, if observers step back from the edge of a
downward slope, there is a failure of slope constancy as
well as accuracy: they see the slope as steeper than they
do if they are positioned right at the edge (Li & Durgin
2009). Durgin and Li have suggested that all these perceptual distortions can collectively be explained by so-called
scale expansion (Durgin & Li 2011; Li & Durgin 2010) –
the tendency to overestimate angles (both gaze declination
and optical slant) in central vision by a factor of about 1.5
(Fig. 5B). While this expansion may be beneﬁcial for processing efﬁciency, it raises questions about how such distortions may affect navigational accuracy.

Other, nonvisual distortions of slope perception may
occur, as well. Profﬁtt and colleagues have suggested that
there is an effect on slope perception of action-related
factors, such as whether people are wearing a heavy backpack or are otherwise fatigued, or are elderly (Bhalla &
Profﬁtt 1999); whether the subject is at the top or bottom
of the hill (Stefanucci et al. 2005); and their level of
anxiety (Stefanucci et al. 2008) or mood (Riener et al.
2011) or even level of social support (Schnall et al. 2012).
However, the interpretation of many of these observations
has been challenged (Durgin et al. 2012).
Creem and Profﬁtt (1998; 2001) have argued that visuomotor perceptions of slope are dissociable from explicit
awareness. By this account, slope perception comprises
two components: an accurate and stable visuomotor
representation and an inaccurate and malleable conscious
representation. This may be why subjects who appear to
have misperceived slopes according to their verbal
reports nevertheless tailor their actions to them appropriately. Durgin et al. (2011) have challenged this view,
suggesting that experimental probes of visuomotor perception are themselves inaccurate. The question of
whether there are two parallel systems for slope perception
therefore remains open.
How does slope perception affect navigation? One
mechanism appears to be by potentiating spatial learning.
For example, tilting some of the arms in radial arm
mazes improves performance in working memory tasks in
rats (Brown & Lesniak-Karpiak 1993; Grobéty & Schenk
1992b; Figure 6a). Similarly, experiments in rodents involving conical hills emerging from a ﬂat arena that rats navigated in darkness found that the presence of the slopes
facilitated learning and accuracy during navigation
(Moghaddam et al. 1996; Fig. 6B). In these experiments,
steeper slopes enhanced navigation to a greater extent
than did shallower slopes. Pigeons walking in a tilted
arena were able to use the 20-degree slope to locate a
goal corner; furthermore, they preferred to use slope information when slope and geometry cues were placed in conﬂict (Nardi & Bingman 2009b; Nardi et al. 2010). In these
examples, it is likely that slope provided compass-like directional information, as well as acting as a local landmark with
which to distinguish between locations in an environment.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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Figure 5. Visual slant estimation. (a) Slope constancy: A subject viewing a horizontal surface with a shallow gaze (β1) versus a steep gaze
(β2) perceives the slope of the ground to be the same (i.e., zero) in both cases despite the optical slant (β) being different in the two cases.
In order to maintain constant slope perception, the nervous system must therefore have some mechanism of compensating for gaze angle.
(b) The scale expansion hypothesis: An observer misperceives both the declination of gaze and changes in optical slant with a gain of 1.5,
so that all angles are exaggerated but constancy of (exaggerated) slant is locally maintained. Increasing distance compression along the line
of sight additionally contributes to slant exaggeration (Li & Durgin 2010).

In humans, similar results were reported in a virtual
reality task in which participants using a bicycle simulator
navigated within a virtual town with eight locations
(Restat et al. 2004; Steck et al. 2003; Fig. 6C). Participants
experiencing the sloped version of the virtual town
(4-degree slant) made fewer pointing and navigation
errors than did those experiencing the ﬂat version. This
530
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indicates that humans can also use slope to orient with
greater accuracy – although, interestingly, this appears to
be more true for males than for females (Nardi et al.
2011). When slope and geometric cues were placed in conﬂict, geometric information was evaluated as more relevant
(Kelly 2011). This is the opposite of the ﬁnding reported in
pigeons discussed above. There are, of course, a number of
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Figure 6. Behavioural studies of the use of slope cues in navigation, in rats (a and b) and in humans (c). (a) Schematic of the tilted-arm
radial maze of Grobéty & Schenk (1992b). (b) Schematic of the conical-hill arena of Moghaddam et al. (1996). (c) The virtual-reality
sloping-town study of Restat et al. (2004) and Steck et al. (2003), taken from Steck et al. (2003) with permission.

reasons why pigeons and humans may differ in their navigational strategies, but one possibility is that different strategies are applied by animals that habitually travel through
volumetric space rather than travel over a surface, in
which geometric cues are arguably more salient.
The presence of sloping terrain adds complexity to the
navigational calculations required in order to minimize
energy expenditure. A study investigating the ability of
human participants to ﬁnd the shortest routes linking multiple destinations (the so-called travelling salesman
problem, or “TSP”) in natural settings that were either
ﬂat or undulating found that total distance travelled was
shorter in the ﬂat condition (Phillips & Layton 2009).
This was perhaps because in the undulating terrain, participants avoided straight-line trajectories in order to minimize
hill climbing, and in so doing increased travel distance.
However, it is not known to what extent they minimized
energy expenditure. Interestingly, Grobéty & Schenk
(1992a) found that rats on the vertical plane made a far
greater number of horizontal movements, partly because
they made vertical translations by moving in a stair pattern
rather than directly up or down, thus minimizing the added
effort of direct vertical translations. This reﬂects the ﬁndings
of the TSP in the undulating environments mentioned above
(Phillips & Layton 2009) and is in line with the reported
horizontal preferences in rats (Jovalekic et al. 2011).
In summary, then, the presence of sloping terrain not
only adds effort and distance to the animal’s trajectory,
but also adds orienting information. However, the extent
to which slope is explicitly incorporated into the metric

fabric of the cognitive map, as opposed to merely embellishing the map, is as yet unknown.
3.3. Navigation in multilayer environments

Multilayer environments – such as trees, burrow systems,
or buildings – are those in which earth-horizontal x-y coordinates recur as the animal explores, due to overlapping
surfaces that are stacked along the vertical dimension.
They are thus, conceptually, intermediate between planar
and volumetric environments. The theoretical importance
of multilayer environments lies in the potential for confusion, if – as we will argue later – the brain prefers to use
a plane rather than a volume as its basic metric reference.
Most behavioural studies of spatial processing in multilayer environments have involved humans, and most
human studies of three-dimensional spatial processing
have involved multilayer environments (with the exception
of studies in microgravity, discussed below). The core question concerning multilayer environments is the degree to
which the layers are represented independently versus
being treated as parts within an integrated whole. One
way to explore this issue is to test whether subjects are
able to path integrate across the layers. Path integration,
introduced earlier, consists of self-motion-tracking using
visual, motor, and sensory-ﬂow cues in order to continuously update representations of current location and/or a
homing vector (for a review, see Etienne & Jeffery 2004).
An early study of path integration in three dimensions
explored whether mice could track their position across
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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independent layers of an environment (Bardunias & Jander
2000). The mice were trained to shuttle between their nestbox on one horizontal plane and a goal location on a parallel
plane directly above the ﬁrst, by climbing on a vertical wire
mesh cylinder joining the two planes. When the entire
apparatus was rotated by 90 degrees, in darkness while
the animals were climbing the cylinder, all mice compensated for this rotation by changing direction on the upper
plane, thus reaching the correct goal location. This suggests
that they had perceived and used the angle of passive
rotation, and mapped it onto the overhead space. A
second control experiment conﬁrmed that the mice were
not using distal cues to accomplish this, thus suggesting
that they were able to rely on internal path integration mechanisms in order to remain oriented in three dimensions.
However, it is not necessarily the case that the mice calculated a 3D vector to the goal, because in this environment the task of orienting in three dimensions could be
simpliﬁed by maintaining a sense of direction in the horizontal dimension while navigating vertically. This is generally true of multilayer environments, and so to show true
integration, it is necessary to show that subjects incorporate
vertical angular information into their encoding. In this
vein, Montello and Pick (1993) demonstrated that human
subjects who learned two separate and overlapping routes
in a multilevel building could subsequently integrate the
relationship of these two routes, as evidenced by their
ability to point reasonably accurately from a location on
one route directly to a location on the other. However, it
was also established that pointing between these vertically
aligned spaces was less accurate and slower than were performances within a ﬂoor. Further, humans locating a goal in
a multi-storey building preferred to solve the vertical component before the horizontal one, a strategy that led to
shorter navigation routes and times (Hölscher et al.
2006). In essence, rats and humans appear in such tasks
to be reducing a three-dimensional task to a one-dimensional (vertical) followed by a two-dimensional (horizontal)
task. However, their ability to compute a direct shortest
route was obviously constrained by the availability of connecting ports (stairways) between the ﬂoors, and so this
was not a test of true integration.
Wilson et al. (2004) investigated the ability of humans to
integrate across vertical levels in a virtual reality experiment
in which subjects were required to learn the location of
pairs of objects on three levels of a virtual multilevel building. Participants then indicated, by pointing, the direction
of objects from various vantage points within the virtual
environment. Distance judgements between ﬂoors were
distorted, with relative downward errors in upward judgements and relative upward errors in downward judgements.
This effect is interesting, as the sense of vertical space
seems to be biased towards the horizontal dimension.
However, in this study there was also a (slightly weaker)
tendency to make rightward errors to objects to the left,
and leftward errors to objects to the right. The results
may therefore reﬂect a general tendency for making
errors in the direction towards the center point of the
spatial range, regardless of dimension (although this was
more pronounced for the vertical dimension). Another
interesting ﬁnding from this study is that there appears to
be a vertical asymmetry in spatial memories, with a bias
in favour of memories for locations that are on a lower
rather than higher plane.
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Tlauka et al. (2007) conﬁrmed the ﬁndings of Wilson
et al. (2004) and suggested that there might be a “contraction bias” due to uncertainty, reﬂecting a compressed vertical memory. They further speculated that such biases
might be experience-dependent, as humans pay more
attention to horizontal space directly ahead than to
regions above or below it. This view is interesting and
might explain the experimental results seen with rats in
Jovalekic et al. (2011). Finally, young children appear to
have more problems in such three-dimensional pointing
tasks (Pick & Rieser 1982), once again suggesting that
experience may modulate performance in vertical tasks.
In the third part of this article, we will argue that the
mammalian spatial representation may be fundamentally
planar, with position in the vertical dimension (orthogonal
to the plane of locomotion) encoded separately, and in a
different (non-metric) way, from position in the horizontal
(locomotor) plane. If spatial encoding is indeed planar, this
has implications for the encoding of multilevel structures,
in which the same horizontal coordinates recur at different
vertical levels. On the one hand, this may cause confusion
in the spatial mapping system: That is, if the representations of horizontal and vertical dimensions are not integrated, then the navigational calculations that use
horizontal coordinates may confuse the levels. As suggested
above, this may be why, for example, humans are confused
by multilevel buildings. On the other hand, if there is, if not
full integration, at least an interaction between the vertical
and horizontal representations, then it is possible that separate horizontal codes are able to be formed for each vertical level, with a corresponding disambiguation of the levels.
Further studies at both behavioural and neurobiological
levels will be needed to determine how multiple overlapping levels are represented and used in navigation.

3.4. Navigation in a volumetric space

Volumetric spaces such as air and water allow free movement in all dimensions. Relatively little navigational
research has been conducted in such environments so far.
One reason is that it is difﬁcult to track animal behaviour
in volumetric spaces. The advent of long-range tracking
methods that use global positioning system (GPS) techniques or ultrasonic tagging is beginning to enable research
into foraging and homing behaviours over larger distances
(Tsoar et al. 2011). However, many of these studies still
address navigation only in the earth-horizontal plane, ignoring possible variations in ﬂight or swim height. Laboratory
studies have started to explore navigation in three-dimensional space, though the evidence is still limited.
One of the earliest studies of 3D navigation in rats, the
Grobéty and Schenk (1992a) experiment mentioned
earlier, involved a cubic lattice, which allowed the
animals to move in any direction at any point within the
cube (see Fig. 4A). As noted earlier, it was found that
rats learned the correct vertical location before the horizontal location, suggesting that these elements may be processed separately. Grobéty and Schenk suggested that the
rats initially paid greater attention to the vertical dimension
both because it is salient and because greater effort is
required to make vertical as opposed to horizontal translations; therefore, minimizing vertical error reduced their
overall effort.
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By contrast, Jovalekic et al. (2011) found that rats shuttling back and forth between diagonally opposite low and
high points within a lattice maze or on a vertical subset of
it, the pegboard (see Fig. 4B), did not tend to take the
direct route (at least on the upward journey) but preferred
to execute the horizontal component of the journey ﬁrst.
However, the separation of vertical from horizontal may
have occurred because of the constraints on locomotion
inherent in the maze structure: the rats may have found
it easier to climb vertically than diagonally. Another experiment, however, also found vertical/horizontal differences
in behavior: Jovalekic et al. (2011) examined foraging behaviour in the Grobéty and Schenk lattice maze and
found that rats tended to retrieve as much of the food as
possible on one horizontal layer before moving to the next.
These authors observed similar behaviour on a simpliﬁed
version of this apparatus, the pegboard, where again, foraging rats depleted one layer completely before moving to
the next. The implication is that rather than using a truly
volumetric representation of the layout, the animals tend
to segment the environment into horizontal bands.
A similar propensity to treat three-dimensional environments as mainly horizontal has been reported in humans by
Vidal et al. (2004), who studied participants in a virtual 3D
maze and found that they performed better if they
remained upright and had therefore aligned their egocentric and allocentric frames of reference in one of the
dimensions. Similar results were also reported by Aoki
et al. [2005]. Likewise, astronauts in a weightless environment tended to construct a vertical reference using visual
rather than vestibular (i.e., gravitational) cues, and remain
oriented relative to this reference (Lackner & Graybiel
1983; Tafforin & Campan 1994; Young et al. 1984).
Finally, one intriguing study has shown that humans may
be able to process not only three- but also four-dimensional
information (Aﬂalo & Graziano 2008). In this virtual-reality
study, in addition to the usual three spatial dimensions, a
fourth dimension was speciﬁed by the “hot” and “cold”
directions such that turns in the maze could be forward/
back, left/ right, up/down or hot/cold, and the usual trigonometric rules speciﬁed how “movements” in the fourth (hotcold) dimension related to movements in the other three.
Participants were required to path integrate by completing
a multi-segment trajectory through the maze and then
pointing back to the start. They eventually (after extensive
practice) reached a level of performance exceeding that
which they could have achieved using three-dimensional
reasoning alone. This study is interesting because it is
highly unlikely that any animals, including humans, have
evolved the capacity to form an integrated four-dimensional cognitive map, and so the subjects’ performance
suggests that it is possible to navigate reasonably well
using a metrically lower-dimensional representation than
the space itself. The question, then, is whether one can in
fact navigate quite well in three dimensions using only a
two-dimensional cognitive map. We return to this point
in the next section.
4. Neurobiological studies in three dimensions
So far we have reviewed behavioural research exploring
three-dimensional navigation and seen clear evidence that
3D information is used by animals and humans, although

the exact nature of this use remains unclear. A parallel
line of work has involved recordings from neurons that
are involved in spatial representation. This approach has
the advantage that it is possible to look at the sensory
encoding directly and make ﬁne-grained inferences about
how spatial information is integrated. While most of this
work has hitherto focused on ﬂat, two-dimensional environments, studies of three-dimensional encoding are beginning to increase in number. Here, we shall ﬁrst brieﬂy
describe the basis of the brain’s spatial representation of
two-dimensional space, and then consider, based on preliminary ﬁndings, how information from a third dimension
is (or might be) integrated.
The core component of the mammalian place representation comprises the hippocampal place cells, ﬁrst identiﬁed by O’Keefe and colleagues (O’Keefe & Dostrovsky
1971), which ﬁre in focal regions of the environment. In
a typical small enclosure in a laboratory, each place cell
has one or two, or sometimes several, unique locations in
which it will tend to ﬁre, producing patches of activity
known as place ﬁelds (Fig. 7A). Place cells have therefore
long been considered to represent some kind of marker
for location. Several decades of work since place cells
were ﬁrst discovered have shown that the cells respond
not to raw sensory inputs from the environment such as
focal odours, or visual snapshots, but rather, to higherorder sensory stimuli that have been extracted from the
lower-order sensory data – examples include landmarks,
boundaries, and contextual cues such as the colour or
odour of the environment (for a review, see Jeffery 2007;
Moser et al. 2008).
For any agent (including a place cell) to determine its
location, it needs to be provided with information about
direction and distance in the environment. Directional
information reaches place cells via the head direction
system (Taube 2007; Taube et al. 1990a), which is a set
of structures in areas surrounding the hippocampus
whose neurons are selectively sensitive to the direction in
which the animal’s head is pointing (Fig. 7B). Head direction (HD) cells do not encode direction in absolute geocentric coordinates; rather, they seem to use local
reference frames, determined by visual (or possibly also
tactile) cues in the immediate surround. This is shown by
the now well-established ﬁnding that rotation of a single
polarizing landmark in an otherwise unpolarized environment (such as a circular arena) will cause the HD cells to
rotate their ﬁring directions by almost the same amount
(Goodridge et al. 1998; Taube et al. 1990b). Interestingly,
however, there is almost always a degree of under-rotation
in response to a landmark rotation. This is thought to be
due to the inﬂuence of the prevailing “internal” direction
sense, sustained by processing of self-motion cues such as
vestibular, proprioceptive, and motor signals to motion.
The inﬂuence of these cues can be revealed by removing a
single polarizing landmark altogether – the HD cells will
maintain their previous ﬁring directions for several minutes,
although they will eventually drift (Goodridge et al. 1998).
The internal (sometimes called idiothetic) self-motion
cues provide a means of stitching together the directional
orientations of adjacent regions of an environment so that
they are concordant. This was ﬁrst shown by Taube and
Burton (1995), and replicated by Dudchenko and Zinyuk
(2005). However, although there is this tendency for the
cells to adopt similar ﬁring directions in adjacent
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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Figure 7. Firing patterns of the three principal spatial cell types. (a) Firing of a place cell, as seen from an overhead camera as a rat
forages in a 1 meter square environment. The action potentials (“spikes”) of the cell are shown as spots, and the cumulative path of
the rat over the course of the trial is shown as a wavy line. Note that the spikes are clustered towards the South–East region of the
box, forming a “place ﬁeld” of about 40 cm across. (b) Firing of a head direction cell, recorded as a rat explored an environment.
Here, the heading direction of the cell is shown on the x-axis and the ﬁring rate on the y-axis. Note that the ﬁring intensiﬁes
dramatically when the animal’s head faces in a particular direction. The cell is mostly silent otherwise. (c) Firing of a grid cell (from
Hafting et al. 2005), depicted as for the place cell in (a). Observe that the grid cell produces multiple ﬁring ﬁelds in a regularly
spaced array. Adapted from Jeffery and Burgess (2006).

environments, especially if the animal self-locomoted
between them, this is not absolute and cells may have discordant directions, ﬂipping from one direction to the other
as the animal transitions from one environment to the next
(Dudchenko & Zinyuk 2005). This tendency for HD cells
to treat complex environments as multiple local fragments
is one that we will return to later.
The source of distance information to place cells is
thought to lie, at least partly, in the grid cells, which are
neurons in the neighbouring entorhinal cortex that
produce multiple place ﬁelds that are evenly spaced in a
grid-like array, spread across the surface of the environment (Hafting et al. 2005; for review, see Moser &
Moser 2008) (Fig. 7c). The pattern formed by the ﬁelds
is of the type known as hexagonal close-packed, which is
the most compact way of tiling a plane with circles.
Grid cell grids always maintain a constant orientation for
a given environment (Hafting et al. 2005), suggesting a
directional inﬂuence that probably comes from the headdirection system, as suggested by the ﬁnding that the
same manipulations that cause HD ﬁring directions to
rotate also cause grids to rotate. Indeed, many grid cells
are themselves also HD cells, producing their spikes only
when the rat is facing in a particular direction (Sargolini
et al. 2006). More interesting, however, is the inﬂuence
of odometric (distance-related) cues on grid cells.
Because the distance between each ﬁring ﬁeld and its
immediate neighbours is constant for a given cell, the
grid cell signal can theoretically act as a distance measure
for place cells, and it is assumed that this is what they are
for (Jeffery & Burgess 2006) though this has yet to be
proven. The source of distance information to the grid
cells themselves remains unknown. It is likely that some
of the signals are self-motion related, arising from the
motor and sensory systems involved in commanding,
executing, and then detecting movement through space.
They may also be static landmark-related distance signals –
this is shown by the ﬁnding that subtly rescaling an
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environment can cause a partial rescaling of the grid
array in the rescaled dimension (Barry et al. 2007), indicating environmental inﬂuences on the grid metric. It seems
that when an animal enters a new environment, an arbitrary
grid pattern is laid down, oriented by the (also arbitrary)
HD signal. This pattern is then “attached” to that environment by learning processes, so that when the animal reenters the (now familiar) environment, the same HD cell
orientation, and same grid orientation and location, can
be reinstated.
Given these basic building blocks of the mammalian
spatial representation, we turn now to the question of
how these systems may cope with movement in the vertical
domain, using the same categories as previously: slope,
multilayer environments, and volumetric spaces.
4.1. Neural processing of verticality cues

The simplest form of three-dimensional processing is
detection of the vertical axis. Verticality cues are those
that signal the direction of gravity, or equivalently, the horizontal plane, which is deﬁned by gravity. The brain can
process both static and dynamic verticality cues: Static
information comprises detection of the gravitational axis,
or detection of slope of the terrain underfoot, while
dynamic information relates to linear and angular movements through space and includes factors such as effort.
Both static and dynamic processes depend largely on
the vestibular apparatus in the inner ear (Angelaki &
Cullen 2008) and also on a second set of gravity detectors
(graviceptors) located in the trunk (Mittelstaedt 1998).
Detection of the vertical depends on integration of vestibular cues, together with those from the visual world and
also from proprioceptive cues to head and body alignment
(Angelaki et al. 1999; Merfeld et al. 1993; Merfeld & Zupan
2002).
The vestibular apparatus is critical for the processing not
only of gravity but also of movement-related inertial three-
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Figure 8. The vestibular apparatus in the human brain. (a) Diagram showing the relationship of the vestibular apparatus to the external
ear and skull. (b) Close-up of the vestibular organ showing the detectors for linear acceleration (the otolith organs – comprising the utricle
and saccule) and the detectors for angular acceleration (the semicircular canals, one in each plane). (Taken from: http://www.nasa.gov/
audience/forstudents/9-12/features/F_Human_Vestibular_System_in_Space.html) Source: NASA.

dimensional spatial cues. The relationship of the components of the vestibular apparatus is shown in Figure 8a,
while the close-up in Figure 8b shows these core components: the otolith organs, of which there are two – the
utricle and the saccule – and the semicircular canals. The
otolith organs detect linear acceleration (including
gravity, which is a form of acceleration) by means of specialized sensory epithelium. In the utricle the epithelial layer is
oriented approximately horizontally and primarily detects
earth-horizontal acceleration, and in the saccule it is
oriented approximately vertically and primarily detects vertical acceleration/gravity. The two otolith organs work
together to detect head tilt. However, because gravity
is itself a vertical acceleration, there is an ambiguity
concerning how much of the signal is generated by
movement and how much by gravity – this “tilt-translation
ambiguity” appears to be resolved by means of the semicircular canals (Angelaki & Cullen 2008). These are
three orthogonal ﬂuid-ﬁlled canals oriented in the three
cardinal planes, one horizontal and two vertical, which
collectively can detect angular head movement in any
rotational plane.
Neural encoding of direction in the vertical plane (tilt,
pitch, roll, etc.) is not yet well understood. Head direction
cells have been examined in rats locomoting on a vertical
plane, and at various degrees of head pitch, to see
whether the cells encode vertical as well as horizontal direction. Stackman and Taube (1998) found pitch-sensitive
cells in the lateral mammillary nuclei (LMN). However,
these were not true volumetric head direction cells,
because their activity was not at all related to horizontal
heading direction. Nor did they correspond to the vertical-plane equivalent of HD cells: Most of the observed
cells had pitch preferences clustered around the almost-vertical, suggesting that these cells were doing something
different from simply providing a vertical counterpart of
the horizontal direction signal. By contrast, the HD cells in
LMN were insensitive to pitch, and their ﬁring was uniformly distributed in all directions around the horizontal
plane. Thus, vertical and horizontal directions appear to be
separately and differently represented in this structure.

In a more formal test of vertical directional encoding,
Stackman et al. (2000) recorded HD cells as rats climbed
moveable wire mesh ladders placed vertically on the sides
of a cylinder. When the ladder was placed at an angular
position corresponding to the cell’s preferred ﬁring direction, the cell continued to ﬁre as the animal climbed the
ladder, but did not ﬁre as the animal climbed down
again. Conversely, when the ladder was placed on the
opposite side of the cylinder, the reverse occurred: now
the cell remained silent as the animal climbed up, but
started ﬁring as the animal climbed down. This suggests
that perhaps the cells were treating the plane of the wall
in the same way that they usually treat the plane of the
ﬂoor. Subsequently, Calton and Taube (2005) showed
that HD cells ﬁred on the walls of an enclosure in a
manner concordant with the ﬁring on the ﬂoor, and also
informally observed that the ﬁring rate seemed to decrease
in the usual manner when the rat’s head deviated from the
vertical preferred ﬁring direction. This observation was
conﬁrmed in a follow-up experiment in which rats navigated in a spiral trajectory on a surface that was either horizontal or else vertically aligned in each of the four cardinal
orientations (Taube et al. 2013). In the vertical conditions,
the cells showed preferred ﬁring directions on the vertical
surface in the way that they usually do on a horizontal
surface. When the vertical spiral was rotated, the cells
switched to a local reference frame and maintained their
constant preferred ﬁring directions with respect to the
surface.
What are we to make of these ﬁndings? In the Calton
and Taube (2005) experiment, it appears that the HD
cells seemed to be acting as if the walls were an extension
of the ﬂoor – in other words, as if the pitch transformation,
when the rat transitioned from horizontal to vertical, had
never happened. A possible conclusion is that HD cells
are insensitive to pitch, which accords with the LMN ﬁndings of Stackman and Taube (1998). This has implications
for how three-dimensional space might be encoded and
the limitations thereof, which we return to in the ﬁnal
section. In the spiral experiment described by Taube
(2005), it further appears that the reference frame provided
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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by the locomotor surface became entirely disconnected
from the room reference frame – when the rat was clinging
to the vertical surface, the cells became insensitive to
the rotations in the azimuthal plane that would normally
modulate their ﬁring on a horizontal plane. The idea of
local reference frames is one that we will also come back
to later.
The Calton and Taube (2005) experiment additionally
replicated an observation made in microgravity, which is
that head direction cells lose their directional speciﬁcity,
or are greatly degraded, during inverted locomotion on
the ceiling (Taube et al. 2004). In another study, head
direction cells were monitored while animals were held
by the experimenter and rotated by 360 degrees (relative
to the horizontal plane) in the upright and in the inverted
positions, as well as by 180 degrees in the vertical plane
(Shinder & Taube 2010). Although the animal was
restrained, head direction cells displayed clear directionality in the upright and vertical positions, and no directionality in the inverted position. Additionally, directionality in
the vertical position was apparent until the animal was
almost completely inverted. These ﬁndings conﬁrm those
of the previous studies (Calton & Taube 2005; Taube
et al. 2004), that loss of HD cell directionality is a feature
of the inverted position, at least in rats.
This breakdown in signalling may have arisen from an
inability of the HD cells to reconcile visual evidence for
the 180 degree heading-reversal with the absence of a
180 degree rotation in the plane to which they are sensitive
(the yaw plane). This ﬁnding is consistent with a recent
behavioural study by Valerio et al. (2010). Here, rats
were trained to locomote while clinging upside-down to
the underside of a circular arena, in order to ﬁnd an
escape hole. Animals were able to learn ﬁxed routes to
the hole but could not learn to navigate ﬂexibly in a
mapping-like way, suggesting that they had failed to form
a spatial representation of the layout of the arena. Taking
these ﬁndings together, then, it appears that the rodent
cognitive mapping system is not able to function equally
well at all possible orientations of the animal.
What about place and grid cells in vertical space? Processing of the vertical in these neurons has been explored in a
recent study by Hayman et al. (2011). They used two
environments: a vertical climbing wall (the pegboard),
and a helix (Fig. 9). In both environments, place and grid
cells produced vertically elongated ﬁelds, with grid ﬁelds
being more elongated than place ﬁelds, thus appearing
stripe-like (Fig. 9E). Hence, although elevation was
encoded, its representation was not as ﬁne-grained as the
horizontal representation. Furthermore, the absence of
periodic grid ﬁring in the vertical dimension suggests that
grid cell odometry was not operating in the same way as
it does on the horizontal plane.
One possible explanation is that grid cells do encode the
vertical axis, but at a coarser scale, such that the periodicity
is not evident in these spatially restricted environments. If
so, then the scale or accuracy of the cognitive map, at least
in the rat, may be different in horizontal versus vertical
dimensions, possibly reﬂecting the differential encoding
requirements for animals that are essentially surface-dwelling. An alternative possibility, explored below, is that while
horizontal space is encoded metrically, vertical space is
perhaps encoded by a different mechanism, possibly even
a non-grid-cell-dependent one. Note that because the
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rats remained horizontally oriented during climbing, it is
also possible that it is not the horizontal plane so much as
the current plane of locomotion that is represented metrically, while the dimension normal to this plane (the dorsoventral dimension with respect to the animal) is represented by some other means. Indeed, given the HD
cell data discussed above, this alternative seems not only
possible but likely. Thus, if the rats had been vertically
oriented in these experiments, perhaps ﬁelds would have
had a more typical, hexagonal pattern.
It is clear from the foregoing that much remains to be
determined about vertical processing in the navigation
system – if there is a vertical HD–cell compass system analogous to the one that has been characterized for the horizontal plane, then it has yet to be found and, if elevation is
metrically encoded, the site of this encoding is also
unknown. The cells that might have been expected to
perform these functions – head direction, place, and grid
cells – do not seem to treat elevation in the same way as
they treat horizontal space, which argues against the likelihood that the mammalian brain, at least, constructs a truly
integrated volumetric map.
We turn now to the question of what is known about the
use of three-dimensional cues in navigationally relevant
computations – processing of slopes, processing of multilayer environments, and processing of movement in volumetric space.

4.2. Neural encoding of a sloping surface

Investigation of neural encoding of non-horizontal surfaces
is only in the early stages, but preliminary studies have been
undertaken in both the presence and the absence of
gravity. In normal gravity conditions, a slope is characterized by its steepness with respect to earth-horizontal,
which provides important constraints on path integration.
If the distance between a start location and a goal includes
a hill, additional surface ground has to be travelled to
achieve the same straight-line distance (i.e., that of ﬂat
ground). Furthermore, routes containing slopes require
more energy to traverse than do routes without slopes,
requiring a navigator to trade off distance against effort in
undulating terrain. Therefore, one might imagine that
slope should be incorporated into the cognitive map, and
neural studies allow for an investigation of this issue that
is not feasible with behavioural studies alone.
The effect of terrain slope has been explored for place
cells but not yet for grid cells. The earliest place cell
study, by Knierim and McNaughton (2001), investigated
whether place ﬁelds would be modulated by the tilt of a
rectangular track. A priori, one possible outcome of this
experiment was that place ﬁelds would expand and contract
as the tilted environment moved through intrinsically
three-dimensional, ovoid place ﬁelds. However, ﬁelds
that were preserved following the manipulation did not
change their size, and many place cells altered their ﬁring
altogether on the track, evidently treating the whole tilted
track as different from the ﬂat track. One interpretation
of these ﬁndings is that the track remained the predominant frame of reference (the “horizontal” from the perspective of the place cells), and that the tilt was signalled by the
switching on and off of ﬁelds, rather than by parametric
changes in place ﬁeld morphology.
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Figure 9. Adapted from Hayman et al. (2011). (a) Photograph of the helical maze. Rats climbed up and down either ﬁve or six coils of
the maze, collecting food reward at the top and bottom, while either place cells or grid cells were recorded. (b) Left – The ﬁring pattern of
a place cell (top, spikes in blue) and a grid cell (bottom, spikes in red), as seen from the overhead camera. The path of the rat is shown in
grey. The place cell has one main ﬁeld with a few spikes in a second region, and the grid cell has three ﬁelds. Right - the same data shown
as a heat plot, for clarity (red = maximum ﬁring, blue = zero ﬁring). (c) The same data as in (b) but shown as a ﬁring rate histogram, as if
viewed from the side with the coils unwound into a linear strip. The single place ﬁeld in (b) can be seen here to repeat on all of the coils, as
if the cell is not discriminating elevation, but only horizontal coordinates. The grid cell, similarly, repeats its ﬁring ﬁelds on all the coils. (d)
Photograph of the pegboard, studded with wooden pegs that allowed the rat to forage over a large vertical plane. (e) Left – The ﬁring
pattern of a place cell (top, spikes in blue) and a grid cell (bottom, spikes in red) as seen from a horizontally aimed camera facing the
pegboard. The place cell produced a single ﬁring ﬁeld, but this was elongated in the vertical dimension. The grid cell produced
vertically aligned stripes, quite different from the usual grid-like pattern seen in Fig. 8c. Right – the same data as a heat plot.

This study also showed that slope could be used as an
orienting cue: In rotations of the tilted track, cells were
more likely to be oriented by the track (as opposed to the
plethora of distal cues) than in rotations of the ﬂat track.
This observation was replicated in a subsequent study by
Jeffery et al. (2006), who found that place cells used the
30-degree slope of a square open arena as an orienting cue
after rotations of the arena, and preferred the slope to local
olfactory cues. Presumably, because the cells all reoriented
together, the effect was mediated via an effect on the head
direction system. Place cells have also been recorded from
bats crawling on a near-vertical (70-degree tilt) open-ﬁeld

arena (Ulanovsky & Moss 2007). Firing ﬁelds were similar
to rodent place ﬁelds on a horizontal surface, a pattern that
is consistent with the ﬁelds using the surface of the environment as their reference plane (because if earth-horizontal
were the reference, then ﬁelds should have been elongated
along the direction of the slope, as in the Hayman et al.
[2011] experiment) (see Fig. 9e).
Grid cells have not yet been recorded on a slope. The
pattern they produce will be informative, because their
odometric properties will allow us to answer the question
of whether the metric properties of place ﬁelds in
horizontal environments arise from distances computed
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5

537

Jeffery et al.: Navigating in a three-dimensional world
in earth-horizontal or with respect to environment surface.
The results discussed above lead us to predict the latter.
Only one place cell study has been undertaken in the
absence of gravity, in an intriguing experiment by
Knierim and colleagues, conducted on the Neurolab
Space Shuttle mission of 1998 (Knierim et al. 2000;
2003). Rats were implanted with microelectrodes for
place cell recording, and familiarized with running on a rectangular track on Earth, before being carried in the shuttle
into space. Under microgravity conditions in space, the
animals were then allowed to run on a 3D track, the
“Escher staircase,” which bends through three-dimensional
space such that three consecutive right-angle turns in the
yaw plane of the animal, interspersed with three pitch
rotations, leads the animal back to its starting point
(Fig. 10a). The question was whether the cells could lay
down stable place ﬁelds on the track, given that the visual
cues might have conﬂicted with the path integration
signal if the path integrator could not process the 3D
turns. On the rats’ ﬁrst exposure to the environment on
ﬂight day 4, the cells showed somewhat inconsistent patterns, with those from one rat showing degraded spatial
ﬁring, those from a second rat showing a tendency to
repeat their (also degraded) ﬁring ﬁelds on each segment
of the track, and those from a third looking like normal
place ﬁelds. By the second recording session, on ﬂight
day 9, place ﬁelds from the ﬁrst two rats had gained
normal-looking properties, with stable place ﬁelds
(Fig. 10b). This suggests either that the path integrator
could adapt to the unusual conditions and integrate the
yaw and pitch rotations, or else that the visual cues
allowed the construction of multiple independent planar
representations of each segment of the track.
It will be important to answer the question of which of
these explanations is correct. If the cells could integrate
turns in three dimensions, this would imply a highly sophisticated ability of the head direction system to co-ordinate
turns in the three axes of rotation, which – given that they

respond mainly to yaw – suggests an integrative process
outside the HD cells themselves.
4.3. Neural encoding of multilayer environments

Very little work has examined neural encoding of space in
multilayer environments, which is unfortunate given the
theoretical importance of this issue, discussed earlier.
Stackman et al. (2000) compared the ﬁring of HD cells
between the ﬂoor of a cylinder and an annular mezzanine
(“annulus”) located 74 cm above the ﬂoor, and found a
30% increase in ﬁring rate on the annulus. However, the
wire-mesh studies of Stackman et al. (2000) and Calton
and Taube (2005) did not report increases in ﬁring rate
as animals climbed the walls, so the height effect may
perhaps have been due to arousal or anxiety on the
annulus. Directional ﬁring preferences were shifted slightly
on the upper level with respect to the lower, which may
have resulted from transient slight disorientation during
the climb.
There is also little work on place and grid cells in multilayer environments. Fenton et al. (2008) recorded place
cells in a large environment, the walls of which supported
stairs leading to an upper ledge housing reward drinking
ports. They found that, frequently, ﬁelds that were present
on the ﬂoor were also present on the corresponding part
of the stairs/ledge. This could mean that either the ﬁelds
were three-dimensional and extended from the ﬂoor to the
staircase, or else that the cells were only responding to horizontal coordinates and ignoring the vertical. Results from the
Hayman et al. (2011) experiment on the helical track support
the latter interpretation, in that the data showed that ﬁring
tended to repeat on each successive coil (Fig. 9, b and c).
There was modulation of ﬁring rate across the coils, which
is not inconsistent with the notion that the ﬁelds may have
been intrinsically three-dimensional (albeit very elongated
in the vertical dimension). However, it could also simply
be rate modulation of the same ﬁeld on each coil. Rate

Figure 10. (a) The “Escher staircase” track, on which rats ran repeated laps while place ﬁelds were recorded. (b) The ﬁring ﬁeld of a
place cell, showing a consistent position on the track, indicating either the use of visual cues or of three-dimensional path integration
(or both) to position the ﬁeld. (From Knierim et al. [2000] with permission.)
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modulation of place ﬁelds has been seen in other situations
(Leutgeb et al. 2004) and suggests an inﬂuence of some
other cues (in this case, elevation) on ﬁeld production.
Grid cells in the Hayman et al. experiment showed a
similar pattern, with ﬁeld location repeating from one coil
to the next, but also (as with the place cells) a slight
degree of rate modulation – something, interestingly, that
has not been reported in other experiments on grid cells.
The implication of these ﬁndings is that the system was
treating the environment as a stack of horizontal planes,
rather than as an integrated three-dimensional space.
However, the helical track experiment is not a true test
of multilayered environment representation, because
there was no discrete boundary between layers as there is
in, say, a multi-storey building. Also, the stereotypical
nature of the route the animals ran might have precluded
the formation of independent maps for each layer. A
truly multi-storey apparatus will be required to resolve
this issue.
4.4. Neural encoding of a volumetric space

The ﬁnal and most important question concerning threedimensional spatial encoding is whether there is metric
encoding of volumetric space. As with multilayer environments, there have been no studies done to date on neural
responses to free movement through true volumetric
spaces, and so the answer to this question remains open.
However, it is interesting to speculate about what kinds
of evidence we should look for.

A volumetric map requires direction and distance to be
calculated for both the horizontal and vertical dimensions.
We have already seen that there is no evidence as yet for
three-dimensional head direction cells, at least in rodents;
so either there are three-dimensional HD cells in some
other region of the brain, or else the cognitive map has a
way of combining the planar signal from the classic HD
areas together with pitch or elevation information,
perhaps from the lateral mammillary nuclei.
What about distance in three dimensions? Because grid
cells seem to provide the odometric representation for
horizontal distance by virtue of their regularly spaced grid
ﬁelds, we could predict that the periodicity observed in
the horizontal dimension might be part of a three-dimensional, lattice-like arrangement of spherical ﬁelds. There
are two ways of close-packing spheres in a volume,
termed hexagonal and face-centered cubic, respectively
(Fig. 11a and b). Since we already know that the grid
array on the horizontal plane is hexagonal close-packed, if
either of these volumetric arrangements were to pertain,
then we would predict it should be the hexagonal form.
Although no recordings have yet been made of grids in a
volumetric space, the experiment by Hayman et al. (2011)
of grids recorded on a vertical plane might have been
expected to reveal evidence of periodicity in the vertical
dimension, akin to what one would ﬁnd by transecting a
close-packed volume (Fig. 11c). However, that experiment
found that the grid ﬁelds formed stripes on the vertical
surface, implying instead that the true underlying pattern
of grids in a volumetric space might be in the form of

Figure 11. The two ways of efﬁciently ﬁlling a volumetric space with spheres: (a) Hexagonal close-packing, in which the spheres on each
layer are planar hexagonal close-packed, and offset between one layer and the next and (b) Face-centered cubic, in which the spheres on
each layer are in a square arrangement, with each sphere in a given layer nestling in the dip formed by four of those in the layers on either
side. (c) The result of transecting a three-dimensional hexagonal close-packed array is a regular set of circles. (d) The result of transecting
a set of horizontally hexagonal close-packed columns is stripes, resembling the grid cell pattern shown in Figure 9e.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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hexagonal close-packed columns (Fig. 11c). Whether this
would also hold true for animals moving in an unconstrained way through the space remains to be seen. It is
also possible that there is periodicity in the vertical dimension, but at a much greater scale than could be seen in a
small laboratory setting.
5. Is the cognitive map bicoded?
At the beginning of this article we reviewed the encoding
schemes that might exist to map three-dimensional space,
highlighting three different mapping schemes that vary in
their use of elevation information (see Fig. 1). Based on
the foregoing review of behavioural and neurobiological
studies, we return now to the question of map types.
Below, we argue that the data collected to date favour a
metrically planar map of the form we have termed
“bicoded” – that is, using a different encoding scheme for
horizontal than for vertical space. Indeed, we go a step
further and suggest that the schemes are referenced not
to horizontal and vertical, but, more generally, to the
plane of locomotion (horizontal in the animal’s canonical
orientation) versus the axis orthogonal to this.
First, however, let us consider the alternative hypotheses
for the possible structure of the cognitive map. These are
(1) that the map is a surface map, lacking information
about vertical travel, or (2) that it is a fully integrated volumetric map. It is unlikely that the cognitive map could be a
surface map, because the evidence reviewed suggests that
almost all animals investigated show some processing
of vertical space. A volumetric map, by contrast, is metric
(i.e., distances and directions are explicitly encoded) in all
three dimensions. No studies have yet been undertaken
in animals that can move freely in all three dimensions
(such as those that ﬂy or swim), and it may be that
through evolution and/or through developmental experience, a fully integrated volumetric map may have formed
in such animals. In particular, animals that have to solve
three-dimensional spatial problems for which there is no
planar approximation, such as those that have to path integrate across a volumetric space like the ocean, may be
expected to possess a volumetric cognitive map if such a
thing exists. Studies in birds, ﬁsh, or swimming and ﬂying
mammals such as cetaceans or bats have the potential to
reveal whether there are spatial metric computations for
travel in all three dimensions, and also whether these are
integrated.
If the cognitive map in animals that have a truly threedimensional ecology is volumetric, we might expect to discover in them a new class of head direction cells that
encode the vertical plane in the same way that the rodent
HD cells discovered to date encode the horizontal plane.
Alternatively, these animals might even possess HD cells
that point uniquely to positions in three-dimensional
space (i.e., that have tuning curves restricted in all three
dimensions). We might also expect to see spherical grid
cell grids in a 3D hexagonal close-packed array like those
shown in Figure 11a and b.
5.1. Arguments for a bicoded cognitive map

The above possibilities concerning 3D maps notwithstanding, we suggest here that even ecologically three540
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dimensional animals may turn out to form planar, or
quasi-planar, cognitive maps. Such animals often live in
environments that are relatively more extended horizontally than vertically, making a planar map useful (particularly as almost all animals maintain a canonical body
orientation with respect to gravity). Also, as discussed
below, encoding three dimensions poses considerable technical challenges for a compass system. Indeed, there is little
evidence for such integrated encoding in the species that
have been studied so far. Head direction cells evidently
operate in a plane rather than a volume, and grid cells
are not periodic in the vertical dimension (or perhaps not
in the dimension perpendicular to the animal’s body plane).
In a bicoded map, there is a spatially metric representation of a reference plane – usually the horizontal
plane – and a non-metric, or at least differently metricized,
representation for the axis perpendicular to this plane. In
the geographical example given earlier (Fig. 1c), the nonspatial indicator of distance was colour, which varies as a
function of elevation but from which elevation cannot be
extracted without a key. Loosely speaking, it is as if the
non-metric variable conveys a coarse signal along the
lines of “high” or “very high,” but does not contain explicit
information about distance that could enter into a trigonometric calculation.
Obviously, the cognitive map does not use colour as its
non-metric variable, but it could plausibly use an analogous
signal, which we call here, for want of a better word, “contextual” – that is, information that pertains to a space but
need not itself contain distance or direction information.
A real-world example of a contextual elevation cue might
be hydrostatic pressure, which Burt de Perera and colleagues put forward as a possible mechanism for ﬁsh to
localize themselves in the vertical axis (Burt de Perera
et al. 2005). For terrestrial animals, it could be visual or
kinaesthetic cues to ascent/descent, or aspects of the
visual panorama; for ﬂying animals, it could be depth
cues from stereopsis or motion parallax, or perhaps olfactory gradients in the atmosphere.
Our hypothesis, then, is that the cognitive map is such a
bicoded map – it is metric in a given plane (the plane of
locomotion), and contextually modulated orthogonal to
this. It is possible that contextual information concerning
elevation could be processed by brain areas that are
located outside the currently established navigation circuitry, although it is likely that these signals would interact at
some point.
What evidence supports this bicoding view? Existing behavioural data from a number of studies, reviewed earlier,
suggest a potential separation between horizontal and vertical dimensions. However, this does not prove that the
encoding itself is different, merely that execution of navigational plans is different. Theoretically, this could be
because the energetic costs of moving vertically are taken
into account when planning, even if the planning is based
on a fundamentally volumetric, three-dimensional map.
The neural data, however, tell a more revealing story. The
observation that head direction cells appear to use the
plane of locomotion as a local reference (Stackman et al.
2000) implies that the directional signal for the vertical
plane (or rather, the plane normal to locomotion) must lie
elsewhere, in an as yet undiscovered region. Furthermore,
the ﬁnding that grid and place cells have different metric
properties in the vertical dimension, at least for horizontally
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oriented body posture, implies that odometry does not take
place equally in all three dimensions – the map is anisotropic
(Hayman et al. 2011).
Note that it remains to be determined experimentally
whether there is something special about the horizontal
plane in the cognitive map, or whether it is simply that
gravity primarily orients the locomotor plane and it is
this plane that is metrically encoded. Recordings of
grid cells on steeply sloping surfaces may answer this
question.
A bicoded scheme seems suboptimal, but in fact a
surface-travelling animal could do quite well with such a
map, because it could use the metrically encoded locomotor plane to calculate the directions needed for travel,
and the topography of the landscape would constrain the
animal to be at the correct elevation for that position.
Although a bicoded map could not be used for path integration in volumetric space, an animal could divide the
navigational task into two parts: It could ﬁrst calculate the
horizontal trajectory and then ascend to the correct
elevation (as indicated by the contextual gradient), or vice
versa – or both simultaneously but in separate computational circuits. Indeed, the ﬁndings of Grobéty and
Schenk (1992a) seem to suggest that this is indeed what
happens, at least in rats. However, in the case where “horizontal” is not true earth-horizontal, but lies on a slope, then
it would be advantageous for the map to encode, in some
form, information about that slope, as this would affect
the energy costs of navigational routes involving that
surface. Hence, there may be some mechanism for encoding the angle of a given planar fragment with respect to
earth-horizontal.
A bicoded map has a planar metric reference, but as
noted earlier, the real world is far from planar. How
could a bicoded map be used on undulating topology?
One possibility is that an undulating surface could be
encoded as a manifold – not a single uniﬁed map, but a

mosaic of contiguous map fragments. In such a scheme,
each fragment would comprise a local reference frame
deﬁned by a reference plane (which would be horizontal
on a horizontal surface, but need not be) and an axis orthogonal to this (which would correspond to the gravitationally
deﬁned vertical for an animal locomoting in its canonical
orientation on a horizontal surface). Figure 12 shows an
illustrative example of such a mosaicized representation.
In the example, a rat, in a fairly short excursion, moves
across the ground from a rock to a tree, up the trunk of
the tree, and out onto a branch – each of these planes
being orthogonal to the one before. To maintain orientation the animal must switch from a planar map referenced to the ground, to a new one referenced to the tree
trunk, to a third referenced to the branch.
If the planar fragments of the cognitive map need not be
oriented horizontally, then how does the animal process the
vertical axis, which remains a special, and important, reference due to the effects of gravity? To form an integrated
map of large-scale space using mosaic fragments, there
also should be some means of associating the local reference frames, both to one another (to enable navigation
between fragments) and to earth-horizontal (to enable
appropriate energy and other gravity-related calculations
to be made). A plausible means of achieving this could be
the vestibular system, which tracks changes in orientation
via the semi-circular canals and could therefore provide
some means of linking the map fragments together at, so
to speak, their “edges.” With such a scheme it would be possible to use heuristic methods to compute, for example,
approximate shortcuts between map fragments. For more
sophisticated navigation, however, it would be preferable
to weld fragments together into a larger, unitary frame
that would allow for precise metric computations across
the space. It may be that such a reference frame adaptation
could occur with experience. In fact, the head direction cell
studies of Stackman et al. (2000), in which reference frames

Figure 12. Hypothetical structure of the cognitive map in a dimensionally complex environment. The map is assumed to be metric in
the plane of locomotion, which is the ground for the space between the rock and the tree, the vertical trunk as the animal climbs, and the
horizontal branch. The shading gradient represents the nonmetric encoding, which conveys coarse information about distance in the
plane orthogonal to the locomotor plane, which is encoded differently from the precise metric of the locomotor plane.
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could be local to the surface or more globally referenced to
the surrounding room, support the possibility of such experience-dependent plasticity.
The possibility that the cognitive map is formed of a
mosaic of locally planar fragments is consistent with the
sudden reorientations experienced by humans and other
animals as they transition from one region of the environment to the next (Wang & Spelke 2002). It is a commonplace experience of urban navigators when taking an
unfamiliar route between two locally familiar places, for
example, that a sudden, almost dizzying re-alignment of
reference frames occurs across the interface between the
two regions. This subjective experience may reﬂect the
sudden reorientation of head direction cells that occurs
when animals cross between local connected regions
having different head direction cell orientations (Dudchenko & Zinyuk 2005; Taube & Burton 1995; Zugaro
et al. 2003). The reorientation episodes experienced by
astronauts in conditions of microgravity may have a
similar underlying cause (Oman 2007; See Fig. 12.)
What about subjects that habitually navigate in volumetric spaces, including animals such as ﬁsh, birds and
bats, and also human divers, aviators and astronauts? Do
they use a surface map too? In these environments, a
plane-referenced map would seem much less useful.
However, evidence from microgravity environment
studies shows that even in a weightless environment, astronauts tend to ﬁnd a reference plane to serve as a local
“ﬂoor” (Oman 2007). This is usually the surface beneath
their feet, but if they drift too far away from this “ﬂoor”
and too far toward the “ceiling,” or switch visual attention,
they frequently report visual reorientation illusions (VRIs),
where surfaces abruptly and unexpectedly exchange
identity (Oman et al. 1986), testifying to the salience of
the reference plane. Volume-travelling animals tend to
maintain a constant body posture with respect to earthhorizontal and so they, too, may use a planar map for navigating, even though their movement in space is
unconstrained.
5.2. Why would animals have a metrically planar map?

Why would animal cognitive maps be (quasi-)planar? On
the face of it, this seems maladaptive, because a planar
map, even a bicoded one, has inherently less information
than a fully integrated volumetric one.
The ﬁrst possibility is an ontogenetic one: that formation
of the map during development is constrained by experience during infancy, and the animals that have been investigated to date have been, mainly for technical reasons,
those species that are primarily surface-dwelling. An exception is ﬁsh, in which we also saw a processing separation
between horizontal and vertical space (Holbrook & Burt
de Perera 2009), but this could have been a behavioural
adaptation superimposed on an underlying volumetric
map. It may be that if rats and mice were to be raised
from birth in a volumetric space – for example, in microgravity, or at least in a lattice system in which they could
move in all directions – then we would see true threedimensional HD cells, and path integration behaviour
that seamlessly encompassed all three dimensions.
Second, it may be that phylogenetic development of the
map was so constrained, and therefore, surface-dwelling
animals such as rats, mice, and humans would never
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develop a 3D map even if raised in conditions that would
allow it. In other words, surface-dwellers have either lost
or else never evolved the neurological capacity to fully represent three-dimensional space. However, if we were to
study HD cells in animals that can move freely in all dimensions, then we may ﬁnd three-dimensional HD cells in
these species. Emerging studies in bats may soon answer
this question, we hope. It should be noted, however, that
rats and mice naturally inhabit dimensionally complex
environments, and therefore might be expected to show
integrated three-dimensional encoding if this ever did
evolve in vertebrates.
The third and ﬁnal possibility – and one for which we
argue here – is that a fully 3D map has never evolved in
any species, because of the difﬁculties inherent in stably
encoding an allocentric three-dimensional space using egocentric sensory receptors. A volumetric map requires three
coordinates for position and three for direction. Monitoring
position and travel in such a space is complicated because
the vestibular inputs to the head direction system originate
in the semicircular canals, which are themselves planar
(one aligned in each plane). In order to extract threedimensional heading, the system would need to modulate
the rotational signal from each canal with each of the
other two, and do so dynamically and instantaneously. It
is possible that the cost-beneﬁt ratio of the required extra
processing power is not sufﬁciently great, even for
animals that have a three-dimensional ecological niche.
As we saw in the four-dimension experiment of Aﬂalo
and Graziano (2008), it is possible to navigate quite well
in a space using a lower-dimensional representation,
together with some heuristics, and what applies in four
dimensions may equally well apply in three.
6. Conclusion
To conclude, then, we have reviewed emerging experimental evidence concerning the encoding of three-dimensional
space in animals and humans. We ﬁnd clear evidence of
ability to process information about travel in the vertical
dimension, particularly in the domain of slope intensity
and slope direction. There is also some evidence of the processing of elevation information. Evidence for true volumetric coding is, however, weak, and both behavioural
and neural studies suggest the alternative hypothesis that
the neural representation of space, in a wide variety of
species, is metrically ﬂat (referenced to a plane – usually the
plane of locomotion) and is modulated in the vertical dimension in a non-metric way. We have termed such a map
“bicoded” to reﬂect its essentially anisotropic nature, and we
suggest that a bicoded representation is a universal feature
of vertebrate (and possibly invertebrate) cognitive maps.
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1. Madeleine Verriotis and Aleksandar Jovalekic contributed
equally to this target article.
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2. Note that some other part of the animal’s brain may be able
to deduce, via postural and kinaesthetic mechanisms, the slope
of the terrain. The point is that this information is not integrated
into the metric fabric of the map itself.
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Abstract: In this commentary, I propose that horizontal and vertical
dimensions of space are represented together inside a common metrics
mechanism located in the parietal cortex. Importantly, this network is
also involved in the processing of number magnitudes and environmentdirected actions. Altogether, the evidence suggests that different
magnitude dimensions could be intertwined with the horizontality and
verticality of our world representation.

In their very attractive theory on navigation in a three-dimensional
world, Jeffery et al. propose that our representations of the
environment are based on cognitive maps, which separately integrate horizontal and vertical dimensions of space. However,
knowledge of our environment is also built through our online
motor behaviours, which improve the processing of other associated dimensions to ﬂexibly adapt future responses. From this perspective, it has been suggested that a common metrics mechanism
associated with sensorimotor experience is in charge of processing
different magnitude dimensions, such as space, time, and
numbers (Walsh 2003). My goal in this commentary is to
suggest that a cognitive map based only on three-dimensional
spaces might be an incomplete picture if abstract semantic dimensions are not fully considered. Accordingly, the representation of
number magnitudes can also interact with the representation of
the horizontal and vertical dimensions of space during performed
actions and contribute to a global map of the three-dimensional
world representation.
Evidence for a link among physical space, actions, and numbers
comes from studies that show the association between small
numbers with left and lower parts of space and large numbers
with right and upper parts (Hubbard et al. 2005; Umiltà et al.
2009). For instance, Dehaene et al. (1993) found that small
number processing can prime hand movement to the left part
of space, and large numbers can prime movement to the right
part. Schwarz and Keus (2004) revealed an association between
the vertical dimension and eye movements – that is, downward
and upward saccades were initiated more quickly in response to
small and large numbers, respectively. Interestingly, Loetscher
et al. (2010) found that during a random number generation
task, the leftward and downward adjustment of eye locations predicted that the to-be-spoken number would be smaller than the
last one. Conversely, a prediction of large numbers was made
through the right and upward location of eyes. Altogether, these
number-space associations occur in an automatic way, and magnitude representation could be represented as a number map that
integrates spatial dimensions and actions (Schwarz & Keus

2004; Walsh 2003). At a neurophysiological level, number magnitudes and three-dimensional Cartesian coordinates of external
space are processed in a common parietal area (Hubbard et al.
2005). It is probable that daily life experience, such as adding
more objects to a pile (for the vertical dimension), or cultural
factors, such as the direction of writing (for the horizontal dimension), could partially be in charge of the link between numbers
and spatially directed actions (Gevers et al. 2006). Another
factor could also come from the fact that during infancy, counting
strategies often involve ﬁnger movements, which in turn reinforce
the number-space association through sensorimotor experience
(Butterworth 1999; Michaux et al. 2010).
Based on sensorimotor accounts, Walsh’s ATOM (“A Theory of
Magnitude”; Walsh 2003) proposes that all magnitude dimensions
(e.g., space, time, numbers, and lengths) are processed inside a
common metrics mechanism located in the parietal cortex (Bueti
& Walsh 2009). Note that neurons in the parietal cortex of different animal species, such as cats and macaque monkeys, can also
respond to number processing (Nieder & Miller 2004; Thompson
et al. 1970). Importantly, the core assumption of ATOM is that we
represent space and time through environment-directed actions.
As stated by Walsh (2003), “the inferior parietal cortex reﬂects
the common need for space, time and quantity information to be
used in the sensorimotor transformations that are the main goal
of these areas of cortex” (p. 483). It is worth noting that the parietal
region is also strongly involved in route-based navigation in primates, especially in the integration of self-movement information
(Sato et al. 2006). From an evolutionary viewpoint, one may
wonder why such common metrics mechanisms exist. The most
probable, straightforward answer is that the brains of human and
nonhuman animals are mainly shaped for anticipating upcoming
events in the environment (Corballis 2013; Hommel et al. 2001;
Suddendorf & Corballis 2007). On this view, we have recently
revealed that the mere processing of number magnitudes is automatically associated with a general sensorimotor and anticipative
mechanism (Badets et al. 2013). In this theory, distal references
in the environment provide information of different magnitudes
that is simulated in an anticipative way to ﬂexibly adapt future
numerical- and motor-based responses (see Badets & Pesenti
[2011] for this “anticipated-magnitude code”).
Such anticipative mechanisms for sensorimotor adaptations are
well documented in the literature on motor control (Hommel
et al. 2001). For example, envisage a person who wishes to
move a bottle of wine from the table to the upper part of the
kitchen shelf. During this motor sequence, there is (1) the processing of a horizontal dimension for the reach-to-grasp movement of the hand towards the bottle on the table, and
subsequently, (2) the processing of a vertical dimension for the
placement of the bottle on the upper part of the shelf. According
to Jeffery and colleagues, both dimensions (i.e., horizontal and
vertical) should be processed and represented separately.
However, data on similar paradigms revealed that when the
ﬁnal placement was high on the shelf (vertical goal), the reachto-grasp position of the hand (horizontal goal) was situated in
the lower part of the object (Cohen & Rosenbaum 2004). This
ﬁnding indicates that the metric encoding the vertical goal is concomitantly anticipated and accurately represented during enactment of the horizontal goal.
In summary, based on several lines of evidence that a common
metrics mechanism located in the parietal region of the brain is in
charge of the processing of space, numbers, and actions, I propose
that different magnitude dimensions are most likely intertwined
with the horizontality and verticality of space during environment-directed actions. Semantic knowledge, such as the
meaning of numbers, is represented inside this common scale
and can reﬁne the representation of physical space. In other
words, semantic sides of three-dimensional space representation
could be anticipatorily activated in a sensorimotor mechanism,
which could give us the capacity to adapt different behaviours
for potential environmental constraints.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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Abstract: Jeffery et al. propose a non-uniform representation of threedimensional space during navigation. Fittingly, we recently revealed
asymmetries between horizontal and vertical path integration in humans.
We agree that representing navigation in more than two dimensions
increases computational load and suggest that tendencies to maintain
upright head posture may help constrain computational processing,
while distorting neural representation of three-dimensional navigation.

The target article is a well-written and timely paper that summarizes much of the spatial cognition literature, which has only recently
made headway into understanding how animals navigate in a threedimensional world. Most of what is known about how the brains of
different animals manage navigation has been constrained to the
horizontal plane. Here Jeffery et al. review experiments that
show how insects, ﬁsh, rodents, and other animals (including
humans) navigate space which includes a vertical component.
From these studies, including some elegant work of their own on
the encoding of three-dimensional space by place and grid cells
(Hayman et al. 2011), the authors propose that 3D space is not uniformly represented by the brain. Rather, they suggest that 3D space
is represented in a quasi-planar fashion, where spaces are constrained to separate planes that are stitched into a non-Euclidian,
but integrated, map. There is, we think, merit in this analysis
which presents a reasonable and testable hypothesis, one that
addresses the need to reduce the computational load required to
fully represent navigation through 3D space while also requiring
a mechanism to stitch representational spaces together.
Given that the real world is three-dimensional, it is somewhat surprising that investigations into three-dimensional navigation have
only recently emerged. One reason for this latency may be that
representing movement in a volumetric space is not only computationally complicated for the brain, it poses additional constraints on
experimental design, equipment, and analysis than are required for
horizontal plane navigation. After reviewing the literature on nonhuman vertical navigation we became interested in human navigation
with a vertical component. In a recent paper (Barnett-Cowan
et al. 2012) we showed for the ﬁrst time that human path integration
operates differently in all three dimensions. We handled experimental constraints by comparing performance in an angle completion
pointing task after passive translational motion in the horizontal,
sagittal, and frontal (coronal) planes. To move participants in three
dimensions, we took advantage of the unique Max Planck Institute
(MPI) CyberMotion Simulator (Teufel et al. 2007), which is based
on an anthropomorphic robot arm and which offers a large motion
range to assess whether human path integration is similar between
horizontal and vertical planes. We found that while humans tend
to underestimate the angle through which they move in the horizontal plane (see also Loomis et al. 1993), either no bias or an overestimate of movement angle is found in the sagittal and frontal planes,
respectively. Our results are generally in agreement with the theory
proposed by Jeffery et al. for the representation of space being ﬁxed
to the plane of movement, and our approach lends itself well to
testing predictions that follow from this theory. For example, if
the representation of space is ﬁxed to the plane of movement and
additional processing is required to stitch planes together, then
one would expect delays in response times to cognitive tasks as the
number of planes moved through increases.
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As Jeffery et al. point out, the constant force of gravity provides an allocentric reference for navigation. However, we
would like to clarify that gravity provides an allocentric reference
direction and not a reference frame. A reference direction is fundamental to perception and action, and gravity is ideally suited as
a reference direction because it is universally available to all
organisms on Earth for navigation and orientation. Knowing
one’s orientation and the orientation of surrounding objects in
relation to gravity affects the ability to identify (Dyde et al.
2006), predict the behaviour of (Barnett-Cowan et al. 2011),
and interact with surrounding objects (McIntyre et al. 2001),
as well as to maintain postural stability (Kluzik et al. 2005;
Wade & Jones 1997). Tendencies to maintain upright head
posture relative to gravity during self-motion and when interacting with objects have the functional advantage of constraining the
computational processing that would otherwise be required to
maintain a coherent representation of self and object orientation
when the eyes, head, and body are differently orientated relative
to one another and relative to an allocentric reference direction
such as gravity. Such righting behaviour is expressed in Figure 1,
where maintaining an upright head posture beneﬁts gaze control
for both ﬂy and human.
In addition to studies of righting behaviour, there are now
numerous studies which indicate that the brain constructs an
internal representation of the body with a prior assumption that
the head is upright (Barnett-Cowan et al. 2005; Dyde et al.
2006; MacNeilage et al. 2007; Mittelstaedt 1983; Schwabe &
Blanke 2008). We speculate that the combination of righting
reﬂexes – to maintain an upright head posture during selfmotion and optimize object recognition – along with prior
assumptions of the head being upright, may interfere with the
brain’s ability to represent three-dimensional navigation through
volumetric space. Further, as vestibular and visual directional sensitivity are best with the head and body upright relative to gravity
(MacNeilage et al. 2010), future experiments aimed at disentangling how the brain represents three-dimensional navigation
must consider how the senses are tuned to work best when
upright.

Figure 1 (Barnett-Cowan & Bülthoff). Optimization of gaze
control in the blowﬂy Calliphora (left; see Hengstenberg 1991)
and in humans (right; see Brodsky et al. 2006), where upright
head posture is maintained during self-motion. Republished
from Hengstenberg (1991) with original photo copyright to MPI
for Biological Cybernetics (left), and Bike Magazine (August
2001, p. 71; right), with permission.*
*Note: The photo shown on the left above was taken at the Max
Planck Institute for Biological Cybernetics, which retains the
copyright. Hengstenberg (1991) published part of this
photograph as well. In addition to holding the copyright for the
original photo we also have permission from the publisher of
Hengstenberg’s article.

Commentary/Jeffery et al.: Navigating in a three-dimensional world
Understanding how humans represent motion through volumetric space is particularly important for assessing human aviation,
where loss of control in ﬂight is today’s major single cause of fatal
accidents in commercial aviation (see the EASA Annual Safety
Review; European Aviation Safety Agency 2006). We suggest that
our understanding of three-dimensional navigation in humans can
be improved using advanced motion simulators – such as our Max
Planck Institute CyberMotion Simulator, which is capable of
moving human observers through complex motion paths in a
volume of space. (An open access video is found in the original
article: Barnett-Cowan et al. 2012.) Future experiments with
fewer constraints, including trajectories using additional degrees
of freedom, longer paths, multiple planes, and with the body differently orientated relative to gravity, will be able to more fully assess
the quasi-planar representation of space proposed by Jeffery et al.,
as well as how vertical movement may be encoded differently.
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Abstract: Existing studies have proposed that humans preferentially
memorize buildings as a collection of ﬂoors. Yet this might stem from
the fact that environments were also explored by ﬂoors. We have
studied this potential bias with a learning and recognition experiment.
We have detected a positive inﬂuence of the learning route – by ﬂoors,
and also crucially by columns – on spatial memory performances.

This commentary addresses the target article’s discussion of
“navigation in multilayer environments” pace Jeffery et al.’s
review of Montello and Pick’s (1993) study, which “demonstrated that human subjects who learned two separate and
overlapping routes in a multilevel building could subsequently integrate the relationship of these two routes.
However, it was also established that pointing between
these vertically aligned spaces was less accurate and
slower than were performances within a ﬂoor” (sect. 3.3,
para. 5). By questioning the underlying methodology we
point out how horizontal learning and also vertical learning
of multiﬂoored environments inﬂuence spatial memory,
which extends the ﬁndings reported by Jeffery et al.
Existing studies on spatial memory in complex buildings
(Büchner et al. 2007; Hölscher et al. 2006; Montello & Pick
1993) have suggested that humans have a tendency to
memorize such environments as a collection of ﬂoors. Yet
this might stem from the fact that environments were
also explored by ﬂoors, of greater length than the height
of vertical junctions (staircases). In Thibault et al. (2013),
we have studied this potential bias with a learning and recognition experiment, for an object-in-place task, under
carefully controlled conditions.
First, a virtual building was designed for the experiment
as a repetition of rooms having the same height and
length, connected by equivalent horizontal and vertical
passages. Second, a group of 28 participants – the ﬂoor learners – learned the simulated space by watching a computer

movie depicting ﬂoor-by-ﬂoor travel; similarly, 28 other participants – the column learners – observed the building
according to a column-by-column route (i.e., travelling by
elevators across ﬂoors). One landmark was visible in each
visited room of the building. Third, we equated the sequence
of landmarks encountered by ﬂoor-learning and columnlearning participants (we changed the positions of the landmarks in the virtual building for each group to achieve this).
We then observed the performances of the two groups in
a recognition phase where the participants viewed a camera
movement from one room to an adjacent one, either following a segment of the learned path (a familiar segment)
or a shortcut (a novel segment). After being moved, they
had to indicate the correct object (among three distractors)
that was there during the learning phase.
Under these controlled conditions, we detected a positive inﬂuence of the learning route, by ﬂoors and also by
columns, on spatial memory performances (in terms of
accuracy and response times). We found that participants
processed familiar segments of the learned path more accurately than novel ones, not only after ﬂoor learning (80%
correct answers in horizontal [familiar] trials vs. 63.5% in
vertical [novel] trials) – which is in line with Montello and
Pick’s (1993) ﬁnding cited in section 3.3 of the target
article (see the ﬁrst two sentences of sect. 3.3, para. 5) –
but, crucially, also after column learning. Participants
who learned the multilevel building by a column-bycolumn route performed better in the recognition of landmarks within a column compared to the recognition of
landmarks across columns, that is, within a ﬂoor (66%
correct answers in vertical [familiar] trials vs. 48% in horizontal [novel] trials).1 This ﬁnding suggests a key role of
the learning mode on the exploitation of spatial memory,
which extends the ﬁndings reported by Jeffery et al.
As a complement, we here point out our own methodological limits:
1. Our work does not use a navigational task but an objectin-place one, which differs from the task considered by Jeffery
et al. In our experiment, the participants viewed a camera
movement – that is, they were not free to change their direction of movement and to update their navigation strategy.
2. Our experiment was conducted in a rectilinear
environment: The participants cannot explore the (x, y)
plane, but only the x-axis. This can be a restricted case
for the bicoded map model proposed by the authors.
NOTE
1. The chance level was equal to 25% correct answers.
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Abstract: Additional evidence is presented concerning the anisotropy
between vertical and horizontal encoding, which emerges from studies
of human perception and cognition of space in plane mirror reﬂections.
Moreover, it is suggested that the non-metric characteristic of
polarization – that Jeffery et al. discuss with respect to gravity – is not
limited to the vertical dimension.

As discussed by Jeffery et al., evidence for true volumetric coding
is weak, and a bicoded map is the most likely encoding spatial
scheme (at least in mammals). Moreover, allocentric encoding
of the horizontal dimension is metric, whereas encoding of the
vertical dimension is non-metric. Among the features of the vertical dimension is its polarization. In this commentary we focus
on these two aspects (anisotropy and polarization). Jeffery et al.
explicitly say that they conﬁne their discussion to studies of navigation rather than spatial cognition. However, some parallels are
strong. We draw attention to behavioral ﬁndings from naïve
optics and phenomenological psychophysics. These data, respectively, (a) provide further evidence concerning the anisotropy
between vertical and horizontal encoding of space in humans,
and (b) suggest that polarization is a general characteristic of
non-metric encoding of ecological space, not exclusive to the vertical dimension.
Many adults hold mistaken beliefs concerning the spatial behavior of reﬂections. For example, when adults imagine a person
entering a room and walking parallel to a wall, they predict that
the person will see his or her reﬂection in a mirror on the wall
before it is possible (i.e., before being aligned with the mirror’s
edge – this has been called the “early error”). A minority also
predict that the image will appear at the mirror’s farther edge
rather than at the nearer edge. The same mistake applies when
moving in a real room, not just when predicting an event in a
paper-and-pencil task (Croucher et al. 2002).
The early error is compatible with overestimation of what is visible
in a mirror from left and right. In other words, people expect a cone
of visibility for a given mirror, largely independent of the viewpoint of
the observer and of distance (Bertamini et al. 2010; Bianchi &
Savardi 2012b). The second error (the location of the image) is compatible with the idea that the virtual world is spatially rotated around
a vertical axis (Bertamini et al. 2003). However, an alternative explanation was found in later studies: The virtual space is thought of as
allocentrically organized in an opposite way with respect to the
real environment (Savardi et al. 2010).
These mistaken beliefs, which are similar in males and females,
and in psychology and physics students, are conﬁned to the horizontal plane. They disappear when vertical movements are considered. For instance, if the imagined character approaches the
mirror by moving vertically – say, climbing up a rope parallel to
the wall (Croucher et al. 2002) or moving in a glass lift (Bertamini
et al. 2003) – people neither expect to see the reﬂection before
reaching the near edge of the mirror, nor to see it appearing at
the farther edge (i.e., opposite relative to the direction of the
approach). Experience does not lead to better understanding of
mirror reﬂections; on the contrary, adults make larger errors compared to children (Bertamini & Wynne 2009).
Further evidence of a difference between transformations
around horizontal and vertical axes comes from studies of perception of mirror reﬂections of the human body: Mirror-reﬂecting a
picture or a real body around the horizontal axis – upside-down
reversal – resulted in larger differences than did reﬂecting it
around the vertical axis – left-right reversal (Bianchi & Savardi
2008; Cornelis et al. 2009).
With respect to polarization, Jeffery et al. argue that this is a
feature typical of the dimension orthogonal to the plane of locomotion (i.e., usually the vertical). They do not explicitly claim
that it is conﬁned only to this dimension, but they do not
specify that polarization can also characterize the representation
of the horizontal dimension (at least in humans). However,
spatial polarization emerges as a key aspect in both dimensions
from studies on the perception and cognition of space and
objects in mirrors (Bianchi & Savardi 2008; 2012b; Savardi et al.
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2010), and it is a non-metric characteristic of direct experience
of space that goes beyond mirror perception. This aspect of
space has been emphasized in various anthropological (e.g.,
Brown & Levinson 1993) and linguistic (e.g., Cruse 1986; Hill
1982) analyses of human cognition and in studies of memory
errors in object recognition (Gregory & McCloskey 2010). Only
recently has its importance been recognized within what has
been deﬁned “phenomenological psychophysics” (Kubovy 2002;
Kubovy & Gepshtein 2003). The basic structure of phenomenological experiences of space and its geometry invariably manifests
properties of polarization (Bianchi et al. 2011a; 2011b; Bianchi
& Savardi 2012a; Savardi & Bianchi 2009). In addition, Stimulus-Response spatial compatibility can be thought of as a direct
effect of an allocentrically polarized encoding of space in
humans (Boyer et al. 2012; Chan & Chan 2005; Roswarski &
Proctor 1996; Umiltà & Nicoletti 1990).
Emerging from phenomenological psychophysics regarding
polarization is the operationalization in metric and topological
terms of spatial dimensions and the ﬁnding that these dimensions
differ in the extent of the polarized area. This in turn depends on
the extension of a central set of experiences perceived as neither
one pole nor the other. For instance, the perception of an object
as positioned “on top” of something (e.g., a ﬂag on top of a mountain)
is conﬁned to one speciﬁc position; the same holds for “at the
bottom.” In between these two extremes there is a range of positions
that are “neither on top, nor at the bottom.” In contrast, in the
dimension “in front of–behind” (e.g., two runners) there is only
one state that is perceived as “neither in front, nor behind” (i.e.,
when the two runners are alongside). Similarly, in the dimension
“ascending-descending” there is only one state that is perceived as
“neither ascending, nor descending” (i.e., being level); all the other
slants are recognized as gradations of ascending or of descending
(Bianchi et al. 2011b; Bianchi et al. 2013). Furthermore, perhaps
counter-intuitively, polarization is not to be thought of necessarily
as a continuum: Ratings of high/low, large/small, wide/narrow, and
long/short (dimensions relevant for navigation) applied to ecological
objects or to spatial extensions do not behave as inverse measurements of the same continuum (Bianchi et al. 2011a).
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Abstract: Animals navigate through three-dimensional environments, but
we argue that the way they encode three-dimensional spatial information is
shaped by how they use the vertical component of space. We agree with
Jeffery et al. that the representation of three-dimensional space in
vertebrates is probably bicoded (with separation of the plane of
locomotion and its orthogonal axis), but we believe that their suggestion
that the vertical axis is stored “contextually” (that is, not containing
distance or direction metrics usable for novel computations) is unlikely,
and as yet unsupported. We describe potential experimental protocols
that could clarify these differences in opinion empirically.

Following behavioural and neurophysiological research on how
three-dimensional space is encoded by animals, Jeffery et al.
hypothesize that vertebrates represent space in a bicoded
fashion, with spatial information about the plane of locomotion
computed and represented separately from space in the
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orthogonal axis. We agree with this. Indeed, experimental evidence shows that ﬁsh that move freely through a volume represent
space in two, separable, vertical and horizontal components, and
not as an integrated three-dimensional unitary representation
(Holbrook & Burt de Perera 2009; 2011b). This is supported by
studies on rats (Grobéty & Schenk 1992a; Hayman et al. 2011;
Jovalekic et al. 2011). However, this still leaves open the fundamental question of whether the vertical axis is represented “contextually” (deﬁned as not available for novel quantitative
processing) or metrically.
Jeffery et al. are ambiguous on this point, as their bicoding
hypothesis can accommodate the vertical axis being represented
metrically, but they favour the idea that it is likely to be
encoded contextually, even for animals that move freely through
three dimensions. They reasonably argue that contextual coding
may free the animal’s brain from complex trigonometric calculations in three dimensions, but this comes at the cost of constraining spatial computations. For instance, metric encoding allows the
animal to know when it is getting close, is roughly where it should
be, or has gone too far, and it allows the animal to use the relation
between multiple landmarks, correcting for distance and perspective when computing novel trajectories. It has been argued that in
the horizontal plane, ants integrate cross-modally metric information obtained from path integration with visual snapshots of
landmarks (Lent et al. 2010; Mueller & Wehner 2010). For
animals that move freely in a volume, the same computational
possibilities are important in the vertical axis.
Because metric information contains spatial relationships, the
presence of metric representations can be expressed in how
the pattern of error or generalization is distributed along the vertical axis. We offer two suggestions. First, we expect generalization along a metric vertical axis either side of signiﬁcant
locations, and for this “error” to obey Weber’s law, displaying a
roughly proportional relation between magnitude of the
percept and accuracy (Foley & Matlin 2010). Such generalization
would not apply to contextual representations. This could be
tested by measuring error in recall of a rewarded vertical position
for an animal that can move freely in the vertical axis (and hence
express that error). Second, generalization curves around a positive and a negative instance should interfere if the instances are
close in a metric vertical axis, and this interference should take
the behavioural form of a computable peak shift (Domjan
2009). So, if an animal is rewarded for visiting a place at a
certain elevation, the presence of a punishing instance marginally
above this should result in a predictable downwards displacement of response.
Whether an animal encodes the vertical axis metrically or not may
be related to the animal’s movement and whether it is surface bound
with three degrees of freedom (forward-backward, left-right, and
rotational (yaw) or moves with six degrees of freedom by the
addition of up-down, roll and pitch. In ﬂying or swimming
animals, the equality in the freedom of movement in the horizontal
and vertical components of space is likely to favour metrical scales
for space in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions.
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Abstract: Jeffery et al. extensively and thoroughly describe how different
species navigate through a three-dimensional environment. Undeniably,
the world offers numerous three-dimensional opportunities. However,
we argue that for most navigation tasks a two-dimensional representation
is nevertheless sufﬁcient, as physical conditions and limitations such as
gravity, thermoclines, or layers of earth encountered in a speciﬁc
situation provide the very elevation data the navigating individual needs.

As Jeffery et al. correctly note, most scientiﬁc efforts on largescale spatial relations have focused on two-dimensional settings
while neglecting further, potentially important dimensions such
as elevation, slant, and distortion. In theoretical terms, generating
a more complete three-dimensional representation of the
environment by integrating such information presumably
enhances navigation accuracy. However, it is rather debatable
whether this also leads to a signiﬁcant improvement in actual navigation and localization performance in everyday tasks (Montello &
Pick 1993).
As a series of empirical works confronting (human) participants
with navigation tasks has documented, speciﬁc deﬁcits in the
assessing of the azimuth angle, for instance, arise in multiﬂoored/three-dimensional versus single-ﬂoored/two-dimensional
settings (Hölscher et al. 2006; Thibault et al. 2013). In ecological
contexts, offering a variety of orientation cues, humans are nevertheless able to actively navigate through three-dimensional
environments without any problems. This might again indicate
here that it is not obligatory to have access to a perfect cognitive
three-dimensional representation of the environment. Furthermore, the mismatch of evidence provided by empirical studies
and everyday experience might point to a lack of ecological validity in the paradigms commonly used to investigate the premises
of actual navigation. This is partly due to laboratory and real-life
navigation tasks requiring completely different, and sometimes
even converse, strategies or behaviors. In a study by Carbon
(2007), for example, participants were asked to estimate national
large-scale distances as the crow ﬂies – but what did they do in
the end? Although they obviously used a consistent and steady
strategy, as indicated by estimates being highly reliable as well
as strongly correlated with the factual physical distances (cf.
Montello 1991), they applied a strategy which differed entirely
from the one speciﬁed in the instructions: Instead of linear distances, they used German Autobahn distances as the basis for
their estimations, thus replacing the requested but unfamiliar
mode (no human was ever found to behave like a bird) with
one derived from everyday behavior – that is, from actually travelling these distances by car (instead of aircraft). Thus, everyday
knowledge was found to be preferred over (artiﬁcial) task affordances, which is indeed reasonable since it is easier and more
economical to do something on the basis of knowledge and familiar routines.
Let’s get back to a point mentioned already and elaborate on
why a complete three-dimensional representation of the environment is not obligatory for the majority of typical real-life navigation tasks. Surface-travelling species, for example, are limited
to the surface they are travelling on; they might hop and dig
from time to time, but they mainly orient themselves to the
surface, thus inherently to the current elevation of the given structure of this surface. Basically, they navigate on an idealized plane.
When directions of places are to be assessed within a single plane,
azimuthal errors are relatively small (Montello & Pick 1993), so
navigation will be quite accurate. If sensory (e.g., visual) cues
are additionally taken into account, it can be further tuned and
optimized (Foo et al. 2005). Concerning navigation through
three-dimensional environments, the ability of extracting and utilizing supplemental information provided by external or sensory
cues turns out to be quite economic: Even a subject climbing a
mountain can still locate its target destination (the peak) on an
idealized two-dimensional map, provided some supplemental
information on the elevation of this target is available. This information can be “gleaned,” for instance, from the required expenditure of energy while climbing. Considering that most parts of the
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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three-dimensional space can thus be reduced to a surface-map
representation with sparse data requirements, a cognitive
system encoding topographies in full three-dimensional coordinates seems rather unnecessary, as it would be too cost-intensive.
Regarding species such as ﬂying insects, birds, or ﬁsh that move
more freely through the third dimension, very similar navigation
routines can be found (e.g., for honeybees: Lehrer 1994).
Research has indeed revealed speciﬁc skills in communicating
elevation (e.g., for ﬁsh: Holbrook & Burt de Perera 2009; e.g.,
for stingless bees: Nieh & Roubik 1998), and that elevation information can be highly relevant in some tasks (e.g., ﬁnding a bird’s
nest). Still, it is improbable that this information is fully integrated
within a complete cognitive three-dimensional representation.
From an information theory perspective, most parts of volumetric
representations of real-world contexts would comprise a great
number of “empty cells.” Furthermore, reliable locations can
hardly be imagined without any physical connection to the
surface. A bird’s nest, for example, may be situated in a treetop
that is part of a tree that is itself solidly enrooted in the ground
(i.e., the surface). Navigation requirements in the water, where
spatial constraints are also obvious, are similar: Most relevant
and reliable locations for hiding or for ﬁnding prey are near the
bottom or the surface of the sea. For navigating through the
sea, elevation information might be needed, but not necessarily
in the form of a complete three-dimensional representation.
Gibson’s (1979) ecological approach offers a solid basis for reducing data for navigating tasks quite efﬁciently: Moving through a
three-dimensional world itself provides important directly visual,
acoustic, and proprioceptive cues (cf. Allen 1999), which help us
to assess distances, elevations, and drifts of our movement trajectories both easily and accurately.

Think local, act global: How do fragmented
representations of space allow seamless
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Abstract: In this commentary, we highlight a difﬁculty for metric
navigation arising from recent data with grid and place cells: the
integration of piecemeal representations of space in environments with
repeated boundaries. Put simply, it is unclear how place and grid cells
might provide a global representation of distance when their ﬁelds
appear to represent repeated boundaries within an environment.
One implication of this is that the capacity for spatial inferences may be
limited.

The Appalachian Trail is a 2,184-mile-long footpath through the
mountains of the eastern United States. Each year, approximately
2,000 “thru-hikers” attempt to backpack the trail’s entire length,
from Georgia to Maine, or vice versa. There are maps for each
section of the trail, and hikers quickly learn that the most salient
feature of these is the elevation proﬁle. Miles are secondary to
elevation change. When carrying a backpack, the amount of
elevation gain is of paramount interest in planning the day’s progress. Elevation has also been formalised in William Naismith’s
rule-of-thumb for estimating pedestrian distance: On ﬂat
ground, walkers usually cover 3 miles per hour, with an additional
half hour added for each 1,000-foot elevation gain.
The consideration of three-dimensional spatial mapping by
Jeffery et al. rightly brings attention to what thru-hikers and
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hill-walkers know ﬁrsthand – that elevation matters. But are distance and elevation represented in the same way, or in different
ways? Jeffery et al., based on a review of behavioural and neurophysiological data, argue that three-dimensional space is represented in a bicoded (anistropic) internal map. Distances are
represented metrically – likely by grid cells – whereas elevation is
represented qualitatively, perhaps as a contextual cue. As an
animal moves up, down, and across a complex environment, it
may represent each surface as a map fragment, and these are
linked in some way.
There is, however, a difﬁculty with map fragmentation, and it is
not just in identifying how maps of different planes are linked.
Rather, it is with the representations of space provided by grid,
place, and to a lesser extent perhaps, head direction cells themselves. Put simply, while in an open space grid cells may encode
distances, in more complex environments with similar, repeated
geometric features, grid and place cells exhibit a fragmented
encoding of space. Hence, the metric representation of space
itself appears to be piecemeal. As we consider below, this may
explain why demonstrations of novel spatial inference in the rat
are a challenge.
For hippocampal place cells, accumulating evidence suggests
that place ﬁelds are controlled by the local features of the environment. For example, Skaggs and McNaughton (1998) found that
some place cells showed similar ﬁelds in each of two identical
boxes. This result was replicated by Fuhs et al. (2005) in their
same box orientation condition, and repeated ﬁelds have been
found in up to four adjacent boxes (Spiers et al. 2009). These ﬁndings, and the demonstration that some place ﬁelds duplicate when
a barrier is inserted into a square environment (Barry et al. 2006),
provide clear support for the hypothesis that place ﬁelds are
driven by the boundaries of the immediate environment
(Hartley et al. 2000; O’Keefe & Burgess 1996). Thus, an animal
traversing an environment with repeated geometric features
may experience a repeated, fragmented place cell representation.
Indeed, the repeated place cell ﬁring in the spiral maze observed
by Hayman et al. (2011) may reﬂect this in the third dimension.
Fragmentary ﬁring also occurs in medial entorhinal cortex grid
cells. In an elegant experiment, Derdikman et al. (2009) showed
that grid ﬁelds fragmented in a hairpin maze in which the
animals ran in alternate directions through a series of alleyways.
The ﬁring of these cells appeared anchored to the start of each
turn in a given direction for much of the distance in an alleyway,
although ﬁring near the end of the alley was anchored to the
upcoming turn. In this same study, hippocampal place cells likewise exhibited repeated ﬁelds in different alleyways when the
rat was running in the same direction. Thus, both grid cells and
place cells exhibited a local, not global, representation of the
environment. Presumably, this occurred even though the animal
treated the environment as a whole.
What then of head direction cells? Here the situation is different. In the same hairpin maze, head direction cells were
unchanged (i.e., they tended to ﬁre in the same direction) compared to recording sessions in an open ﬁeld (Whitlock & Derdikman 2012). Remarkably, in cells that showed grid ﬁelds and
directional tuning (conjunctive cells), grid ﬁelds fragmented in
the hairpin maze, while directional ﬁring was unaffected. The consistency of directional ﬁring across maze compartments is in
agreement with previous demonstrations that the preferred
ﬁring of head direction cells is maintained, with some error,
across environments when the animal walks between them (Dudchenko & Zinyuk 2005; Stackman et al. 2003; Taube & Burton
1995).
On the face of the existing place and grid cell evidence, it is
unclear how rodents solve distance problems in environments
with repeated boundaries. This raises two possibilities. First, the
distance map may become more global with repeated experience,
though there is not strong evidence for this yet (Barry et al. 2006;
Spiers et al. 2009). Second, it may be that rodents are not all that
good at navigating multiple enclosure environments. For example,
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we have found that rats are surprisingly limited in their ability to
take a novel shortcut between familiar environments (Grieves &
Dudchenko 2013). In short, their representations of the world
may be local, and only incidentally global.
To return to Jeffery et al.’s main argument: The ﬁring of grid
and place cells in three-dimensional mazes is certainly consistent
with a bicoded representation of space. Challenges that emerge
from this view, and from the ﬁndings reviewed above, include
identifying how global distance is represented when there is a
change in elevation, and how it is represented when the environment contains repeated geometric features.

Perceptual experience as a bridge between
the retina and a bicoded cognitive map
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Abstract: The bicoded cognitive maps described by Jeffery et al. are
compared to metric perceptual representations. Systematic biases in
perceptual experience of egocentric distance, height, and surface
orientation may reﬂect information processing choices to retain
information critical for immediate action (Durgin et al. 2010a).
Different information processing goals (route planning vs. immediate
action) require different metric information.

Jeffery et al. propose that the cognitive maps used by vertebrates
are bicoded rather than fully volumetric, insofar as they represent
a two-dimensional metric map in combination with a non-metric
representation of the third dimension. In some cases, the twodimensional metric surface might be a vertical surface. Additionally, the maps are piecemeal. This is an important hypothesis that
will help to focus future research in the ﬁeld, but it raises questions concerning the relationship between metric representations
in perception and those in cognition. Our commentary will
propose possible links between metric perceptual experience
and bicoded cognitive maps.
The visual world is normally understood as being sensed
through a two-dimensional medium (e.g., the retina; pace
Gibson 1979) that provides direct (angular) access to the vertical
dimension and to the portion of the horizontal that is frontal to
the observer. In contrast, the information most relevant for
route planning might be said to be roughly along the line of
sight itself – the horizontal depth axis, or the ground plane,
which is highly compressed on the retina. A large number of
visual (and non-visual) sources of information may be used to
locate things in depth, but foremost among these, for locomotion,
is information about angle of regard with respect to the ground
surface (whether this is horizontal, slanted, or vertical) and eyeheight.
Relating the two-dimensional frontal retinal image to a cognitive metric surface map is an important achievement. The
information evident to perceptual experience about surface
layout in locomotor space includes information about surface
inclination (i.e., slant relative to the gravitationally speciﬁed
horizontal plane), as well as information about surface extent
and direction. Over the past three decades, several competing
claims about surface layout perception have been advanced,
including afﬁne models of depth-axis recovery (Wagner
1985), well-calibrated performance at egocentric distance
tasks (Loomis et al. 1992), energy-based models of slant perception (Profﬁtt et al. 1995), intrinsic bias models of distance
(Ooi & He 2007), and our own angular scale expansion
model of slant and distance (Durgin & Li 2011; Hajnal
et al. 2011; Li & Durgin 2012).

The common observations that many of these models seek to
address include perceptual facts that are superﬁcially inconsistent
with accurate metric spatial representations: Distances are underestimated (Foley et al. 2004; Kelly et al. 2004), surface slant relative to horizontal is overestimated (Li & Durgin 2010; Profﬁtt
et al. 1995), and object height is consistently overestimated relative to egocentric distance (Higashiyama & Ueyama 1988; Li
et al. 2011). Alongside these facts are the observations that
angular variables, such as angular declination (or gaze declination)
relative to visible or implied horizons, seem to control both perceptual experience and motor action (Loomis & Philbeck 1999;
Messing & Durgin 2005; Ooi et al. 2001), emphasizing the importance of angular variables in the perceptual computation of
egocentric distance.
Because the perceptual input to vision is speciﬁed in a polar
coordinate system (the retinal “image,” and its polar transformations afforded by eye, head, and body movements), a basic
issue for relating the bicoded maps proposed by Jeffery et al. to
the perceptual input is to understand the transformation from
spherical coordinates to metric space. One argument that we
have made in various forms is that metric spatial coding of distance might be incorrectly scaled in perception without producing
a cost for action. Because our actions occur in the same perceptual
space as our other perceptions (i.e., we see our actions; Powers
1973), they can be calibrated to whatever scaling we perceive.
Metric representation is important to successful action (Loomis
et al. 1992), but perceived egocentric distance can be mis-scaled
as long as the scaling is stable and consistent.
We have observed that angular variables (including slant) seem
to be coded in a way that exaggerates deviations from horizontal;
this scaling could have the felicitous informational consequences
of retaining greater coding precision while producing perceptual
underestimation of egocentric ground distance (Durgin & Li
2011), to which locomotor action can nonetheless be calibrated
(Rieser et al. 1995). Believing that the resulting cognitive maps
are metric does not require that perception also be metric in
the same way (there is substantial evidence that egocentric horizontal extents appear shorter than frontal horizontal extents;
see, e.g., Li et al. 2013), though it suggests that anisotropies in perceptual experience are overcome in cognitive maps. However, the
notion that the vertical dimension is coded separately is intriguing
and likely reﬂects a later transformation.
The perception of surface slant appears to require integration
of vertical and horizontal metrics, and the systematic distortions
evident in surface slant cannot be explained in detail merely by
assuming that vertical scaling is expanded relative to horizontal
scaling. Rather, the most elegant quantitative model of slant perception available suggests that perceived slant may represent the
proportion of surface extent that is vertical (i.e., the sine of actual
slant; see Durgin & Li 2012). Importantly, the misperception of
surface orientation shows constancy across changes in viewing
direction (e.g., Durgin et al. 2010b) that implies that the
coding of slant in perceptual experience is with respect to a gravitational (rather than an egocentric) reference frame, even when
no horizontal ground surface is visible in the scene. It would
therefore be of interest, based on the suggestion that the twodimensional cognitive map may sometimes be vertical, to determine how a vertical planar reference frame (e.g., a vertical navigation surface) affects the human interpretation of relative
surface orientation.
The transformations between retinal input and cognitive maps
probably involve an intermediate stage of perceptual representations of space that resembles neither. This perceptual stage
clearly overcomes the superﬁcial limitations of retinal images,
yet it integrates vertical and horizontal (in the form of perceived
surface orientation) in a way that cognitive maps may not. The
selection of a two-dimensional metric representation is probably
highly determined by information processing constraints in
spatial cognition. Such ideas are also at the heart of scale
expansion theory.
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Abstract: We discuss the idea that environmental factors inﬂuence the
neural mechanisms that evolved to enable navigation, and propose that a
capacity to learn different spatial relationship rules through experience
may contribute to bicoded processing. Recent experiments show that
free-ﬂying bees can learn abstract spatial relationships, and we propose
that this could be combined with optic ﬂow processing to enable threedimensional navigation.

Experiments that have investigated navigation in insects add considerably to the generality of the arguments presented by Jeffery
et al., in revealing additional evidence for potential bicoded processing in animal brains. A contemporary point of interest in
neuroscience is whether solving complex cognitive problems actually requires large mammalian brains (Chittka & Niven 2009). In
this regard, free-ﬂying bees are an interesting model for understanding how visual systems deal with navigation in a three-dimensional world.
It is known that the mechanism by which both stingless bees
(Melipona panamica) and honeybees (Apis mellifera) judge distance in the horizontal plane is visually driven by optical ﬂow,
where the velocity of angular image motion is integrated over
time to enable a bee to estimate the ﬂown distance with accuracy
(Dacke & Srinivasan 2007; Eckles et al. 2012). Interestingly, when
honeybees are presented with the equivalent type of visual
problem requiring judgment of distance using optic ﬂow in the
vertical plane, they solve this task with a much lower level of precision (Dacke & Srinivasan 2007). We argue that the relative accuracy of navigation in the horizontal and vertical dimensions makes
sense in terms of normal ecological imperatives, and that brain
plasticity can be recruited to facilitate robust bicoded processing
if required.
Studies on honeybees suggest that visual processing of optic
ﬂow is dominated by information impinging on the ventral
visual ﬁeld (Dacke & Srinivasan 2007), which makes ecological
sense for an animal that predominantly ﬂies in the horizontal
plane when foraging for nutrition. In contrast, the stingless bee
operates in dense tropical environments where ﬂower resources
are typically scattered horizontally and throughout a range of vertical heights of up to 40 metres in the forest canopy. These stingless bees have been shown to be equally proﬁcient at gauging
distance in both the horizontal and vertical planes, potentially
using optic ﬂow mechanisms in both ventral and lateral visual
ﬁelds (Eckles et al. 2012). Nonetheless, honeybees do sometimes
also have to operate in complex three-dimensional environments
such as tropical forests. How might they deal with the complexity
of reliable orientation in the vertical plane? We suggest below that
honeybees are able to use information other than optic ﬂow, and
that their brains can learn to combine different visual perceptions
to solve novel problems, in a manner consistent with the bicoded
hypothesis.
Whilst honeybees do communicate horizontal direction and distance to hive mates through a symbolic dance communication
language, this does not reliably communicate elevation (Dacke
& Srinivasan 2007). It is therefore likely that individual foragers
must learn through their own experience to determine vertical
components of their three-dimensional world. One possible solution to this problem is relationship learning – estimating vertical
position by understanding the relative relationships, such as
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above/below, between different elemental features in the environment. The capacity to process such relationship rules is not innate
for a brain. Three-months-old human babies do not show evidence of relationship processing, although by 6 months of age
this capacity has developed (Quinn et al. 2002). Other adult primates, such as capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella), also show a
capacity for solving problems requiring the learning of above/
below rules (Spinozzi et al. 2004). Recent work in honeybees
shows that while their brains do not innately code spatial relationship rules, individual free-ﬂying bees can learn such relationships
through visual experience, including the reliable processing of
above/below (Avarguès-Weber et al. 2012).
The relationship rule processing mechanism observed in honeybees would thus give the potential for experienced individuals
to forage in complex environments with acquired knowledge
about relative vertical positions between biologically plausible
objects, such as ﬂowers and tree limbs (Chittka & Jensen 2011;
Dyer et al. 2008). Could “vertical knowledge” then be combined
with the perception of optic ﬂow in the horizontal plane, to give a
true bicoded perception of three-dimensional space? We believe
so. The work on how honeybees process complex visual relationship rules, including above/below and same/different, suggests
that there is also a capacity to learn simultaneously two separate
rules or types of visual information, and then combine this
acquired knowledge to solve novel problems (Avarguès-Weber
et al. 2012). Thus, although the honeybee appears to process horizontal and vertical optic ﬂows as separate signals (Dacke & Srinivasan 2007), it does appear that their brains have the capacity to
combine multiple sources of sensory perception and other
spatial cues to make novel decisions in complex environments.
In summary, learning to build concepts to process multiple
dimensions of three-dimensional navigation using a bicoded
system as hypothesised by Jeffery et al. may represent a more
general biological capacity, which likely extends to relatively
simple brains such as those of insects. Further, we suggest that
the opportunity for a brain of an individual to learn complex
tasks through experience is critical to revealing the true behavioural capabilities in animals, irrespective of the relative number
of neurons and synapses involved.
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Abstract: Recent research investigating the language–thought interface in
the spatial domain points to representations of the horizontal and vertical
dimensions that closely resemble those posited by Jeffery et al. However,
the ﬁndings suggest that such representations, rather than being tied to
navigation, may instead reﬂect more general properties of the
perception of space.

Jeffery et al. propose that bicoded representations may support
the encoding of three-dimensional space in a wide range of
species, including non–surface-travelling animals. Only humans,
however, have the ability to draw on their representations of
space to talk about their spatial experience. Here we highlight
the potential of spatial language – not traditionally considered
in the study of navigation through space – to provide insight into
the nature of nonlinguistic spatial representation. In particular,
we suggest that recent research on spatial language, spatial
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cognition, and the relationship between the two offers an unexpected source of evidence, albeit indirect, for the kinds of representations posited by Jeffery et al. Such evidence raises the
possibility that bicoded representations may support spatial cognition even beyond navigational contexts.
There are several striking parallels between Jeffery et al.’s
account of spatial representation and the semantics of spatial
language. Jeffery et al. argue that animals represent the vertical
dimension in a qualitatively different manner than they do the
two horizontal dimensions, in large part due to differences in locomotive experience. This distinction between vertical and horizontal is also evident in spatial language. Clark (1973) noted that
English spatial terms rely on three primary planes of reference,
one deﬁned by ground level (dividing above from below) and
the other two deﬁned by canonical body orientation (dividing
front from back and left from right). In a similar vein, Landau
and Jackendoff (1993) pointed to axial structure (e.g., the vertical
and horizontal axes) as a key property encoded by spatial prepositions, which otherwise tend to omit much perceptual detail (see
also Holmes & Wolff 2013a). More recently, Holmes (2012;
Holmes & Wolff 2013b) examined the semantic organization of
the spatial domain by asking native English speakers to sort a comprehensive inventory of spatial prepositions into groups based on
the similarity of their meanings. Using several dimensionality
reduction methods to analyze the sorting data, including multidimensional scaling and hierarchical clustering, Holmes found that
the ﬁrst major cut of the domain was between vertical terms (e.g.,
above, below, on top of, under) and all other prepositions; terms
referring to the left-right and front-back axes (e.g., to the left of,
to the right of, in front of, behind) tended to cluster together.
These ﬁndings suggest that the vertical-horizontal distinction
may be semantically, and perhaps conceptually, privileged.
Holmes’s (2012) ﬁndings are also consistent with Jeffery et al.’s
claims about the properties that distinguish horizontal from vertical representations. Jeffery et al. propose that horizontal representations are relatively ﬁne-grained, whereas vertical representations
are coarser and nonmetric in nature. In Holmes’s study, prepositions encoding distance information (e.g., near, far from) clustered exclusively with horizontal terms, implying that metric
properties are more associated with the horizontal dimensions
than the vertical. Further, vertical terms divided into discrete subcategories of “above” and “below” relations, but horizontal terms
did not; English speakers regarded to the left of and to the right of
as essentially equivalent in meaning. Perhaps most intriguingly,
Holmes found that the semantic differences among the dimensions were mirrored by corresponding differences in how spatial
relations are processed in nonlinguistic contexts (see also Franklin
& Tversky 1990). When presented with visual stimuli depicting
spatial relations between objects (e.g., a bird above, below, to
the left of, or to the right of an airplane), participants were
faster to discriminate an “above” relation from a “below” relation
than two different exemplars of an “above” relation – but only in
the right visual ﬁeld, consistent with the view that the left hemisphere is specialized for categorical processing (Kosslyn et al.
1989). Though observed for vertical relations, this effect of lateralized categorical perception, demonstrated previously for color
(Gilbert et al. 2006) and objects (Holmes & Wolff 2012), was
entirely absent in the case of horizontal relations: Participants
were just as fast to discriminate two different exemplars of “left”
as they were to discriminate “left” from “right.” That the vertical
dimension was perceived categorically but the horizontal dimension was not suggests differences in how the mind carves up
spatial information along different axes. In characterizing the
nature of the bicoded cognitive map, Jeffery et al. use color
merely as a way of illustrating the nonmetric property of vertical
representations, but such an analogy seems particularly ﬁtting:
Whereas the vertical axis may be represented in the same way
that we see a rainbow as forming discrete units, the horizontal
axis may be represented more like color actually presents itself,
namely as a continuous gradient.

Together, the ﬁndings reviewed above tell a story about spatial
representation that is, in many respects, similar to that proposed
by Jeffery et al. in the target article. However, such ﬁndings
suggest an alternative explanation for the many differences
observed between the horizontal and vertical dimensions. Early
in the target article, Jeffery et al. brieﬂy distinguish between
spatial navigation and spatial perception more generally, implying
that the representations supporting navigation may not extend to
other spatial contexts. But given the parallels between spatial
language and the representations implicated by Jeffery et al.’s
account, and the fact that spatial terms often refer to static
spatial conﬁgurations rather than motion through space, bicoded
representations may constitute a more general property of
spatial perception, rather than being speciﬁcally tied to navigation.
This possibility could be examined in future research on the representation of three-dimensional space. More broadly, our observations suggest a role for research on the language–thought
interface in informing accounts of cognitive abilities ostensibly
unrelated to language, lending support to the enduring maxim
that language is a window into the mind (Pinker 2007).
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Abstract: Multilevel wayﬁnding research in environmental psychology
and architecture exhibits a strong compatibility with Jeffery et al.’s
“bicoded” representation of space. We identify a need for capturing
verticality in spatial analysis techniques such as space syntax and argue
for investigating inter-individual differences in the ability to mentally
integrate the cognitive maps of separate ﬂoors in buildings.

Our commentary focuses on navigating multilayer environments
and extends Jeffery et al.’s view to an architectural and environmental psychology perspective.
The functions of buildings are generally organized horizontally,
probably reﬂecting the constraints that humans encounter: A horizontal plane is neutral to the axis of gravity and allows for stable
walking, sitting, and storing of objects. Humans and buildings
“inhabit” the same “two-dimensional” ecological niche, and buildings stack ﬂoors on top of one another. As a consequence, the
structure of typical buildings is highly compatible with the
“bicoded” representation: Whereas the horizontal plane is continuous (albeit subdivided by corridors and partitions) and in
line with the ﬂoors, the vertical axis is discontinuous and discretized; that is, ﬂoors are on top of one another, with only local connections via stairs or elevators. Unless one has a view along a
multi-storey atrium, the vertical dimension is visually limited to
the current or directly adjacent ﬂoor. Verticality is presented as
“contextual,” at ordinal rather than metric scale, and perceived
indirectly or derived by inference processes.
Tlauka et al. (2007) describe a systematic bias in vertical pointing between ﬂoors. Across several studies in our group we have
observed a pattern in the process of pointing that links to the
bicoded representation: Pointing appears to be based on categorical and discretized rather than continuous information, visible in
smooth horizontal pointing and stepwise vertical pointing. Participants report counting ﬂoors, rather than making spontaneous
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judgments (Hölscher et al. 2009). This is further illustrated by
longer response times for the vertical component of the pointing
gesture.
Environmental researchers such as Weisman (1981) and
Carlson et al. (2010) differentiate between four types of environmental characteristics that impact navigation in buildings: (1)
visual access to decision points, (2) architectural differentiation
(the likelihood of confusing visual scenes), (3) layout geometry,
and (4) signage. These features can be seen in the light of the
bicoded representation, with vertical integration as the central
challenge. Several studies (e.g., Soeda et al. 1997) illustrate that
multilevel public buildings are inherently difﬁcult to navigate,
and wayﬁnding complexity can be traced to mentally linking individual ﬂoors of the building. Participants expect a consistent corridor layout across ﬂoors and are disoriented by layout differences
between ﬂoors. Buildings in which the ﬂoors are partially horizontally offset from one another, such as the Seattle Public Library
(by architect Rem Koolhaas; Carlson et al. 2010), provide an
additional challenge for the mental alignment of corresponding
locations across ﬂoors.
Vertical connections form salient elements in the mental representation of the building and are usually limited in number.
Level changes are a key source of disorientation about one’s
heading and position in a building (Hölscher et al. 2006),
especially when a staircase is offset from the main corridor axis,
enclosed by walls, or requires many turns. An atrium in the
center of a building can provide visual access between ﬂoors
that helps people correctly align ﬂoors in their memory representations (Peponis et al. 1990), especially when the staircase/escalator/elevator is visually linked to this vertical core. Views to the
outside with a distinctive global landmark can further support
integration of cognitive maps between ﬂoors.
The architectural community has developed spatial analysis
methods to predict human movement patterns and cognitive representations, namely “space syntax” (Conroy Dalton 2005; Hillier
& Hanson 1984) and “isovist” approaches (Benedikt 1979; Wiener
et al. 2012), capturing visual access and layout complexity alike. It
is noteworthy that these approaches concentrate on single-ﬂoor
environments and that current space syntax analysis treats multilevel connections only in a simpliﬁed fashion (Hölscher et al.
2012). While this reﬂects a correspondence with the bicoded
view, more ﬁne-grained analysis of vertical connectors in building
analysis is called for.
Human indoor navigation is strongly driven by the semantics of
ﬂoor layout and expectations about the positioning of meaningful/
typical destinations and landmark objects (Frankenstein et al.
2010), as well as by expectations of regularity, good form, and
closure (Montello 2005). Human navigation is further guided by
symbolic input like signage and maps. Hölscher et al. (2007)
have shown that signage and cross-sectional maps explicitly
designed to highlight multilevel relations and connections
between ﬂoors help to overcome vertical disorientation, making
ﬁrst-time visitors almost as efﬁcient in wayﬁnding as a benchmark
group of frequent visitors.
Based on their experience with typical buildings, humans
develop speciﬁc strategies for handling vertical layouts (e.g.,
central-point or ﬂoor strategies; Hölscher et al. 2006). Jeffery
et al. refer to Büchner et al.’s (2007) ﬁnding that more people preferred a horizontal-ﬁrst route. This could be partly due to the fact
that the horizontal distances were longer than the vertical here (as
in many buildings) and that people tend to follow the longest line
of sight (Conroy Dalton 2003; Wiener et al. 2012). Furthermore,
people adapt their strategies to properties of the building; the
aforementioned ﬂoor strategy can then be replaced by a “lineof-sight” strategy, depending on the connections in a complex
building (Hölscher et al. 2009).
Finally, we wish to point to the need for understanding the role
of inter-individual differences in handling verticality, along the
distinction of route versus survey knowledge, and the degree to
which humans are able to coherently integrate cognitive maps
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of stacked ﬂoors. Studies cited by Jeffery et al., as well as our
own, are compatible with separate, planar representations of
spatial information. However, a subset of participants in our
experiments consistently reports imagining the environment
from an external perspective, with walls and ﬂoors like glass (“a
glass doll house”). This appears to require a consistent representation of the vertical dimension, and these people tend to report
allocentric rather than egocentric orientation strategies, as well
as high levels of spatial abilities. Jeffery et al. state that investigating multi-ﬂoor environments alone is insufﬁcient to identify
to what degree surface-dwelling animals can build true volumetric
mental maps. Virtual-reality simulations of such environments –
for example, tilting a building layout by 90 degrees or comparing
multilevel navigation to “vertical ﬂoating” along tunnels – provide
useful extensions in this direction. In studies currently under way,
we focus on the role of individual differences in how the vertical
component is integrated.

Applying the bicoded spatial model to
nonhuman primates in an arboreal multilayer
environment
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Abstract: Applying the framework proposed by Jeffery et al. to nonhuman
primates moving in multilayer arboreal and terrestrial environments, we
see that these animals must generate a mosaic of many bicoded spaces
in order to move efﬁciently and safely through their habitat. Terrestrial
light detection and ranging (LiDAR) technology and three-dimensional
modelling of canopy movement may permit testing of Jeffery et al.’s
framework in natural environments.

Jeffery et al. propose that a bicoded representation of threedimensional space, in which horizontal and vertical dimensions
are encoded in fundamentally different ways (i.e., metric and
non-metric), is common to all vertebrate animals. Although
bicoded spatial representation has implications for animals
moving in all substrates, this commentary focuses on how the
theoretical framework outlined by Jeffery et al. might be
applied to nonhuman primates moving in natural multilayer
environments and what techniques might be applied to this
problem.
The neural evidence upon which Jeffery et al. base their conclusions comes largely from rats habitually moving within single
layers of space or in multilayered, compartmentalized space
(e.g., tunnels). The authors also describe animals that move in
volumetric space (e.g., ﬁsh, birds) and the need for data regarding
how these animals represent space in three dimensions. Applying
Jeffery et al.’s framework to arboreal/terrestrial nonhuman primates, we ﬁnd that the space in which these animals move presents signiﬁcant challenges for generating spatial representation
mosaics which Jeffery et al.’s examples do not habitually encounter. A nonhuman primate that moves both on the ground and in
trees (e.g., chimpanzees, capuchin monkeys, macaques) is presented with the option of travel on substrates that may occur at
a great variety of distances, angles, and heights from the horizontal
plane of the animal’s location at any given moment. Vertical, horizontal, and intermediately angled arboreal substrates comingle
and contact substrates from neighboring trees. The animal must
accurately estimate distance to cross open spaces by leaping or
brachiation. These locomotor patterns are associated not only
with horizontal, but also vertical displacements of the animal
(e.g., Channon et al. 2010). Considering Jeffery et al.’s
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Figure 12 in the context of a primate travelling in the trees, we
might visualize similar arboreal bicoded map fragments that
occur along numerous branches in many directions and extending
into various distances from the central tree trunk. These bicoded
map fragments meet and join fragments from neighboring trees,
forming a web of metrically mapped spaces that, with increasing
density of branches and variation in the branch angles, will
approach metrically mapping both horizontal and vertical space
(in the canonical orientation sense), assuming that the bicoded
fragments are accurately joined in a mosaic.
Landscapes within which animals move consist of both vertical
and horizontal components that animals act upon. Landscape
components such as topography have an impact on the manner
in which animals move through their environments (e.g.,
Mandel et al. 2008). Animals moving primarily through a single
layer of their environment (e.g., large grazing animals) are
impacted by elevation, the one vertical component of the landscape upon which they move (Bennett & Tang 2006). Because
moving uphill requires greater energy expenditure than moving
on level ground (Taylor & Caldwell 1972), terrestrial animals
may make changes in the horizontal nature of their movements
in order to avoid a given area due to its vertical character (i.e.,
detouring around steep slopes). In contrast, animals that move
in multilayer environments contend with elevation as well as
other additional vertical components to their movement decisions
(i.e., substrate height). For example, nonhuman primates and
other vertebrates locomote in multilayer environments with a
combination of arboreal and terrestrial substrates. The varying
slopes of the multitude of potential substrates (i.e., branches,
tree trunks, and terrestrial surfaces) and the locations to which
these substrates convey present these animals with numerous
options for movement. These options also allow the animal to
exert greater control over the vertical component of its movement
decisions. For example, continuous canopy forest would allow
arboreal primates and other quadrupedal animals that move
through arboreal habitats to travel at a constant height, minimizing vertical displacement, while the elevation of the forest ﬂoor
rises and falls. We maintain that the use of non-compartmentalized multilayer environments requires a representation of space
that is sufﬁciently accurate to allow for movement decisions in
the vertical and horizontal dimensions as well as precise aerial
swinging/leaping to distal substrates. Logistically, this spatial
model may be hypothesized to include, at a minimum, precise
heuristics regarding where, when, and how to swing or leap, or
perhaps even a metric component of the vertical dimension.
In studies of the movement of nonhuman primates in multilayer environments, movement observations are frequently simpliﬁed for their analysis. Actual three-dimensional animal
movements are reduced to two-dimensional displacements
across a planar surface (Janson 1998; 2007; Normand & Boesch
2009; Noser & Byrne 2007b; Sueur 2011; Valero & Byrne
2007). Some prior studies have incorporated the vertical dimension of movement in discussions of nonhuman primate movement
patterns by linking elevation to visibility of resource sites (e.g., Di
Fiore & Suarez 2007; Noser & Byrne 2007a). Draping the movements of nonhuman primates onto a digital elevation model of
their habitat allows us to consider the energetic and viewpoint
effects resulting from the vertical component of movement on a
terrestrial substrate (e.g., Howard et al. 2012). However, the
greater vertical complexity of moving through multilayer environments (e.g., arboreal and terrestrial) and its effects on adaptive
movement choice are not considered using this technique.
One technique that may accurately represent the arboreal substrates upon which nonhuman primates move is Light Detection
and Ranging (LiDAR) technology. Terrestrial LiDAR is threedimensional laser scanning that generates a hemispherical point
cloud representing the returns of laser pulses from a groundbased vantage point (Beraldin et al. 2010). This high-density
point cloud can be used in forest inventories and in measuring
the detailed geometric characteristics of trees (Maas 2010).

Point clouds can be used to generate three-dimensional models
of the canopy through which animals move. The use of this
technique would allow researchers to catalog all possible substrates on a tree or group of trees, estimate the energetic costs
of movement on those substrates, and even model animals’ movement through a multilayer canopy based on heuristics or metric
knowledge of vertical and horizontal spatial components of their
environment. In this way, the framework proposed by Jeffery
and colleagues may be tested against movements of animals in
natural environments.

The complex interplay between threedimensional egocentric and allocentric spatial
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Abstract: Jeffery et al. characterize the egocentric/allocentric distinction
as discrete. But paradoxically, much of the neural and behavioral
evidence they adduce undermines a discrete distinction. More strikingly,
their positive proposal – the bicoded map hypothesis – reﬂects a more
complex interplay between egocentric and allocentric coding than they
acknowledge. Properly interpreted, their proposal about threedimensional spatial representation contributes to recent work on
embodied cognition.

The efforts of Jeffery et al. to synthesize and provide an overarching theoretical interpretation for the literature on two-dimensional and three-dimensional spatial representation will
undoubtedly prove useful to the ﬁeld. Their focus on 3D space
also highlights the importance of investigating navigation performance in more complex, ecologically valid task environments.
Despite these strengths, the authors fall prey to a common confusion involving the central egocentric/allocentric distinction.
At the outset, the authors ﬂag this familiar distinction to emphasize how the “focus of the present article is on the allocentric
encoding of the space that is being moved through” (target
article, sect. 2, para. 1). Although a discrete distinction is widely
assumed in the literature, and the authors imply it is incidental
to the main goals of the article and hence can be glossed over,
taking it at face value is problematic for two reasons. First,
much of the neural and behavioral evidence the authors survey
undermines a clean division. Second, and more strikingly, their
positive proposal – the bicoded map hypothesis, in which different
encoding schemes are employed for horizontal versus vertical
space, yet both are referenced to the organism’s plane of locomotion – clearly reﬂects a more complex interplay between egocentric and allocentric spatial representation than the authors
explicitly acknowledge.
Egocentric and allocentric representations are primarily distinguished by the different reference frames they employ. Reference
frames specify locations in terms of distances along two (or three)
perpendicular axes spanning out from an intersection point at the
origin. Egocentric representations specify locations relative to a
reference frame centered on a body axis, such as the midline, or
on a body part of the organism (e.g., “20 cm to the right of my
right hand”). Allocentric representations encode locations relative
to a reference frame centered on some environmental feature or
object (or set of these), and independently of the organism’s own
orientation or possibly even position (e.g., “33°S 151°E”). Framed
in this way, the key difference underlying the egocentric/allocentric distinction concerns the origin or center of the reference
frame for the spatial representation, a point which is clearly
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reﬂected etymologically in the terms “egocentric” and “allocentric.” Nevertheless, characterizing a spatial reference frame
involves more than just specifying the origin. Axis orientation
and a metric for assessing distances along these axes must also
be determined. This gives rise to another facet of the egocentric/allocentric distinction that has been largely ignored in
the literature (for an exception, see Grush 2007).
There are at least two senses in which a spatial representation
may be egocentric (or allocentric). As canvassed above, a representation can be egocentric if the origin of the reference
frame is anchored to the observer’s location. But a spatial representation can also be egocentric if the alignment or orientation
of the reference frame axes is itself dependent on properties of
the organism (independently of whether the origin is ﬁxed to
the organism or not). Consider how bodily features such as the
dorsal/ventral axis of the head might serve to determine the up/
down axis for certain egocentric spatial representations used in
early vision (Pouget et al. 1993), or how the body midline might
serve to orient the left/right axis for spatial representations
employed in reach planning (Pouget & Sejnowski 1997). These
representations are plausible candidates for being egocentric in
both senses. Although these two kinds of egocentricity can go
hand in hand, this is not necessary. Importantly, allocentric
spatial representations are subject to an equivalent analysis, such
that a representation may be allocentric with respect to its
origin, axes, or both.
A more nuanced egocentric/allocentric distinction facilitates
the identiﬁcation of a richer representational taxonomy including
hybrid cases incorporating both egocentric and allocentric
elements as building blocks. For example, consider a hybrid representation in which locations are speciﬁed relative to an egocentric origin, but where the horizontal and vertical axes are
aligned with respect to some environmental feature such as the
Earth’s magnetic ﬁeld. The axes deﬁned by the cardinal directions
are allocentric, as they bear no direct relationship to any egocentrically deﬁned axes and are invariant across changes in orientation
and position of the subject.
This is important because the authors’ bicoded map hypothesis
posits a hybrid spatial representation, incorporating an allocentrically deﬁned origin and egocentrically deﬁned axes. According to
the hypothesis, different encoding schemes (metric vs. nonmetric) are used for the representation of horizontal and vertical
space in the hippocampus and medial entorhinal cortex (MEC).
Importantly, these schemes are not referenced to horizontal and
vertical per se (i.e., gravitationally deﬁned earth-horizontal and
earth-vertical) as might be expected based on previous navigation
studies employing two-dimensional arenas. Instead, studies conducted by the authors using three-dimensional environments
(Hayman et al. 2011) and by other groups using microgravity conditions (Knierim et al. 2000), in which egocentric and allocentric
axes can be explicitly dissociated, indicate that the “horizontal”
axis is deﬁned by the organism’s canonical orientation during
normal locomotor behavior and the axis orthogonal to this
deﬁnes “vertical.” If correct, this organism-dependent axial alignment makes the spatial representation under consideration egocentric in the second sense outlined above. Nevertheless, the
metrically coded (horizontal) portion of this map, implemented
by assemblies of hippocampal place cells and entorhinal grid
cells, also possesses characteristic features of an allocentric representation, as its reference frame is anchored to the external
environment and does not depend on the organism’s own location.
The bicoded map is a hybrid spatial representation.
When the bicoded map hypothesis is interpreted as has been
suggested here, its link to recent work in the ﬁeld of embodied
cognition becomes evident. Embodied cognition researchers
have long sought to reveal how physical embodiment and motor
behavioral capacities shape and constrain our ability to represent
space. Until now, ﬁndings in support of this link were restricted to
how organisms represent their local workspace. If Jeffery et al. are
right, evidence is emerging for how an organism’s motor
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behavioral repertoire may also inﬂuence its representation of
large-scale, navigable space.

The planar mosaic fails to account for spatially
directed action
doi:10.1017/S0140525X13000435
Roberta L. Klatzkya and Nicholas A. Giudiceb
a
Department of Psychology, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, PA
15213; bSpatial Informatics Program, School of Computing and Information
Science, University of Maine, Orono, ME 04469-5711.
klatzky@cmu.edu
nicholas.giudice@maine.edu
http://www.psy.cmu.edu/people/klatzky.html
http://spatial.umaine.edu/faculty/giudice/

Abstract: Humans’ spatial representations enable navigation and reaching
to targets above the ground plane, even without direct perceptual support.
Such abilities are inconsistent with an impoverished representation of the
third dimension. Features that differentiate humans from most terrestrial
animals, including raised eye height and arms dedicated to manipulation
rather than locomotion, have led to robust metric representations of
volumetric space.

Consider some human capabilities for actions directed at spatial
targets at varying distances above the ground plane: at an extreme,
snagging a ﬂy ball on the run or pole vaulting; at the mundane
level, turning on the wall switch or stepping over an obstacle on
the ground. These actions are accurate and precise; yet they generally are not performed under closed-loop control that would free us
from metric demands. It seems unlikely that the planar mosaic representation proposed by Jeffery et al. – where the third dimension is
not only non-metric, but unstable – could support their execution.
How do we resolve the disparity between what would be possible under a non-metric representation of space and what people
can actually do? One avenue toward resolution is to say, “Oh, but
Jeffery et al. are not referring to those types of behaviors.” But
what, then, differentiates the behaviors ostensibly governed by
the planar mosaic from human spatially directed actions such as
pointing, reaching, over-stepping, and making contact?
For one thing, actions such as catching balls and reaching for
targets on a wall result from characteristics of human perception
and action that most other terrestrial mammals do not share.
Humans are “ecologically three-dimensional” to a high degree.
Our raised eyes provide a perspective view of the terrain where
we might travel, within a volumetric context so vast it has been
called “vista space” (Cutting & Vishton 1995). Although not
without error, our representation of height variation across
environmental undulations is simply not possible for animals
whose sense organs remain close to the ground during navigation.
Humans differ as well from rodents and ants by having arms:
limbs that are used not for locomotion (beyond infancy), but
rather to reach and manipulate objects above the ground.
Spatially directed actions also potentially differ from terrestrial
navigation in that the corresponding motor commands must
specify the disposition of the entire organism in volumetric
space – not only its location in point coordinates, but limb postures
and joint angles. Perhaps this provides an avenue of reconciliation
with the planar mosaic representation. Actions directed toward
targets with particular metric relationships to the body may be
designated as egocentric. Hence, they would lie speciﬁcally
outside the scope of the current theory, which restricts itself to
allocentric (environmentally referred) representations. This exclusion of metrically constrained behaviors from consideration is
undermined, however, by the intrinsic ambiguity of frames of
reference (Klatzky 1998). Humans ﬂexibly compute transformations between self-referred and environmentally referred
frames, even within a single task (Avraamides et al. 2004).
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Lacking reliable behavioral or neural signatures that would allow
us to designate actions as egocentric on the basis of their metric
demands, it seems inappropriate simply to exclude them from a
theory of volumetric spatial representation.
But wait – there is another feature of reaching, jumping, catching, and so on, that might render such behaviors distinct from
those guided by a volumetric mosaic. Arguably, these behaviors
are supported by perception, rather than representational abstractions. This argument might work if perceptually guided actions are
somehow different from those guided by something called “representation,” presumably including navigation. However, a position to the contrary has been put forward by Jack Loomis and
the present authors, along with collaborators (for review, see
Loomis et al. 2013). Our proposal stems from the fundamental
idea that the perceptual system functions to create representations, and it is these representations that guide action.
We have used the term “spatial image” to refer to a particular type
of representation that can support behaviors such as navigation and
reaching, even when sensory systems no longer provide data about
the physical world. For example, when a sound is emitted and
then ceases, a spatial image of the sound’s location still remains to
support navigation (Loomis et al. 2002). The spatial image makes
possible not only orienting and direct locomotion toward the
target, but also spatial updating by means of path integration.
Importantly for present concerns, we have recently shown that
the spatial image is three-dimensional and can be formed by
actions with the arm, as well as by vision (Giudice et al. 2013).
Subjects in our experiments formed representations of locations
in volumetric space that they viewed, touched directly, or
probed with a stick. They then walked without vision by an indirect path, requiring spatial updating, and touched the target at the
appropriate height. Localization was not only accurate, but minimally affected by how the target representation was formed: The
mean height error (signed distance between target and response
height) was only 1, 9, 7, and 3 cm for targets originally explored
with the hand, long pole, short pole, and vision, respectively. Precision, as measured by variability around the response location,
was also little affected by mode of exploration.
These ﬁndings demonstrate several pertinent points. First, fully
three-dimensional spatial representations were formed with high
accuracy. Second, those representations conveyed metric data sufﬁcient to support navigation, even in the absence of vision – that
is, with perceptually guided homing precluded and spatial updating as a requirement. Third, the spatial image afforded action
directed toward the object with the arms, as well as locomotion.
We have posited that human action capabilities require a metric
representation of volumetric space that seems incompatible with the
claim that terrestrial mammals are restricted to an impoverished
representation of the third dimension, in the form of a loosely
bound mosaic of planar maps. Although we have focused on
humans, we see no reason not to extend these arguments to primates more generally, and we note that other mammals, such as
squirrels and cats, routinely leap and jump to vertical target
locations. We concede, however, the potential for constraints on
human spatial representation. In particular, when our circumstances
become more like those of animals conﬁned to the ground plane
(e.g., when travelling in a car), our cognitive maps, too, may
provide only a local orientation relative to the direction of travel.

Monkeys in space: Primate neural data
suggest volumetric representations
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Abstract: The target article does not consider neural data on primate
spatial representations, which we suggest provide grounds for believing
that navigational space may be three-dimensional rather than quasi–twodimensional. Furthermore, we question the authors’ interpretation of
rat neurophysiological data as indicating that the vertical dimension may
be encoded in a neural structure separate from the two horizontal
dimensions.

The neurophysiological data presented by Jeffery et al. in the
target article in support of the view that spatial representations
for navigation by surface-travelling mammals are quasi-planar
come from just one animal: the rat. There is no consideration of
neural data from primates. We suggest here that when primate
neural data are examined, it raises the possibility that primates
have three-dimensional volumetric spatial representations for
navigation, not quasi-planar ones. Furthermore, we question the
authors’ interpretation of rat physiological data as suggesting
that the encoding of the vertical dimension occurs in a different
neural structure from the horizontal dimensions, “in an as yet
undiscovered region” (sect. 5.1, para. 5).
One indication of possible differences in spatial representations
between rats and primates comes from comparing allocentric
responses in the hippocampus. Rat hippocampal place cells ﬁre
only when a rat is located at a particular place. On the other
hand, macaque monkeys also have hippocampal cells that
respond when a monkey is merely looking from a distance at a particular spot, whose location has both horizontal and vertical components (Georges-François et al. 1999; Rolls 1999).
Although neurophysiological studies of navigation in rats
have focused on the hippocampus, neurophysiological and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies in macaque
monkeys and humans have highlighted other structures as also
important during navigation. Among them are the posterior parietal cortex, posterior parahippocampus, and retrosplenial cortex
(RSC), together with the nearby posterior cingulate cortex
(PCC) (Epstein 2008; Kravitz et al. 2011). RSC and PCC
appear to be part of a network that transmits spatial information
for navigation from the posterior parietal cortex to medial temporal lobe structures, in particular the parahippocampus and
hippocampus.
In addition to being the ultimate source of spatial information
for navigation, the posterior parietal cortex is also involved in
spatial representations for the control of action (which may be
distinct from spatial representations for object recognition and
memory [Sereno & Lehky 2011]; see also earlier work by
Goodale & Milner 1992). Control of action includes control of
3D eye movements and 3D visually guided reaching and grasping by the arm and hand (Blohm et al. 2009; Breveglieri et al.
2012; Hadjidimitrakis et al. 2012). Spatial representations for
the control of action in primates operate in a 3D volumetric
space, and not a quasi–2D multiplanar space. Furthermore,
recent physiological studies in monkeys of populations of posterior parietal cells (Sereno & Lehky 2011) show evidence for
a 3D representation of space in primates even when simply
ﬁxating.
As the posterior parietal cortex in primates appears to be a
source of spatial information both for control of action and for
navigation, it seems a reasonable conjecture that known parietal
3D spatial representations for control of action could also be
used for navigation. While the dimensionality of space representation for navigation in primates is an important topic that has
not been well studied, there are physiological reasons to believe
that it may be three-dimensional.
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It is also not clear that the representation of space in the rat is
quasi–two-dimensional, as Jeffery et al. claim, in the sense that
information about the vertical dimension is processed by different
neural circuitry. The authors cite physiological evidence of neural
activity in navigation circuits that is modulated by the vertical
dimension; for example, elongated vertical (relative to horizontal)
place-cell and grid-cell receptive ﬁelds for vertically arranged
spatial layouts. It doesn’t follow from those response anisotropies
that medial temporal lobe structures are not encoding the vertical
dimension. Computational studies, for example, might establish
that observed properties of rat grid and place cells are sufﬁcient
to account for behavioral abilities within the vertical dimension
without postulating other unknown neural centers for vertical
spatial representations. Indeed, there is a debate within the theoretical literature about whether narrowly tuned or coarsely tuned
cells provide better representations within a population (Lehky
& Sereno 2011; Pouget et al. 1999; Zhang & Sejnowski 1999).
As the authors themselves state, “much remains to be determined
about vertical processing in the navigation system” (sect. 4.1, para.
10). Therefore, the conclusion of the target article that space for
navigation is quasi–two-dimensional for all surface-travelling
mammals may be premature.
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Abstract: Jeffery et al. accurately identify the importance of developing an
understanding of spatial reference frames in a three-dimensional world.
We examine human spatial cognition via a unique paradigm that
investigates the role of saliency and adjusting reference frames. This
includes work with adults, typically developing children, and children
who develop non-typically (e.g., those with autism).

Jeffery et al.’s target article explores behavioural and neurobiological studies from many species and draws attention to the gaps in
the literature on human three-dimensional navigation. Our own
work addresses this gap by using a novel paradigm to examine
human searching behaviour in large-scale space. We have used
this setup in a series of adult and developmental studies (Pellicano
et al. 2011; Smith et al. 2005; 2008; 2010).
Our large-scale search laboratory contains an array of green
light-emitting diode (LED) light switches embedded in the
ﬂoor. Participants press illuminated switches to discover targets
that change colour when pressed. Potential targets can be
manipulated by colour, saliency, and probability of distribution.
Our paradigm preserves the experimental rigor of classic visual
search, by recording button presses to millisecond accuracy,
while scaling up to large-scale search in which the human participant has to move through the search array. This provides a ﬁrst
step towards investigating the processes involved in human navigation, which addresses a concern that has been raised regarding
the validity of modelling human search solely via two-dimensional
computer monitor–based search (Dalrymple & Kingstone 2010;
Foulsham et al. 2011; Foulsham & Kingstone 2012; Ingram &
Wolpert 2011).
Work comparing visually guided versus hidden target conditions revealed increased search latencies when the target is
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not visually available (Smith et al. 2008). In both visually and
non-visually guided conditions there were fewer revisits to previously explored locations than are present in classic computer
screen visual search studies, emphasizing a key distinction
between visual search and large-scale search (Smith et al. 2008).
Jeffery et al. also highlight a gap in human developmental
work on navigation and spatial cognition, which is crucial to building an understanding of how humans develop complex spatial
representations. Research in our paradigm has investigated the
role of short-term memory in preventing revisits to previously
inspected locations (Smith et al. 2005). Children made signiﬁcantly more revisits to previously examined search locations
when performing a more effortful search with the non-dominant
hand, suggesting that when the task is more effortful, individuals
are less able to optimize search. In addition, although children’s
general ﬂuid intelligence was unrelated to search time, there
was a signiﬁcant relationship between search latency and visuospatial short-term memory (measured via Corsi blocks). These
data highlight the role of spatial working memory in the development of efﬁcient exploration of large-scale space (Smith
et al. 2005).
Further work focused on the learning of likely target locations
(Smith et al. 2010). Here, targets were located on one side of the
room in 80% of trials. Participants were able to learn likely targets
when both the start location and search locations were ﬁxed
throughout the task. However, when room-based and reference
frames were disrupted, there was no evidence of learning,
suggesting that encoding of likely locations depends on a combination of egocentric and allocentric cues (Smith et al. 2010).
This same paradigm has been used in individuals with autism,
following the suggestion by Baron-Cohen (e.g., Baron-Cohen
2008) that the exceptional visual search skills of children with
autism are due to an increased aptitude at systemizing spatial cognition. However, children with autism were less efﬁcient, less systematic, less optimal, and overall less likely to follow probabilistic
cues than ability-matched typical children. This provides further
evidence that visual search and large-scale search do not always
share the same cognitive mechanisms (Pellicano et al. 2011).
Recent work has investigated the role of saliency in building
spatial representations. In work with adult participants, the perceptual salience of search locations was manipulated by having
some locations ﬂashing and some static, a paradigm adapted
from established visual search literature (Theeuwes 1994; Yantis
& Jonides 1984). Adults were more likely to search at ﬂashing
locations, even when explicitly informed that the target was
equally likely to be at any location (Longstaffe et al. 2012). We
propose that attention was captured by perceptual salience,
leading to an automatic bias to explore these targets. When this
work was extended to a population of typically developing children, they were also more likely to search at ﬂashing locations,
and the magnitude of this effect did not vary with age.
However, there was a strong developmental trend in the
number of times children revisited previously examined locations.
The developmental trajectory for ability to remember previously
visited locations and limit revisits shows a development in
spatial working memory occurring separately from perceptual
inhibition. This suggests individual executive sub-processes may
play different roles during search, with different developmental
trajectories. Further work in this paradigm examines the effect
of mediating working memory load on search behaviour. This
investigation of working memory during search is crucial for a
transition into real-world tasks, such as searching for lost keys or
a lost car in a parking lot.
The review by Jeffery et al. commendably addresses the scope
of research across many species and paradigms; here we present
work in a novel paradigm that expands our understanding of
human adult and child populations in the three-dimensional
world. Understanding how individuals incorporate reference
frames and employ cognitive mechanisms such as memory and
attention is key to modelling human navigation.
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Abstract: I propose that it is premature to assert that a fully threedimensional map has never evolved in any species, as data are lacking to
show that space coding in all animals is the same. Instead, I hypothesize
that three-dimensional representation is tied to an animal’s mode of
locomotion through space. Testing this hypothesis requires a large body
of comparative data.

The target article by Jeffery et al. reviews the literature on threedimensional spatial navigation and highlights important considerations for interpreting both behavioral and neurobiological data
on this topic. In their review, they lay the foundation for the
hypothesis that three-dimensional spatial navigation is “bicoded” –
that is, based on different encoding mechanisms for horizontal
and vertical space. Furthermore, they argue that a fully threedimensional map has never evolved in any species.
The “bicoded” model is based on studies of animals that move
along surfaces to navigate, which constrains the design of experiments and the data used to build theory. For a complete theory
of three-dimensional spatial navigation, a wider range of animals
must be studied. In particular, data from animals that freely navigate three-dimensional volumetric space will help determine
whether a single model can account for three-dimensional
spatial navigation in terrestrial, aerial, and aquatic species.
Counter to the model proposed by the authors of the target
article, I hypothesize that a fully three-dimensional volumetric
map has evolved in species that are not limited to navigating
along surfaces. More broadly, I hypothesize that three-dimensional spatial representation depends upon an animal’s mode of
locomotion and the navigational tasks it encounters in the
natural environment.
Another point I would like to make is that models of threedimensional spatial navigation must be grounded in behavioral
and neurobiological studies of animals engaged in biologically relevant and natural tasks. For example, rodents have conveniently
served as animal models for a wide range of studies, including
spatial navigation. Many rodent maze studies are, however,
highly artiﬁcial, requiring that animals perform tasks they are unlikely to encounter in a natural setting, and in spaces far more
restricted than they would navigate in the wild. The study of
inbred rodents that have not navigated the natural environment
for many generations raises additional concerns.
Research traditions have limited the study of spatial navigation,
and advances in the ﬁeld require a comparative approach. The
importance of choosing the right animals for the questions
under study, ﬁrst articulated by Nobel Laureate August Krogh
(1929), is widely recognized in the ﬁeld of Neuroethology, but is
less inﬂuential in the broad ﬁeld of Systems Neuroscience. It is
important that the spatial navigation research community interested in problems of three-dimensional spatial navigation turn
to the study of animals that have evolved to solve this problem.
Echolocating bats present an excellent model system to pursue
questions about three-dimensional spatial navigation. Bats belong
to the order Chiroptera, many species of which use biological
sonar systems to represent the spatial location of targets and
obstacles. In turn, this spatial information is used to build a cognitive map that can guide navigation in the absence of sensory cues.
Anecdotal reports and laboratory studies of echolocating bats
provide evidence that bats rely strongly on spatial memory
(Grifﬁn 1958; Jensen et al. 2005), and ﬁeld studies show that

bats use memory on many different spatial scales (Schnitzler
et al. 2003; Tsoar et al. 2011). Importantly, bats use an absolute-space–based (allocentric) navigational strategy that is hippocampus-dependent, and place cells have been identiﬁed and
characterized in the bat hippocampus (Ulanovsky & Moss 2007;
Yartsev & Ulanovsky 2013). Furthermore, grid cells have been
recently described in the medial entorhinal cortex (MEC) of the
Egyptian fruit bat (Yartsev et al. 2011). Therefore, echolocating
bats are particularly well suited for researchers to use in behavioral, neurobiological, and computational studies of three-dimensional spatial navigation.
Neural recording data from the MEC and hippocampus of bats
have raised questions about the generality of the rodent model in
spatial representation. Although neural recordings from awake,
behaving rats and bats show that neurons in the hippocampus
and MEC represent two-dimensional space in a similar way (Ulanovsky & Moss 2007; Yartsev et al. 2011), there is one noteworthy
difference, namely an absence of continuous theta oscillations in
hippocampal recordings from the big brown bat (Ulanovsky &
Moss 2007) and the MEC and hippocampus in the Egyptian
fruit bat (Yartsev et al. 2011; Yartsev & Ulanovsky 2013). Whole
cell patch clamp studies of the MEC of the big brown also demonstrate differences in subthreshold membrane potential resonance
between bats and rats (Heys et al. 2013). These reported species
differences challenge a fundamental assumption of the oscillatory
interference model of spatial coding (e.g., Burgess et al. 2007;
Hasselmo et al. 2007). By extension, comparative data could
raise questions about the generality of three-dimensional spatial
coding mechanisms in the brains of animals that have evolved to
navigate along surfaces, compared with those that move freely
through three-dimensional volumetric spaces, such as air and
water.
In summary, I propose that it is premature to assert that a fully
three-dimensional map has never evolved in any species, as
empirical data are lacking to support the notion that three-dimensional space coding in all animals is the same. Recent ﬁndings
from Yartsev & Ulanovsky (2013), demonstrating three-dimensional space representation in the hippocampus of the freeﬂying Egyptian Fruit bat, are consistent with the hypothesis that
space representation is tied to an animal’s mode of locomotion.
To fully test this hypothesis requires a large body of comparative
data.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT

Supported by ONR Grant (N00014-12-1-0339), Three-dimensional Spatial Navigation, to Cynthia F. Moss and Timothy
Horiuchi.

Making a stronger case for comparative
research to investigate the behavioral and
neurological bases of three-dimensional
navigation
doi:10.1017/S0140525X13000472
Daniele Nardia and Verner P. Bingmanb
a

Department of Psychology, Sapienza Università di Roma, 00185 Rome, Italy;
Department of Psychology and J.P. Scott Center for Neuroscience, Mind, and
Behavior, Bowling Green State University, Bowling Green, OH 43403.
d.nardi@uniroma1.it
vbingma@bgsu.edu
b

Abstract: The rich diversity of avian natural history provides exciting
possibilities for comparative research aimed at understanding threedimensional navigation. We propose some hypotheses relating
differences in natural history to potential behavioral and neurological
adaptations possessed by contrasting bird species. This comparative
approach may offer unique insights into some of the important
questions raised by Jeffery et al.
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5

557

Commentary/Jeffery et al.: Navigating in a three-dimensional world
Jeffery et al.’s target article is a fascinating synthesis of the relatively scarce but expanding research on three-dimensional navigation, in addition to proposing an engaging hypothesis on the
neural representation of vertical space. As recognized by Jeffery
et al., birds offer intriguing possibilities as model species for investigating the behavioral and neurological bases of navigation in 3D
space. Studies on homing pigeons (Columba livia) suggest that the
topography of the landscape is an important source of information
for bird navigation. As mentioned by Jeffery et al., sloped terrain
provides a global feature and – at least locally – a directional reference frame. The extent to which pigeons encode and use this
reference frame, when walking on a slanted ﬂoor, is impressive
(Nardi & Bingman 2009a; Nardi et al. 2010). A crucial attribute
of slope – and more generally, the vertical dimension – is the
involvement of effort. This has been highlighted in rats, which
show a strategy preference for horizontal movements relative to
vertical movements (Grobéty & Schenk 1992a; Jovalekic et al.
2011). In pigeons, evidence suggests that effort, modulated by
different, energetically demanding upward and downward movements, affects how a sloped environment is represented, or at least
used (Nardi et al. 2012). This strengthens the hypothesis that
effort could be used as a “contextual” cue, in the sense proposed
by Jeffery et al., derived from kinesthetic/proprioceptive information during locomotion on a slope. Importantly, hippocampal
lesions in pigeons do not impair the slope-based goal representation (Nardi & Bingman 2009b), despite having disruptive
effects on memory for other spatial cues (e.g., Gagliardo et al.
1999; Vargas et al. 2004). Possibly slope does not engage the hippocampus because it is used more as a source of directional,
compass-like information than for determining distances and
map-like information. More studies are needed to ascertain the
role of effort in the representation of sloped – and volumetric –
space, and its neurological underpinnings.
Beyond pigeons, the class Aves, with its rich diversity in natural
history, offers exciting opportunities to apply comparative
methods for better understanding the representation of 3D
space. Although Jeffery et al. acknowledge that evolutionary adaptation (and constraints), reﬂected in species natural history, may
be important in how vertical and horizontal space may be integrated, they offer few explicit hypotheses that can be answered
by comparative-based research. As a well-known example of the
power of comparative research, the larger hippocampus and
superior spatial cognitive abilities of food-storing birds (e.g., Pravosudov & Clayton 2002) indicate that differential evolutionary
pressure can lead to variation in natural history, which co-occurs
with variation in brain-behavior organization. We are similarly
convinced that interesting differences can also be found with
respect to navigating 3D space at both the relatively easily
studied behavioral level and the more difﬁcult to study neurobiological level. Almost all species of birds ﬂy and necessarily inhabit a
three-dimensional world, but often differ with respect to their
“3D occupancy proﬁle.” For example, ground birds, such as
some quail species (family Odontophoridae) inhabit a robustly
horizontal space, whereas tree creepers (family Certhididae)
search for food vertically but move horizontally among different
trees, and wallcreepers (family Tichodromidae) live in the substantially vertical world of cliff faces.1 How might natural differences in horizontal, vertical, and volumetric occupancy inﬂuence
the representation of space and its neural encoding in the hippocampal formation or elsewhere in the brain?
In our opinion, the most exciting and novel hypothesis
advanced by Jeffery et al. is the notion that horizontal space is
more richly represented and is dissociated, at least partially,
from the relatively impoverished, contextual representation of
vertical space. And this may indeed be true for species such as
rats and even humans. We wonder, however, how generally applicable this idea may be. The black-capped chickadee (Poecile atricapillus) is a remarkable species of bird that routinely lives in the
complex volumetric space of deciduous trees and will seasonally
store and later recover seeds within the chaotic world of
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intersecting tree branches – a behavior dependent on the integrity
of the hippocampal formation (Sherry & Vaccarino 1989). Chickadees apply their robust, spatial memory ability in a 3D space,
which may appear multilayered but, because deciduous tree
branches can intersect at almost any angle, would often be
better characterized as true volumetric space. (Coniferous trees
have a more multilayered quality.) The survival of individuals is
very much dependent on “volumetric encoding” of stored food
that would likely suffer if only a contextual heuristic would be
used to encode vertical location. From a purely adaptationist perspective, if any species – and more generally, any natural history
proﬁle – would support the evolution of a uniﬁed representation
of volumetric space, it would be the black-capped chickadee
and other species that store seeds in deciduous trees. As a
natural comparative experiment, chickadees could be contrasted
with the Clark’s nutcracker (Nucifraga columbiana), which also
stores seeds and has an extraordinary ability to recall the locations
of those seeds (e.g., Kamil et al. 1994). However, whereas chickadees store seeds within the volumetric space of tree limbs,
nutcrackers store them in the ground, in a rolling but two-dimensional horizontal space. Would chickadees outperform nutcrackers in a spatial memory task in a sloping, multilayered or
volumetric space? Would hippocampal neurons in chickadees be
more likely to encode aspects of volumetric space?
We are not advocating that comparative approaches would
answer all the important questions raised by Jeffery et al., but
we hope we have convinced the reader that comparative
research – not necessarily limited to birds – is a powerful experimental strategy that can reveal much about the diversity of
three-dimensional spatial representations.
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Abstract: Single-cell studies of monkey posterior parietal cortex (PPC)
have revealed the extensive neuronal representations of threedimensional subject motion and three-dimensional layout of the
environment. I propose that navigational planning integrates this PPC
information, including gravity signals, with horizontal-plane based
information provided by the hippocampal formation, modiﬁed in
primates by expansion of the ventral stream.

Jeffery et al. ignore half of navigation, namely navigation in egocentric frameworks. Many of the mechanisms of this type of navigation – as important as allocentric navigation, as walking along a
cliff demonstrates – have been investigated in primates, but are
conspicuously absent from the present review. Yet, from an evolutionary and genetic standpoint, we humans are obviously much
closer to apes and monkeys than to rodents. Monkeys typically
live and climb in trees and, not surprisingly, possess a threedimensional (3D) space representation in their posterior parietal
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cortex (PPC) (Andersen & Buneo 2002). The PPC is dramatically
expanded in primates compared to rodents, in which primary cortices V1 and S1 lie very close, leaving little room for the extrastriate or posterior parietal cortex (Whitlock et al. 2008). Single-cell
studies in monkeys have revealed neurons selective for optic
ﬂow components in several parietal regions: middle superior temporal dorsal (MSTd: Lagae et al. 1994; Tanaka et al. 1986), ventral
intraparietal (VIP: Schaafsma & Duysens 1996), and medial PPC
(Squatrito et al. 2001). Human imaging studies suggest that
additional regions, such as V6, might be involved (Wall & Smith
2008). DeAngelis, Angelaki, and coworkers have compared
visual and vestibular selectivities of neurons in MSTd, VIP, and
visual posterior sylvian (VPS) for rotation and translation in
three dimensions (see Chen et al. 2010; 2011a; 2011b; Takahashi
et al. 2007). Whereas MSTd and VIP neurons can support the perception of heading, neurons in VIP and VPS support those of selfrotation. In these areas, all directions in space are represented
with no clustering of preferences close to the horizontal plane,
as would be expected if the vertical direction were poorly represented. This is unsurprising as in primates equipped with binocular vision the z-axis (depth) is unique, not the vertical axis,
which unlike depth is represented on the retina. Indeed, particularly in VIP and to a lesser degree in MSTd, the depth axis was
under-represented among preferred directions. Preferred directions and tuning widths of MSTd neurons, however, were nonuniformly distributed along the horizontal meridian, explaining
the decrease in behavioral sensitivity to self-motion direction
with increasing eccentricity in humans and monkeys (Gu et al.
2010).
In their quest to demonstrate that humans mainly use a horizontal reference frame for navigation, Jeffery et al. quote psychophysical studies of 3D slope perception and the misperception of
vertical slopes they reveal. Contrary to the authors’ claims, this
misperception is part of a larger problem, depth reconstruction
(see above), which is complicated by the dependence of distance
scaling on the derivation order of disparity. Indeed, human subjects have no precise representation of metric 3D structure,
whether using stereo or monocular cues (Todd & Norman
2003). In no way can these misperceptions be taken as evidence
that neuronal mechanisms for estimating 3D slopes do not exist.
In fact, such neurons have been documented in caudal intraparietal (CIP), part of the PPC (Taira et al. 2000), and also in the inferotemporal cortex (Liu et al. 2004) – thus, in both the dorsal and
ventral visual systems. Similarly, selectivity for second-order disparity gradients has also been documented (see Orban 2011 for
review). Some of the cortical areas in which these higher-order
neurons have been recorded may not even exist in rodents,
again underscoring the importance of using adequate models
for the human brain. Together, these results indicate that the
primate PPC includes representations in three dimensions of
subject motion and of the layout of the environment, two critical
pieces of information for navigating through 3D space.
The starting point of the target article is the importance of the
cognitive map in the hippocampus for spatial navigation. Even if
grid cells have recently been identiﬁed in monkey entorhinal
cortex (Killian et al. 2012), the hippocampal system of primates
bears only a vague resemblance to that of rodents. Relatively
small numbers of human hippocampal neurons are place cells,
and these occur in several brain regions (Jacobs et al. 2010).
This is not surprising, as the hippocampus receives major projections from the ventral stream (Kravitz et al. 2013), which in primates processes information about objects at least as much as
scenes, and even information concerning conspeciﬁcs. Indeed,
considerable evidence indicates that the human hippocampal formation processes not only spatial, but also non-spatial and even
non-visual information (Liang et al. 2013). This species difference
may be even further underestimated, as the human brain evolved
to accommodate bipedalism, and thus navigation in open spaces,
but such navigation has so far been little investigated for technical
reasons. On the other hand, navigation supposes a transformation

of coordinate information from spatial maps into body-centered
representations, a function likely to be subserved by the PPC,
which is connected to the hippocampal formation via the retrospenial cortex in rodents (Whitlock et al. 2008). A similar route links
the primate precuneus and adjacent dorsal superior parietal
lobule with the hippocampal system (Kravitz et al. 2011). The
involvement of these medio-dorsal PPC regions in the control
and planning of navigation is supported by their activation
during observation of climbing and locomotion in humans (Abdollahi et al. 2012). Hence, I propose a much more balanced view,
whereby spatial navigation is both allocentric and egocentric and
is controlled by both the hippocampal formation (fed by the qualitative scene analysis in parahippocampal gyrus where gravity is not
incorporated) and the metric space representation in the PPC (in
which gravity is incorporated). These two streams of information
are integrated in the dorso-medial PPC devoted to planning locomotor body movements. A recent imaging study indicates that this
scheme, clearly different from the bicoded scheme of Jeffery
et al., applies to humans (Indovina et al. 2013). To what extent
it may also apply to rodents is unclear but, intriguingly, one of
the subregions of the rodent PPC (the anteromedial visual area;
Torrealba & Valdes 2008) may be a precursor of primate V6
and supply optic ﬂow information.
In conclusion, including nonhuman primates among the animal
models is essential for understanding the human brain, even for
navigation and spatial memory, avoiding errors induced by
jumping from rodents to humans as these authors have done.
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Abstract: Jeffery et al. suggest that three-dimensional environments are
not represented according to their volumetric properties, but in a quasiplanar fashion. Here we take into consideration the role of visual
experience and the use of technology for spatial learning to better
understand the nature of the preference of horizontal over vertical
spatial representation.

The article by Jeffery et al. reviews the literature on spatial cognition relative to three-dimensional environments, which is an area
vastly less investigated than are two-dimensional (or planar)
environments. The authors have concluded that three-dimensional spaces are represented in a quasi-planar fashion. Here we
add to the discussion by examining the role played by developmental vision on the structure and functioning of brain areas
involved in spatial cognition, and the results of studies investigating the role of spatial learning on three-dimensional space
representation.
The role of developmental vision in spatial representation has
been reported by numerous studies on humans (Pasqualotto
et al. 2013; Postma et al. 2007; Röder et al. 2007; Vecchi et al.
2004; see Pasqualotto & Proulx [2012] for a review) and animals
(Buhot et al. 2001; Hyvärinen et al. 1981; Paz-Villagrán et al.
2002). Yet, the role played by vision on the establishment of the
quasi-planar representation of three-dimensional spaces has not
been investigated. This represents a broad avenue for future
studies. Due to the crucial role played by vision in spatial cognition
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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(e.g., Frankenstein et al. 2012) and vertical spatial perception (Ooi
et al. 2001; Sinai et al. 1998), it is conceivable that visual experience has an effect on both horizontal and vertical spatial representation, and, therefore, the results discussed by Jeffery et al. may be
driven by experience with the visual world. In other words, blind
individuals, especially if congenitally blind, may not exhibit quasiplanar spatial representation of three-dimensional environments.
This hypothesis may be well supported by studies reporting the
role of blindness in the functioning of hippocampal cells in
rodents (Hill & Best 1981; Larsen et al. 2009; Paz-Villagrán
et al. 2002; Poucet et al. 2000) and on hippocampal structure
and activation in humans (Chebat et al. 2007; Deutschländer
et al. 2009; Kupers et al. 2010; Leporé et al. 2009).
The study by Passini and Proulx (1988) represents a rare investigation on the spatial representation of a three-dimensional
environment by congenitally blind and sighted participants.
They found that overall, blind participants took more decisions
at crucial points of the environment than did sighted ones.
These points included intersections, stairs, open spaces, etc. Crucially, vertical structures of the environment did not receive more
attention than horizontal ones.
In a recent article, Thibault et al. (2013) investigated the effect
of spatial learning on memory of a virtual three-dimensional building. The same building was learned either through “planar” or
“columnar” exploration. It was followed by a spatial memory
task where participants re-experienced a segment of the exploratory route. The results showed that the group of participants who
underwent planar exploration had superior spatial memory performance. Yet, Thibault et al. also found that for both groups,
the spatial memory task was better performed when participants
re-experienced the same segments as during the exploratory
phase (i.e., congruency effect). This suggests that, according to
the learning type, participants could store the three-dimensional
building in quasi-planar and quasi-columnar fashions.
These results suggest that quasi-planar spatial representation
may be the result of quasi-planar spatial exploration. In other
words, by using virtual reality (Lahav & Mioduser 2008; Péruch
et al. 1995) or sensory substitution devices (Kupers et al. 2010;
Proulx et al. 2008; 2012), three-dimensional environments could
be explored and stored according to any fashion (i.e., planar or
columnar). These devices would overcome the energetic cost
associated with vertical exploration (Butler et al. 1993; Hölscher
et al. 2006). Finally, the ability of the brain to learn and carry
out spatial memory tasks in non-planar fashion is supported by
studies in “gravity-less” three-dimensional virtual mazes (Vidal
et al. 2003; 2004). Therefore, we advocate that future research
should address the role played by visual experience and spatial
learning on spatial representation of three-dimensional
environments.
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Abstract: We describe an augmented topological map as an alternative for
the proposed bicoded map. Inverting causality, the special nature of the
vertical dimension is then no longer ﬁxed a priori and the cause of
speciﬁc navigation behavior, but a consequence of the combination of
the speciﬁc geometry of the experimental environment and the motor
capabilities of the experimental animals.
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Based on a review of neurophysiological and behavioural evidence
regarding the encoding of three-dimensional space in biological
agents, Jeffery et al. argue for a bicoded map in which height
information is available and used but not fully integrated with
information from the horizontal dimensions in the cognitive
map. We propose an alternative hypothesis, namely an augmented
topological map with “semi-metric” properties that under certain
circumstances will give rise to a representation which appears to
be bicoded but is based on the same principles of spatial encoding
operating in all three dimensions.
As an alternative to a metric representation, roboticists
(Kuipers et al. 2000; Wyeth & Milford 2009) have found that a
topological representation sufﬁces for robots to map and navigate
planar environments. In these experiments, a graph representation, with nodes corresponding to distinct places and edges to
speciﬁc motor programs, enables the robot to follow a path
from one distinct place to another. To also allow the capability
of executing shortcuts, this graph representation is augmented
with metric information. Sensor-based estimates of travelled distance and travel direction associated with the edges allow assignment of metric coordinates to the nodes in the graph. These
estimates will initially be unreliable. However, a mechanism as
described by Wyeth and Milford (2009) corrects the metric coordinate estimates for the graph nodes when the agent returns to a
previously visited distinct place. As a consequence, this representation converges to a “semi-metric” map. This differs from a real
metric map in that the reliability of the metric information associated with the nodes varies across the graph. For sparsely connected subgraphs, for example less-travelled parts of the
environment, the metric information can be unreliable. For
highly interconnected subgraphs – for example, well-explored
parts of the environment – the metric information can be used
for optimizing paths: for instance, in calculating shortcuts.
We propose that such a scheme can be extended to three
dimensions: the nodes represent three-dimensional positions,
and the edges the three-dimensional motor programs that move
the agent from one position (i.e., sensorially distinct place) to
another. If the environment allows multiple three-dimensional
paths from one place to another, a “semi-metric” three-dimensional map would result. Elsewhere we have described a mechanical analogue (Veelaert & Peremans 1999) to model this process,
in which we map the nodes in the graph onto spherical joints and
the edges onto elastic rods. To represent both the uncertainty
about the actual distance travelled and the direction of travel
between the distinct places represented by the nodes, both the
lengths of the rods and their orientations can vary (see Fig. 1).
The rigidity of the resulting mechanical construction tells us
whether all nodes are at well-deﬁned positions relative to one
another. Whenever particular subparts of the mechanical construction can still move relative to one another, this indicates
that the corresponding parts of space are not well deﬁned with
respect to each other. However, if the subparts of the mechanical
construction are rigid, relative positions within those parts of
space can be fully deﬁned.
Multilayer environments modeled with this representation
result in a discrete set of highly interconnected subgraphs, one
for each layer, connected together by a small number of isolated
links. The isolated links correspond to the few paths that can be
followed to go from one layer to another; for example, a staircase
in a building. As the subgraphs are connected by a few links only,
they can be metrically related to each other but the uncertainty on
this relationship is higher than that between distinct places at the
same layer. The metric representations of the different layers are
only partially registered. In terms of our mechanical analogue, the
constructions representing the individual layers are rigid, but
these rigid substructures are linked to one another through a
few links only, allowing them to move relative to each other as
illustrated in Figure 1.
From the mechanical analogue, it is clear that the extent to
which the augmented topological representation of space could
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Figure 1 (Peremans & Vanderelst). (a) Two-layered environment with marked distinct places; (b) three hypothetical representations of
(a), where green = accurate travelled distance and orientation estimates, blue = inaccurate travelled distance estimate, and red = inaccurate
travelled distance and orientation estimates.

act as a metric representation – that is, give rise to a rigid mechanical construction – depends on the interconnectivity of the nodes
in the graph. One factor that determines this interconnectivity is
whether the environment provides many opportunities for following different closed-loop paths that return to already-visited distinct places. Furthermore, given an environment providing
many such opportunities, whether a highly interconnected
graph would actually be constructed also depends on the movement patterns of the mapping agent. For example, the rats in
the vertical plane maze seem to prefer movement patterns that
extensively explore horizontal layers, only sparsely interspersed
with short movements up or down the vertical dimension. Such
a movement pattern gives rise to a set of highly interconnected
subgraphs linked together by a few isolated links, similar to that
of a multilayer environment. Hence, to really test whether the
augmented topological representation (and the mechanism by
which a three-dimensional “semi-metric” representation arises
from it) corresponds with the actual cognitive map as
implemented in mammalian brains, the experimental agents
should be able to treat all spatial dimensions equivalently.
We propose that bats are a promising animal model for such a
study, as they live in a true three-dimensional environment and
have the motor capabilities to follow arbitrary three-dimensional
paths through this environment. In particular, the spatial
memory and orientation of nectar-feeding bats using both visual
and echo-acoustic environment sensing have already been investigated in a series of studies (Thiele & Winter 2005; Winter et al.
2004). Interestingly, Winter and Stich (2005) note that the hippocampus of nectar-feeding glossophagine bats is 50–100% larger in
size than that of insectivorous members of the same family (Phyllostomidae). Although the reported results do not show evidence
that these animals treat vertical and horizontal dimensions differently, more speciﬁc experiments are necessary, as the ones
described were not aimed at ﬁnding out the nature of the bats’
cognitive map.

Navigation bicoded as functions of x-y and
time?
doi:10.1017/S0140525X13000514
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Abstract: Evidence from egocentric space is cited to support bicoding of
navigation in three-dimensional space. Horizontal distances and space are
processed differently from the vertical. Indeed, effector systems are
compatible in horizontal space, but potentially incompatible (or chaotic)
during transitions to vertical motion. Navigation involves changes in
coordinates, and animal models of navigation indicate that time has an
important role.

Jeffery et al. provide evidence that horizontal and vertical coordinates are processed by different systems, to the effect that navigation in a three-dimensional environment requires two codes. The
authors summarise evidence from allocentric navigation and
single cell recording to support their position. Although we are
more familiar with egocentric coordinate systems, we agree with
Jeffery et al. that bicoding is likely, and note evidence from perceptual illusions, neurological conditions, studies of stimulus–
response compatibility, and biomechanical constraints further
supporting this.
Perceptual illusions. Distinctly different codes responsible for
horizontal and vertical distances are indicated by perceptual illusions. In the horizontal/vertical illusion, two lines of equal
length form an upside-down T. Although of equal length, the vertical line nevertheless appears longer perceptually (Avery & Day
1969). Such observations imply that horizontal and vertical distances are processed differently, and this is reinforced by the
differential vulnerabilities of horizontal and vertical coordinate
systems to neurological disorders.
Neurological disorders. Cerebro-vascular accidents (strokes)
affecting the right hemisphere, particularly the parietal lobe,
lead to hemineglect (Mattingley et al. 1992). Hemineglect is a tendency to ignore the left side of space that occurs independently of
any deﬁcits in the visual ﬁeld. These strokes affect the perception
of space and the willingness to search and explore the left side of
space. Although hemineglect is a relatively common neurological
syndrome, a comparable tendency to ignore the lower or upper
zones of space is quite rare, and the underlying pathophysiology
is not well understood (Shelton et al. 1990), suggesting that different systems are responsible for horizontal and vertical coordinates,
and this is reinforced by a consideration of effector systems.
Stimulus–response compatibility. The transition from a horizontal plane to a three-dimensional coordinate system as occurs
in three-dimensional interfaces (Phillips et al. 2005), poses potential sources of incompatibility between stimulus and response
(Worringham & Beringer 1989). For instance, in human–computer interfaces, leftwards joystick or leftwards mouse motions both
indicate left cursor motion, and remain so in three dimensions.
Nevertheless, the use of motions to code for up can be arbitrary,
with forward mouse movements coding for upwards cursor
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5

561

Commentary/Jeffery et al.: Navigating in a three-dimensional world
motion on computer screens and forward joystick motion coding
for downwards cursor movements. Indeed, this arbitrariness is
also seen within animals, with locomotor responses operating in
opposition to trunk/body responses, such that downward propulsive movements code for up (ﬂying, swimming) or head-down
movements code for down (ﬂying, swimming).
Biomechanical constraints. Indeed, navigation is necessarily a
corollary of activity and motion, and there are biomechanical constraints that argue for motion to be primarily coded in the horizontal plane. Motion occurs within the context of a constant
gravitational ﬁeld that has implications for movement (Phillips &
Ogeil 2010). For most mammals, locomotion is roughly analogous
to the oscillations of pendulums suspended vertically from hip or
shoulder joints. Such motions are mathematically predictable.
However, there are potential sources of problems if motions
incorporate additional oscillators to create motion in the third
dimension. If motion in the third dimension requires horizontally
oriented oscillators, these physical systems have the potential to
be chaotic and unpredictable, because the combination of horizontal and vertical oscillators approximates a pendulum (x oscillator) suspended on a rotating driving arm (y oscillator). Such
systems are potentially chaotic (Baker & Gollub 1996) in their behaviour, with system characteristics dependent upon speed and
the size of the y oscillator. Given a potential unpredictability
inherent in motion in three dimensions, it should not be surprising
that motion systems are primarily oriented in accordance with
gravity and that coordinate systems are oriented perpendicularly
to gravity, with other sources of information being more important
for navigation than is altitude.
Coordinate systems. Navigation requires motion, with coordinates updated as time and location change. For example,
studies of Monarch butterﬂy navigation during seasonal migration
have demonstrated at the cellular level that the circadian system
integrates information about navigating space based on time in
addition to an insect’s position relative to the sun (Reppert
2006). Central to this is a time-compensated sun compass,
which likely receives direct input from the circadian system
(Zhu et al. 2008), to allow correction of ﬂight direction and coordinates relative to changing light levels across the course of the
day. This time-compensated sun compass appears to be genetically determined rather than learned (Reppert 2006). Hence,
we feel the second code is more likely to involve a time component than an altitude component.

Vertical and veridical – 2.5-dimensional visual
and vestibular navigation
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Abstract: Does the psychological and neurological evidence concerning
three-dimensional localization and navigation ﬂy in the face of
optimality? This commentary brings a computational and robotic
engineering perspective to the question of “optimality” and argues that a
multicoding manifold model is more efﬁcient in several senses, and is
also likely to extend to “volume-travelling” animals, including birds or ﬁsh.

We think we live in a three-dimensional world, so it is natural to
think that our representation of our environment would reﬂect
a three-dimensional structure, and be represented as such in
our three-dimensional brain. In fact, we operate in at least a
four-dimensional world, with time being a dimension that also
needs representation in order to process events, deal with
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causality, and so forth. The traditional computing model,
whether the one-dimensional Turing Machine or the sequential
address space of a central processing unit (CPU), is to embed multidimensional structures by arithmetic or referential mappings to
linear arrays. Computer circuits and living brains also have a
strong, locally two-dimensional structure. In the cortex, the
layers of the brain represent both layers of complexity and a
mapping of time to depth, with opportunity for increasingly
diverse associations to be formed. The cochlear is essentially a
one-dimensional representation physically coiled and temporally
coded for time and frequency. The retina is essentially a twodimensional representation with quaternary coding for frequency,
and again an analog encoding of time and amplitude. The vestibular system is a collection of essentially one-dimensional sensors,
as described by Jeffery et al., who note that there would be considerable complexity in producing a three-dimensional analog representation from this.
Although the three-dimensional world nominally has volume
“larger than a plane by a power of 3/2” (sect. 2, para. 4), the vertical
dimension is in general many orders of magnitude smaller than
the distances navigated in the horizontal plane, there is no need
to encode it this way, and even “volume-travelling” creatures
tend to maintain a preferred orientation in relation to gravity, as
Jeffery et al. point out (sect. 5.1, para. 11). Animals also tend to
operate in strata, being far from “unconstrained.” In fact, there
is arguably less constraint for a rat jumping around a three-dimensional maze or a squirrel jumping around an even more complex
forest – for example, they can move vertically in a way a bird or
a ﬁsh cannot. Similarly, the “three planes” of directional information when viewed egocentrically, combined with the vertical
dimension “characterized by gravity” (sect. 2, para. 4), provide a
natural two-dimensional manifold which can be topologically
expanded locally when there is more information available, as is
well known from self-organizing maps (von der Malsburg 1973).
The constraints of gravity do not “add” complexity, but rather
give rise to both constraints and heuristics that reduce complexity.
The visual system is also constrained by the locus of eyegaze and
the characteristic poses with respect to gravity. Here we have twodimensional sensors from which three-dimensional information
could be reconstructed, but again the evidence points to a 2.5dimensional model (Marr 1982). But the two-dimensional plane
of the retina tends to be near vertical, whereas the two-dimensional plane of locomotion tends to be near horizontal, and it
would seem natural that both should track egocentrically when
these assumptions are invalid, with discrepancies between the
canonical gravitational and egocentric navigational model
leading to errors that increase with the deviation.
Jeffery et al. have little to say about navigation, focusing almost
exclusively on representation without much comment on aspects
of the reviewed experiments that relate to their actual title.
When we consider vision and navigation in robotics, whether
underwater, aerial, or surface vehicles are used, we tend to use
a two-dimensional model coded with far more than just one
additional piece of dimensional information. We tend to track
and correct individual sensor readings to keep track of our
location, based on simple models that predict based on location,
velocity, and acceleration, and we also attach information about
the terrain, the temperature, the sights and sounds, and potentially also information about how hard or dangerous, or how
much energy is being expended. These factors become inputs
for both algorithmic and heuristic components of the actual
path planning that is the key task in navigation. One additional
factor that is important here is the ability to deal with the world
at multiple scales, with approximate paths being worked out for
a coarse scale before zooming in recursively to plan the coarse
stages in detail. Even fully detailed two-dimensional maps lead
to impossibly complex calculations of an optimal path, so the solution is to select a reasonable one at a coarse level based on highlevel detail, and then burrow down into the detail when needed.
Humans also have difﬁculty navigating more than two dimensions,
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and even 2.5 dimensions is not in general a good computer interface feature (Cockburn & McKenzie 2001; 2002).
In terms of Shannon Information, the most frequent events or
landmarks or percepts are the least interesting and useful, and
Kohonen Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) will tend to allocate area
to its inputs in a monotonic increasing but sublinear way ( p 2/3
rather than -log p) for a gain in efﬁciency of representation,
whilst the Zipﬁan Principle of Least Effort will ensure encoding
so that the frequent data can be dealt with faster, and sparse representation principles will lead us to store events that occur rather
than placeholders for events that never occur or voxels that are
seldom occupied, as would be the case for a four-dimensional
model with a cell for every time and place. In fact, the antiShannon allocation of memory in a SOM means there is more
real estate available for the subtle details that correspond to the
next level of detail in our robotic model. For the squirrel this
might be brain space for the vertical dimensions and horizontal
layers of a forest, and, more importantly still, the nutritional and
territorial dimensions. The latter is an important ﬁfth dimension
for the squirrel, marked by its own pheromones and those of its
potential mates and potential predators.
Jeffery et al. argue for a 2.5-dimensional model, but allow that
this could be a manifold with an egocentric normal rather than a
gravimetric plane. They seem to prefer a mosaic model, which is
reminiscent of many robotic and vision models where extra details
are linked in. The manifold model would in many ways seem to ﬁt
better with current ideas of brain processing and self-organization,
although a distributed mosaic of contextual associations with multiple sensory-motor areas would be a highly plausible model for
survival navigation.

Foreshortening affects both uphill and
downhill slope perception at far distances
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Abstract: Perceived slope varies with the viewing distance, and is
consistent with the effects of foreshortening. Distant viewing makes
uphill slopes appear steeper and downhill slopes ﬂatter than does near
viewing. These effects are obvious to skiers and climbers in
mountainous country. They have also been measured in outdoor
experiments with controlled viewing distances. There are many other
sources of slope illusions.

Jeffery et al. discuss the human ability to estimate the slope of surfaces, and leave open the question of whether there is a dissociation between inaccurate conscious judgements of slope and
accurate motor actions on the slope. They say that perceptual
slope constancy exists – that is, a surface appears to have a relatively constant slope regardless of viewing distance, even though
the angle the slope makes with the eye (the optical angle)
changes. They also state that observers always overestimate
slope, and that this cannot be explained by foreshortening of distance, because that would make downhill slopes appear ﬂatter.
Some of these statements can be challenged.
To perceive a geographical scene correctly, the two-dimensional image presented to the eye has to be turned into a threedimensional image, and related to gravity and the angle of
regard. Gravity information is obtained through the vestibular
system and postural cues, and contributes to knowledge of the
angle of regard. Translation to a three-dimensional image
depends on distance information, which can be obtained from
various binocular and monocular cues at short distances, and at

Figure 1 (Ross). Distance foreshortening makes uphill slopes
appear too steep (EF to E′F′) and downhill slopes too shallow
(AB to A′B′). [Reprinted from Ross (1994) with permission]
all distances from the probabilistic relationship between images
and their physical sources (Yang & Purves 2003). Local relationships between different parts of the terrain can produce large
slope illusions, or “anti-gravity hills” (Bressan et al. 2003),
perhaps by changing the probabilities.
Outdoor observations and experiments using long viewing
distances show that apparent slope does vary with the viewing
distance and viewing height. Distant uphill slopes appear
steeper than near uphill slopes. Distant downhill slopes appear
ﬂatter than near downhill slopes, and very distant downhill
slopes appear to slope uphill. Skiers at the top of a hill may
observe skiers in the valley below apparently skiing uphill.
These effects can all be explained by increased foreshortening
of distance at further distances (Fig. 1). However, when viewing
different parts of the terrain, observers also vary their angle of
regard, and the optical angle will change. These effects are particularly marked at short viewing distances and may contribute
to different perceptual effects with close viewing.
It is well known that uphill slopes appear steeper from a far than
a near distance. Alhazen used foreshortened distance in the 11th
century to explain the vertical appearance of distant hills (Sabra
1989). Ross (1974, p. 73) found that skiers gave steeper verbal
estimates of an uphill slope from a far viewpoint than when standing on the slope. Creem-Regehr et al. (2004) varied the viewing
distance from the base of a hill to 70 meters away, and found an
increase in slope estimates from the far distance. Bridgeman
and Hoover (2008) had observers stand on a paved hill with an
11 degree slope, and judge the slope when looking up to a cone
placed at 1, 2, 4, 8, and 16 meters uphill from them; their slope
estimates increased with the viewing distance. Thus, quite short
increases in viewing distance are sufﬁcient to cause an increase
in apparent uphill slope, at least when accompanied by a raised
angle of regard. In this case the optical angle decreases with the
viewing distance, and cannot be used as an explanation of the
increase in apparent slope.
The appearance of downhill slopes is more controversial.
Unlike uphill slopes, downhill slopes can only be viewed with a
lowered angle of regard. For evidence that downhill slopes
appear too steep the authors cite Profﬁtt et al. (1995) and Li
and Durgin (2009). However, Li and Durgin conducted a laboratory experiment using very short viewing distances, and found that
downhill slopes appeared steeper when viewed further back from
the edge of a drop. The increased viewing distance was
accompanied by a decreased optical angle and a less depressed
angle of regard. For downhill views a smaller optical angle is
associated with a steeper slope, and this may explain the effect.
The experiment does not compare uphill and downhill views, or
deal with large distances. Profﬁtt et al. used real outdoor hills,
viewed from the base or the top. The hills had slopes of from 2
to 34 degrees, but their lengths were not speciﬁed. The hills
were selected to be near footpaths on a university campus, and
to be sufﬁciently long that the top of the hill was “well above
the horizon” when viewed from the base. For an average viewer
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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with an eye-height of 1.5 meters, the 2 degree hill would have to
be more than 43 meters in length, but the steeper hills could be
shorter. The authors also conducted a virtual reality experiment,
in which they simulated the measurements for the real 5 degree
hill and stated that it was 100 meters in length. The outdoor hill
lengths must have varied, but are short in comparison with the
mountainous terrain experienced by skiers and hill walkers. The
authors found that slopes were overestimated both uphill and
downhill, but very slightly more for the steeper downhill views
on visual and haptic measures (but not on verbal angular estimates). Similarly, Ross (2006) found no difference between
uphill and downhill views on verbal angular estimates, for
outdoor slopes between 2 and 23 degrees, with maximum
viewing distances of 15 meters for the 23 degrees uphill view,
and views of around 50 meters or more for the downhill views.
Ross (2010) varied the viewing distance to a bench on a 7
degree downhill slope: She had observers stand on the slope 20
meters above the bench, or view it from a window in a building,
giving a viewing distance of 36 meters. The verbal slope estimates
were signiﬁcantly less steep from the higher and further viewpoint. This shows that when viewing distances are well controlled,
the ﬂattening effect of a more distant viewpoint can be measured
over fairly short distances. Ross (2010) also had observers make
angular estimates from the Wallace Monument, 100 meters
above a ﬂat plain. The mean estimate for the ﬂat plain was
+6.45 degrees, signiﬁcantly steeper than the estimate of +0.93
degrees given by observers standing on a horizontal footpath,
and demonstrating the apparent uphill slope of ﬂat terrain when
viewed from a height.
These errors have practical implications for skiers and mountaineers who are trying to decide whether a distant slope is navigable
and what effort will be required. Large slope illusions are usually
not detected as illusions (Bridgeman & Hoover 2008) – unless evidence is available, such as skiers gliding uphill or water running
uphill. One can learn from experience to guess what is navigable,
but experience does not seem to change the false appearance of
distant slopes. These observations cannot help the debate on
whether there is a dissociation between perception and action,
because by the time the traveller reaches the distant slope his perception usually corresponds to reality.

The problem of conﬂicting reference frames
when investigating three-dimensional space
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Abstract: In a surface-dwelling animal like the rat, experimental strategies
for investigating the hippocampal correlates of three-dimensional space
appear inevitably complicated by the interplay of global versus local
reference frames. We discuss the impact of the resulting confounds on
present and future empirical analysis of the “bicoded map” hypothesis
by Jeffery and colleagues.

At ﬁrst glance, the question of how the brain represents threedimensional space appears to be a straightforward problem.
This review by Jeffery and colleagues highlights instead the
thorny nature of the question. The main problem is that most
mammals are surface-dwelling animals, and it becomes tricky to
devise proper experiments to determine whether these organisms
encode space as an isotropic, volumetric representation when they
move along surfaces that extend in three dimensions. The
“bicoded map” proposal of Jeffery et al. suggests that three-
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dimensional space is represented not as a true volumetric map,
but as a patchwork of diversely oriented, local, quasi-planar
maps. Neurophysiological data informing this issue are themselves
fragmentary and limited to a few studies that employed complementary strategies (e.g., with respect to the orientation of the
animal’s body) while addressing different functional correlates
of space (e.g., head-direction cells vs. grid cells). Much experimental work is therefore needed to empirically evaluate the
debated theoretical scenarios.
The implicit assumption in many experiments is that spatial
locations are represented in a global reference frame (e.g., the laboratory room), and that the local apparatus is merely a substrate
for the animal to move (actively or passively) in and out of different locations in the global reference frame. However, it is increasingly clear from both behavioral and neurophysiological studies
that hippocampal spatial representations are tied more strongly
to the local apparatus frame of reference than the global frame
of reference when the two frames are translated relative to each
other (Knierim & Hamilton 2011). Hence, all experiments on
three-dimensional representations of space that employ surfacedwelling animals must address the problem of interacting reference frames when the 3D volume of the global reference frame
is sampled serially via surface-bound navigational epochs. For
example, in an experiment not discussed in the target article,
place ﬁelds were bound to the behavioral track, rather than the
x, y, or z coordinates of the room, when the track was moved to
different locations in both horizontal and vertical axes of the
room (Knierim & Rao 2003). These results suggest that the
spatial representation was tied to the local reference frame of
the track, rather than to the room coordinates, precluding any
strong interpretation regarding whether the cells represented
two-dimensional or three-dimensional space in the global reference frame.
One key experiment considered by the authors involved rats
running up and down a helical path (Hayman et al. 2011).
Firing ﬁelds from grid cells and place cells repeated themselves
in corresponding positions of all or nearly all laps. Although
Jeffery et al. interpret this result as evidence of a diminished representation of space in the z-axis, this result could be also interpreted as the laps sharing an identical representation under the
control of the frame of reference established by the recurring,
stereotypical lap. This interpretation is strongly supported by a
study using planar circular and square spiral paths (Nitz 2011):
Place ﬁelds recurred in corresponding positions of each spiral
loop, similar to the repeated ﬁring on the different levels of the
helical track. The sizes of the ﬁelds grew in lockstep with the concentric loops, except for those ﬁelds that recurred at the corners of
square spirals. These ﬁndings suggest a form of pattern detection
operating on the geometrical features of the lap.
The second experiment with neural recordings considered by
Jeffery et al. concerned rats climbing on a vertical pegboard
(Hayman et al. 2011). Grid cells ﬁred in patterns of vertical
stripes, suggesting that the vertical wall was “slicing into” a columnar extension of a classic two-dimensional grid pattern existing on
the contiguous ﬂoor (which was not sampled in this experiment).
This is perhaps the strongest piece of evidence supporting the
authors’ theoretical proposal, but how would one test this model
rigorously? One simple idea is to record the grids on the ﬂoor,
and then have the rat do the pegboard task as the pegboard is
moved to different locations/orientations relative to the ﬂoor. As
the pegboard slices into different columns, the pattern of stripes
should be predictable based on the ﬂoor-based grid vertices
being intersected by the pegboard. However, once again, the
interplay of reference frames may prevent a simple answer.
Place cells (Knierim & Rao 2003; O’Keefe & Burgess 1996;
Siegel et al. 2007) and grid cells (Derdikman et al. 2009; Savelli
& Knierim 2012; Savelli et al. 2008) are strongly inﬂuenced by
local boundary manipulations, and boundary-responsive neurons
are found in multiple hippocampus-related regions (Boccara
et al. 2010; Lever et al. 2009; Savelli et al. 2008; Solstad et al.
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2008). If the ﬂoor-based grid becomes bound to the pegboard in
the ﬁrst recording, this grid may reset identically at the boundary
formed by the base of the pegboard, regardless of where the pegboard is moved. The vertical ﬁelds predicted to project over the
pegboard from this grid would then remain unchanged, too.
This is just one example of a general concern applicable to
similar experimental designs in which a surface reference frame
is moved relative to another.
The authors make the provocative argument that even animals
that truly navigate in three-dimensional volumes – birds, bats,
insects, ﬁsh – are likely to use a bicoded strategy, rather than a
volumetric representation that is isotropic and metric in all
three axes. The question can be addressed in these animals
without the need of a surface substrate that may be in conﬂict
with a global reference frame. A recent study (Yartsev & Ulanovsky 2013) did not ﬁnd elongation along a single common axis
in three-dimensional place ﬁelds recorded from the hippocampus
of freely ﬂying bats, seemingly in contrast with the bicoded map
hypothesis.. Future experiments in the same species can test if
this result applies to grid cells as well. Regardless of the
outcome, it will not be clear whether surface-dwelling creatures
will show the same results. Understanding the proper reference
frame of the “cognitive map” is one of the crucial problems that
must be resolved in order to interpret the data from animals
running on surfaces in three-dimensional space, and the reference
frames may differ across terrestrial, arboreal, and ﬂying animals.

Just the tip of the iceberg: The bicoded map
is but one instantiation of scalable spatial
representation structures
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Abstract: Although the bicoded map constitutes an interesting candidate
representation, proposing it as the predominant representation for threedimensional space is too restrictive. We present and argue for scalable
spatial representation structures as a more comprehensive alternative
account that includes the bicoded map as a special case.

The question of how space, including the third dimension, is represented in the human mind is doubtless of major importance to
the behavioral and brain sciences. The bicoded map proposed by
Jeffery et al. constitutes an interesting candidate representation.
However, it seems unlikely that it captures more than one very
speciﬁc type of the multitude of spatial representations available
to humans. To assume that the bicoded map is more than a
special case is to misjudge the nature of spatial representations.
Even in one or two dimensions, mental representations of
spatial information are usually neither as metric nor as consistent
as assumed in the bicoded map. More often, humans use so-called
qualitative representations. Such representations abstract from a
continuous property (e.g., distance) by partitioning it and distinguishing only between classes that are deﬁned by these partitions (e.g., near and far in the case of distance; see Forbus
2011). Empirical behavioral (Knauff et al. 1997) and neuroscientiﬁc (Sereno et al. 2001) as well as computational (Krumnack et al.
2011) studies have shown that humans are prone to employing
qualitative, non-metric spatial representations. Furthermore,
human spatial representations suffer from systematic distortions
that lead to misrepresentations of, for example, distance (McNamara & Diwadkar 1997) and orientation (Moar & Bower 1983).
According to these properties, mental spatial representations are

often better viewed not as cognitive maps, but as cognitive collages
(Tversky 1993): combinations and overlays of qualitative, nonmetric representations of parts and aspects of the overall represented space. In addition, organization of human memory has
been found to favor representation structures that are economic
in the sense of minimizing storage space and processing requirements for representing a given body of knowledge, both for
semantic knowledge generally (Collins & Quillian 1969) and for
spatial knowledge in particular (McNamara 1986; Stevens &
Coupe 1978).
Given these properties of human spatial representations, it
seems unlikely that the bicoded map constitutes more than one
out of many representations employed by humans. A more comprehensive view on human spatial representations that includes
the bicoded map as a special case is provided by our framework
of scalable spatial representation structures (Schultheis & Barkowsky 2011; Schultheis et al. 2007). According to this conception, representations are constructed such that they remain
as simple as possible given the current task demands. If the task
demand changes, the representations are adapted accordingly
and, thus, the representations scale to and with the current task
requirements. This on-demand scaling can occur with respect to
several aspects of the representations.
First, scaling can occur with respect to the types of spatial
knowledge that are represented (e.g., distance, topology, orientation). Evidence from psychological and artiﬁcial intelligence
research (reviewed in Schultheis et al. 2007) indicates that
mental representations of spatial information are best viewed as
being composed of several distinct, knowledge-type–speciﬁc representation structures. Such knowledge-type–speciﬁc representation structures contribute to the scalability of spatial
representations. If a certain situation provides or requires only
knowledge about orientations between objects, only a representation structure specialized for representing orientation knowledge will be employed. If the consideration of further types of
knowledge such as topology becomes necessary, further representation structures that are specialized for representing topological
knowledge will be added to the overall spatial representation.
Second, each knowledge-type–speciﬁc representation is subject
to scaling such that (a) only task-relevant entities are included in
the representation and (b) the granularity of the representation,
that is, its ability to distinguish between different relations,
changes with task demands. Since the granularity of a representation is directly related to how coarsely or ﬁnely the represented
spatial continuum is partitioned, spatial representations are also
scalable in terms of how qualitative or metric they are.
Finally, spatial representations are scalable with respect to the
number of dimensions that are encoded. Although a two-dimensional representation may be considered the most common
form of spatial representation, one-dimensional representations
can be sufﬁcient and even superior to two-dimensional representations in certain contexts (e.g., route representations; MacEachren 1986).
When viewed in the framework of scalable representation
structures, the conception of the bicoded map as the predominant
mental representation appears too restrictive. It seems implausible to assume that the spatial plane is always represented metrically while the vertical dimension is always exclusively
represented qualitatively; which dimensions are represented and
how ﬁne-grained the representation is depend on the demands
of the current spatial task. For example, when planning a bike
trip, the plane may not be represented, but the vertical dimension
may be instantiated by a ﬁne-grained (perhaps metric) representation of slope and elevation, because this may constitute the
most important information for planning the bike route. On the
other hand, if required by the task, humans may construct a full
three-dimensional volumetric mental representation. Research
on air trafﬁc controllers, for instance, suggests that experienced
controllers form a continuous “functional picture of the momentary trafﬁc situation” that allows them “to interpret very
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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complex dynamic constellations within a few seconds” (Eyferth
et al. 2003, p. 415).
That there is little empirical evidence for metric representations of the vertical dimension or a three-dimensional volumetric representation is, therefore, more indicative of the
necessity than of the ability to maintain and employ such representation structures. For many spatial tasks it is sufﬁcient to
exclude construction of a representation of the vertical, because
the vertical information is (a) irrelevant to the task or (b) partly
redundant with horizontal information (e.g., in slanted terrain,
moving in certain directions implies certain elevation changes).
Due to this lack of a necessity to represent vertical information
in much detail (if at all) in many situations, the data reviewed in
the target article do not allow unequivocally ruling out alternative
representations to the bicoded map. Given the above considerations, the framework of scalable representation structures provides a much more convincing account of human mental spatial
representations than does the overly speciﬁc bicoded map.
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Abstract: An animal confronts numerous challenges when constructing an
optimal navigational route. Spatial representations used for path
optimization are likely constrained by critical environmental factors that
dictate which neural systems control navigation. Multiple coding
schemes depend upon their ecological relevance for a particular species,
particularly when dealing with the third, or vertical, dimension of space.

Modeling the neural systems used for navigating between two
locations is ecologically valid when the speciﬁc constraints of an
environment on a species are accounted for. Navigational routes
may be optimized by certain factors in one species, and by different factors in others. Therefore, models of navigational systems
within terrestrial, arboreal, aquatic, or aerial species should
account for speciﬁc factors that dictate route optimization.
Jeffery et al. have presented an argument for bicoding, where
space in the plane of locomotion is represented independently
from that in the orthogonal axis. Although we agree that the evidence presented points toward this coding scheme concept, representation of space may be encompassed by “multi-coding,”
where multiple systems (not limited to two) compute ecologically
valid representations to optimize navigation.
What is the most relevant factor in optimizing a three-dimensional route? Ignoring ecological validity and all factors being
equal, the simplest answer is distance. The optimal route is the
shortest distance between two points, which is a straight line. In
two-dimensional surface navigation, a number of neural computational models propose mechanisms by which the hippocampal
formation could compute a straight path (Blum & Abbott 1996;
Burgess & O’Keefe 1996; Muller & Stead 1996). Extrapolating
from these models to account for the vertical dimension, and
maintaining shortest distance as the most optimized factor, calculating the “straight line” is performed by treating the z-axis as analogous to the x- and y-axes.
Treating the vertical dimension as equivalent to the two horizontal dimensions is not always possible for terrestrial animals
when the straight line would require ecologically invalid operations, such as ﬂight or tunneling. To avoid this issue, Jeffery
et al. argue that in a three-dimensional environment, the
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optimal shortest path (straight line) is calculated by using the tangents-to-ground contours. However, other factors that may come
into play when optimizing a route should be taken into consideration; for example, metabolic expenditure and journey time.
On ﬂat, unobstructed terrain, the straight-line distance between
two locations will yield the path requiring minimal time and energy
(metabolic optimization). However, given a terrain with a vertical
dimension, the energy expenditure for climbing or descending is
complicated and relates to instantaneous slope. Metabolic rate in
humans walking on an adjustable incline is a function of speed
and slope. For instance, locomotion on a 10 degree slope will
approximately double metabolic rate compared with movement
at the same speed on a level surface (Silder et al. 2012). Similarly,
the metabolic rate of horses on a 10 degree slope increases by
approximately 2.5 times (Eaton et al. 1995). Additionally,
because climbing is slower than walking on the horizontal, shortest
path distance is not equivalent to shortest path time. For species
that optimize metabolic cost, models solely optimizing shortest
path distance are not ecologically valid when metabolic cost is a
primary factor in route navigation. For a terrestrial animal, linear
or tangential distance is a poor optimizer for routes in threedimensional space. Though we strongly concur with the overall
conclusion of Jeffery et al. our conclusions are based on the inappropriate simpliﬁcation that the shortest path is the optimal path.
However, the shortest path in three dimensions may be optimized in some species. A number of studies done with spatial representations in the barn owl (Tyto alba) offer insight into how the
vertical dimension is processed, and add support to the concept of
multi-coding of three-dimensional space (Euston & Takahashi
2002; Takahashi et al. 2003). Barn owls are known for their
ability to hunt in total darkness (Konishi 1973; Payne 1971), and
their navigation is guided by a topographical representation of
auditory space located in the external nucleus of the inferior colliculus (Knudsen & Konishi 1978a; 1978b). Neurons within this
auditory space map have discrete spatial receptive ﬁelds, not
unlike place cells in the hippocampus, that result from the computation of inter-aural differences in the level and time-of-arrival of
sounds. The most optimal route for the barn owl while hunting is
the route that minimizes distance and time to get to the prey.
The auditory spatial map of the barn owl is used as a model of
mammalian auditory localization and navigation, and it may be an
example of how information about the vertical dimension can be
used in conjunction with two-dimensional representations of
space. Though terrestrial species may not use auditory information as primary spatial information, arboreal mammals and
primate species likely do use this information in forming and utilizing three-dimensional representations.
In conclusion, avoiding a steep direct path by taking a ﬂat, circuitous route is supported by optimizations other than straightline distance. In fact, given the arguments presented here for
adding metabolism and time into the optimization of a particular
route, we suggest that the shortest path in three-dimensional, as
well as two-dimensional, terrains may or may not be a factor
used for route optimization. A multi-coding and multi-system
scheme for spatial representations in three dimensions is an
attractive concept to explain how ecologically relevant factors
can contribute to spatial processing.
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Abstract: We show that, given extensive exploration of a threedimensional volume, grid units can form with the approximate
periodicity of a face-centered cubic crystal, as the spontaneous product
of a self-organizing process at the single unit level, driven solely by ﬁring
rate adaptation.

In the target article, Jeffery et al. suggest that a fully three-dimensional representation of space may have not been found in a
number of studies, because of the intrinsic computational complexity of 3D representations, which would make the cost of
setting them up too high, and not because of anything to do
with the spatial behaviour of the species, such as rats and primates,
used in those studies. If so, genuine representations of 3D
volumes would be unlikely to be revealed even when moving
beyond surface-dwelling species, towards ﬂying or marine
animals who appear capable of experiencing 3D space more
thoroughly, through three-dimensional navigation.
Clearly, managing directional information in three-dimensional
space offers more challenges than on the plane (Finkelstein et al.
2012). Nevertheless, how this may affect the development of a
grid representation in three dimensions depends on the mechanisms at work to generate it. If such mechanisms were to rely
heavily on head direction inputs, then Jeffery et al. would have
a point. If not, there might be space for surprises.
Since 2005, we have been analysing a model for grid cell formation (Kropff & Treves 2008; Treves et al. 2005) based on a
self-organisation process driven solely by ﬁring rate adaptation
(head direction information and recurrent connections are
needed only to align the grids along common axes; Si et al.
2012). The model produces grids in two dimensions spontaneously. Individual grid cells average in time the content of
spatially modulated inputs, which can be very generic and need
not require any speciﬁc computation. The emergence of a grid
in the ﬁring rate map is induced by the animal’s exploration of
space, and the ﬁnal appearance of the grid, its structure,
depends on the way the environment is explored (Si et al. 2012)
and on the topology of the space itself (Stella et al. 2013).
What would this model predict in three dimensions, if the units
receive broad spatial inputs modulated also in the third dimension? Individual grids are expressed by the feedforward inputs

in the basic model, and the same inputs could “carry” both twodimensional crawling grids and three-dimensional ﬂying grids.
We have looked at how the very same model behaves when
expanding the original square environment into a cubic one and
allowing the simulated animal to ﬂy around for the time usually
required for the two-dimensional exploration to generate good
grid units.
As in two dimensions, the model produces a regular tiling of
space: Its units develop grid ﬁelds positioned at the vertices of a
lattice uniformly ﬁlling the available volume. By computing the
3D autocorrelogram of the spatial activity of these units (Fig. 1),
it is apparent that the conﬁguration reached by the ﬁelds is the
so-called face centered cubic (fcc). In this conﬁguration each
ﬁeld is surrounded by 12 other ﬁelds, and all pairs of neighbouring
ﬁelds have roughly the same distance.
Our model shows how grids in two and three dimensions (or in
any number of dimensions) may be produced starting from the
very same principles of auto-organization, without increasing
costs in higher dimensions. Adaptation provides the means to
shape regular forms out of rough and unpolished spatial inputs,
and it does so regardless of the topology of the external environment. Without a spatial behaviour engaging the full three-dimensional environment, however, no 3D grid units would appear, as
there is no hard-wired or ad hoc designed structure, in our
model, to support them.
In the words of Jeffery et al. our model seems to indicate that
the absence of three-dimensional grids in rats has an ontogenetic
cause (target article, sect 5.2, para. 2): Rats do not possess threedimensional grids because, alas, they have never learned to ﬂy.

What counts as the evidence for threedimensional and four-dimensional spatial
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Abstract: The dimension of spatial representations can be assessed by
above-chance performance in novel shortcut or spatial reasoning tasks
independent of accuracy levels, systematic biases, mosaic/segmentation
across space, separate coding of individual dimensions, and reference
frames. Based on this criterion, humans and some other animals
exhibited sufﬁcient evidence for the existence of three-dimensional and/
or four-dimensional spatial representations.

Figure 1 (Stella et al.). The three-dimensional autocorrelogram
of a sample unit developing an approximate face-centered cubic
(fcc) 3D ﬁring rate map.

How can one prove that an animal has three-dimensional spatial
representations? For navigation in two-dimensional space (e.g.,
horizontal plane), the classical paradigm is the novel shortcut
test: If an animal traverses a route and then returns home by a
novel shortcut, this is taken as sufﬁcient (but not necessary) evidence of a 2D spatial representation. A variant of the novel shortcut test is the detour test, where a familiar route is blocked and the
animal must navigate around the obstacle to reach the destination.
Although novel shortcutting is usually attributed to path integration rather than cognitive mapping, both mechanisms require
2D spatial representations, and therefore the conclusion regarding dimensionality holds in both cases.
Based on this logic, novel shortcutting in three-dimensional
space is sufﬁcient evidence for 3D spatial representations. If an
animal traverses a route in three-dimensional space and returns
home through a novel shortcut or navigates around an obstacle
to reach the goal, then that animal possesses a 3D spatial representation. Among the four candidate models, only the
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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volumetric map supports such behavior. Animals using the surface
map and the extracted ﬂat map may take shortcuts within the
encoded surface, but they cannot return to the appropriate
elevation once they are displaced along that dimension. A
bicoded map with non-spatial (e.g., contextual) coding of the
third dimension allows shortcuts within the surface(s) of the two
spatial dimensions, but the animal has to perform a random
search along the third dimension until it happens to reach the
desired context, because by deﬁnition the contextual coding
without spatial mapping provides no information about the direction and distance an animal should travel to reach the goal context
from a novel context.
The ability to perform novel shortcuts does not necessarily
mean high accuracy or efﬁciency. Performance in navigation
tasks varies depending on the species, the perceptual information
available, and properties of the trajectory (Loomis et al. 1993;
Wang & Spelke 2003). Differences in accuracy may be due to
the quality of the spatial representation and spatial processing.
However, lower accuracy cannot be used as evidence against
the presence of 3D spatial representations. Instead, the criterion
for possessing a 3D representation should be above-chance performance in the third dimension. Similarly, biases occur in
spatial judgments of lower dimensions (e.g., Huttenlocher et al.
1991; Sampaio & Wang 2009) and veridical information is not
required for spatial representations. Hence, systematic biases
are not evidence against 3D representations.
Moreover, spatial representations do not require integration
across dimensions, and none of the four models makes this
assumption. Multiple dimensions can be encoded separately, for
example, as coordinates for each dimension, as long as the information can be used together for spatial processing. Therefore,
separation of one or more dimensions is not evidence against
3D spatial representations. Integration across space is also not
required, and fragmentation has been shown in 2D spatial representations (Wang & Brockmole 2003). All four models are
open about whether the entire space is represented as a whole
or is divided into pieces/segments, and all can accommodate
both mosaic and integrated representations. Thus, segregation
of space is not informative on the dimensionality of the spatial
representations.
Finally, the dimensionality of spatial representations for navigation needs to be considered in a broader theoretical framework in
terms of reference frames and sensory domains. Flexible, efﬁcient
navigation does not require an allocentric map. For example, an
egocentric updating system can provide the same navigational
capabilities as an allocentric cognitive map (Wang 2012; Wang
& Spelke 2000). It is also important to consider visual, proprioceptive, and motor command information for self-motion estimation,
which may provide simpler and more efﬁcient computation than
the vestibular signals (Lappe et al. 1999; Wang & Cutting 1999).
As Jeffery et al. discuss in the target article, the dimensionality
question has been extended to four dimensions for humans.
Although humans probably did not evolve for navigation in fourdimensional space, there are no known inherent constraints in
implementing 4D spatial representations with neurons and
neural connections, and the existing brain structure may be utilized to accommodate higher-dimensional spatial representations.
Therefore, 4D spatial representations cannot be dismissed a priori
based on evolution alone and should be treated as an empirical
question.
A few studies have examined human 4D spatial representations
using variations of the shortcutting task and spatial judgment
tasks. Aﬂalo and Graziano (2008) showed that humans can
perform path integration in four-dimensional space with extended
training and feedback. Because the movements were orthogonal
(90° rotations) and determined by the observer, updating at
each translation and rotation involved only one and two dimensions, respectively, and was relatively easy to compute algebraically within an egocentric reference frame. Nevertheless,
representation of a 4D vector was required, hence the study
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provided some evidence of 4D representations. Other studies
used virtual reality techniques to create visual simulations of 4D
geometric objects (hyper-tetrahedron) and showed that observers
could judge the distance between two points and the angle
between two lines embedded in the 4D virtual space (Ambinder
et al. 2009). Observers could also estimate novel spatial properties
unique to 4D space, such as the size (i.e., hyper-volume) of virtual
4D objects (Wang, in press), providing further evidence of 4D
spatial representations.
In summary, an animal possesses three-dimensional spatial representations if it can exhibit above-chance performance along the
third dimension in a novel shortcut or detour test in 3D space.
Based on this criterion, humans (e.g., Wilson et al. 2004), rats
(e.g., Jovalekic et al. 2011), and possibly ants (Grah et al. 2007)
all encode spatial information about the vertical dimension that
is beyond a surface map, extracted ﬂat map, or bicoded map
with contextual coding for the third dimension. Thus, these
species possess some form of 3D spatial representations for navigation, which may vary in quality and format across species and
the individual dimensions may be represented separately and differently. Empirical studies of four-dimensional path integration
and spatial judgments suggest that human 4D spatial representations are possible, although the condition and properties of
such representations require further investigation.
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Abstract: The vertical component of space occurs in two distinct fashions
in natural environments. One kind of verticality is orthogonal-to-horizontal
(as in climbing trees, operating in volumetric spaces such as water or air, or
taking elevators in multilevel buildings). Another kind of verticality, which
might be functionally distinct, comes from navigating on sloped terrain (as
in traversing hills or ramps).

Jeffery et al. propose that vertical space is coded using a different
set of mechanisms from the head direction, place, and grid cells
that code horizontal space. In particular, the authors present evidence that grid cells do not ﬁre periodically as an organism
moves along the vertical axis of space, as they do along the horizontal axis, and that the head direction system uses the plane of locomotion as its reference frame. But a challenge for the bicoded
model is whether it can account similarly for the different types
of information that can be speciﬁed in the vertical dimension. We
argue that there are two markedly different components of vertical
space that provide entirely different spatial information, and therefore are represented differently: orthogonal-to-horizontal (as in
multilevel buildings and volumetric space) and sloped terrain.
The vertical dimension, when orthogonal-to-horizontal, can
specify contextual information that can be used to reference the
appropriate planar map (“what ﬂoor am I on”), as well as bodyorientation information (“which way is the axis of gravity”). The
former is likely coded categorically in terms of low, high,
higher, and so forth, as described by Jeffery et al. in the target
article. Theoretically, this information functions no differently
from the contextual information provided by rooms with differently colored walls or by the ﬂoor numbers outside elevators.
The cue (wall color or ﬂoor number) speciﬁes the planar cognitive
map to which the organism should refer. The vertical dimension
can also specify body-orientation information. The organism
constantly refers to the plane of its body with respect to

Commentary/Jeffery et al.: Navigating in a three-dimensional world
earth-horizontal as a source of input for the direction of gravity.
These cues combine for an organism to determine its elevation
with respect to the ground.
In contrast, none of this information is available in sloped
environments. Terrain slope can provide a directional cue by specifying compass-like directions (i.e., up = North), which could
then orient or augment the planar cognitive map. Note that this
processing is distinct from orientation with respect to the direction of gravity, which provides no directional information for the
horizontal plane. Recent work conducted in our lab shows that
slope is very useful for locating the goal in an otherwise ambiguous
environment, and that the directional information it provides is
coded with respect to one’s own body (Weisberg et al. 2012).
Our data suggest that, unlike North, which is an invariant directional cue that does not change based on the direction one
faces, terrain slope is coded preferentially as uphill or downhill,
depending on one’s current facing direction. It is unclear how
the vertical dimension with respect to one’s own body could
provide similar directional information.
Data from our lab also suggest that the way slope information
augments the planar map is computationally different from the
way the orthogonal-to-horizontal dimension provides context. In
a replication of Restat et al. (2004), we found that participants
were able to use unidirectional-sloped terrain to make more accurate pointing judgments and sketch maps, compared to the same
environment on a ﬂat terrain. However, this was only the case for a
simple environment. In a complex environment, only participants
with a high self-reported sense of direction used the slope information, while low self-reporters did no better than in the ﬂat condition (Weisberg et al. 2012).
Neither of these experimental effects arises from information
provided by the vertical dimension as orthogonal-to-horizontal.
That is, the participants in these experiments need not encode
their elevation with respect to the ground, but only the direction
speciﬁed by the gradient of the sloped terrain. The goals of the
organism modulate which type of vertical information it
encodes. As further evidence of their dissociability, consider
how the two possible reference frames might interact (see Fig. 1).
For example, an organism navigating along a sloped terrain
could have a categorical representation of the vertical dimension
either as it refers to the organism’s own body (the gradient at
left in the ﬁgure) or as it refers to earth-horizontal (the gradient
at right). The rat on the left is unconcerned with the increase in
elevation, and is similar to the rat on the vertical trunk of the
tree in Figure 12 of the target article. The rat on the right,
however, is encoding its elevation with respect to some low or
high point. Presumably, Jeffery et al. would predict that a rat
would encode the vertical dimension with respect to its own
body, as in the ﬁgure on the left. But in doing so, they may be discounting the information provided by the terrain gradient.
By considering the possible representations of the vertical component of space, one can characterize the qualities of each

Figure 1 (Weisberg & Newcombe). Two possible representations
of the vertical dimension – one speciﬁed with respect to the plane of
the organism’s body, the other speciﬁed by the organism travelling
along a sloped surface and therefore changing its elevation. Which
of these representations would be predicted by the bicoded
model? Are they both categorical? If so, are they functionally
similar? (After Jeffery et al.)

representation separately. For example, are each of the resultant
representations derived from sloped terrain and volumetric space
non-metric, or do some of them contain metric properties? If they
are non-metric, are they functionally different; susceptible to the
same distortions? Whether these representations become integrated and can be used together is an empirical question, but
exploring these possibilities creates a richer picture of threedimensional spatial cognition.
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Abstract: The suggestion that three-dimensional space is represented by a
mosaic of neural map fragments, each covering a small area of space in the
plane of locomotion, receives support from studies in complex twodimensional environments. How map fragments are linked, which brain
circuits are involved, and whether metric is preserved across fragments
are questions that remain to be determined.

Jeffery et al. present an inspiring overview of behavioural and neurobiological studies of neural map formation and navigation in
three-dimensional environments. Based on their review of the literature, they suggest that three-dimensional space is “bicoded,”
meaning that different neural mechanisms are used to map
environments in the horizontal and vertical planes. Only the horizontal plane has a metric for distance and direction. The suggested
dual coding scheme raises several interesting questions.
The authors propose that three-dimensional space is encoded
as a mosaic of contiguous map fragments. These fragments
need not be horizontal but can, in principle, have any orientation
relative to the Earth’s surface. The proposed fragmentation is
reminiscent of the decomposition of grid cell maps that takes
place in complex environments in two-dimensional space. A few
years ago, Dori Derdikman and colleagues measured the effect
of environmental compartmentalization on the spatial periodicity
in grid cells (Derdikman et al. 2009). Rats were trained to run in a
zigzag fashion through 10 consecutive hairpin-shaped ﬂat corridors in a large square enclosure. The compartmentalization of
the recording environment disrupted the global grid pattern
observed in the same cells in the absence of the corridors.
When internal walls were inserted, separate maps were formed
for each corridor. Each time the rat turned from one alley to
the next, the grid map was reset, and a new sequence of grid
ﬁelds unfolded. The internal walls broke the grid map into
smaller maps, one for each compartment. A similar pattern of
sub-maps is visible in entorhinal neurons during navigation in
other multi-alley environments (Frank et al. 2000). The sharp
transitions at the turning points in these mazes appear to take
place simultaneously, in a coherent manner, in grid cells and
place cells (Derdikman et al. 2009). Taken together, the studies
suggest that complex real-world environments are not represented by a single universal map. Instead, the brain has multiple
contiguous grid cell and place cell maps, each covering a small
uninterrupted space within the larger environment (Derdikman
& Moser 2010). As argued by Jeffery and colleagues, this
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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fragmentation of the cognitive map is probably not limited to the
horizontal plane. Fragmentation may be an efﬁcient mechanism
for mapping complex environments, both within and across
planes.
The fragmentation of the spatial map introduces new issues,
however. How are fragments “glued” together at transition
points? How does the brain adjust for changes in the slope of
the terrain between segments? Is metric information carried
over from one fragment to the next? Can animals path-integrate
across segments? It is possible, as proposed by the authors, that
the integration of the fragments is solved by neural systems and
computational algorithms not involving the currently known
spatial cell types in the hippocampus or entorhinal cortex. In
order to understand how animals navigate in real-world environments, we need to identify the factors that elicit fragmentation
and the mechanisms that link one fragment to the next.
We agree that some observations speak in favour of partly
specialized mechanisms for encoding space in horizontal and vertical planes, at least in terrestrial animals. This includes the presence of separate cell populations for encoding of pitch and yaw in
the lateral mammillary nucleus of the rat (Stackman & Taube
1998), as well as the ﬁnding that head direction cells in rats
respond exclusively to variations in the horizontal (yaw) plane,
or the plane of locomotion if the surface is tilted (Stackman
et al. 2000). The proposed segregation receives further support
from a study demonstrating less sensitivity to the vertical dimension in place cells and grid cells in rats (Hayman et al. 2011). As
indicated by Jeffery et al., it remains possible that vertical modulation was not expressed in that study because the animals maintained a horizontal orientation during the vertical movement.
Moreover, with a predominance of horizontal movements, we
cannot exclude that horizontal and vertical dimensions differed
with respect to availability of metric cues and that precise ﬁelds
would emerge also in the vertical direction if sufﬁcient information were available. Jeffery et al. also acknowledge that
precise representation of the vertical dimension may require a
minimum of prior experience with active movement in threedimensional environments. Most laboratory rats lack such experience. Collectively, the limited existing data raise the possibility
that horizontal and vertical dimensions rely on somewhat segregated mechanisms, but the ﬁndings do not rule out that experience contributes to such segregation or that the brain, as a
whole, has an integrated representation of volumetric space.
More experimental work is clearly needed to settle these issues.
The target article of Jeffery et al. takes important steps towards
identifying critical questions that must be addressed.
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Abstract: The presumption that navigation requires a cognitive map leads
to its conception as an abstract computational problem. Instead of loading
the question in favor of an inquiry into the metric structure and
evolutionary origin of cognitive maps, the task should ﬁrst be to
establish that a map-like representation actually is operative in real
animals navigating real environments.

“The core question for animal navigation,” according to Jeffery
et al. “concerns what the reference frame might be and how the
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coordinate system encodes distances and directions within the
frame” (sect. 2, para. 2). To answer this question, they hypothesize
that a bicoded cognitive map underlies the navigational capacities
of animals. Their presumption that navigation requires a cognitive
map leads them to conceive of navigation as an abstract computational problem that requires a representational schema powerful
enough to encode geometrical features of the familiar environment of the navigating animal. We argue that this presumption
leads them to ignore important ethological evidence against cognitive maps.
The work of ethologists is especially relevant to the problem of
navigating in a three-dimensional world. Ethologists have produced concrete methods for testing the cognitive map hypothesis
during navigational tasks. Despite their passing references to
ethology, Jeffery et al. fail to note that most ethologists believe
that the experimental evidence runs against the hypothesis that
cognitive maps underlie animal navigation (e.g., Bennett 1996;
Dyer 1991; Wray et al. 2008; Wystrach et al. 2011). In one such
experimental paradigm, the “displacement experiment,” an
animal is moved prior to navigating to a familiar goal in a familiar
range (e.g., see Wehner & Menzel 1990). If the animal were to
take a novel path from the displacement point to the goal, that
would count as evidence for map-like navigation. However, typically the animal assumes a heading based on some other kind of
information, providing evidence that the animal is using navigational systems (e.g., landmark learning, path integration, systematic search behavior, or a combination thereof) whose
representational structure does not preserve the geometrical
properties assumed by the cognitive map hypothesis. These
studies, unlike those to which Jeffery et al. refer, propose alternate
explanations that account for the navigational abilities of animals
without presupposing the kinds of complex computation implied
by a cognitive map. Simpler navigational strategies (e.g., visual
snapshot matching) have been proposed to explain navigation to
a goal (Judd & Collett 1998), with landmarks serving to provide
context-dependent procedural information rather than geometric
positional information (Wehner et al. 2006). This work shows that
an animal may not need to abstract higher-order spatial characteristics of its environment in order to successfully navigate in it.
However, without ﬁrst determining what kind of information an
animal is actually using while navigating, it is premature to be
investigating the nature of the metric properties of the presumed
cognitive map.
We suggest that reconceiving the problem of navigation in a
three-dimensional world in ethological terms would shift the
focus from describing the computational complexity of the geometric properties of the navigable environment to one wherein
the information used by the animal to determine its location relative to some goal is investigated under ecologically valid conditions. By failing to consider the alternative explanations of
how animals navigate in real environments, Jeffery et al.’s
bicoded map hypothesis puts the hypothetical cart before the evidential horse.
Having ignored evidence against cognitive maps in animals,
Jeffery et al. appeal to human behavioral evidence suggesting
that the representations utilized in navigation preserve the
planar properties of the navigation environment. For example,
they summarize several studies indicating that humans are relatively poor at estimating the height of landmarks in a familiar
environment (sect. 3.1, para. 7) and other studies suggesting
that people overestimate the steepness of hills (sect. 3.2, para.
3). They mention yet another study suggesting that people do
poorly when attempting to estimate the direction of objects in a
multilayer virtual environment (sect. 3.3, para. 4). What is not
clear is how these kinds of judgments are related to the information a navigating animal may use in an online navigational
task. Jeffery et al. fail to acknowledge the possibility that these
kinds of distance judgments (and their failures) may not be evidence for a bicoded cognitive map precisely because the information contained in such a representation may not be that used
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by a navigator in a real navigational task. Differential performance
on vertical versus horizontal distance of objects, though perhaps
having import for spatial perception in general, may simply be
irrelevant to navigation.
We applaud Jeffery et al. for acknowledging that, in general, the
problem of navigation is an evolutionary one. However, we ﬁnd
the possibility they endorse to be problematic. They argue that
a fully three-dimensional map has never evolved, on the
grounds that “[it] is possible that the cost-beneﬁt ratio of the
required extra processing power is not sufﬁciently great” (sect.
5.2, para. 4), and they suggest that a lower dimensional map-like
representation supplemented with unspeciﬁed encoding heuristics could achieve successful navigational behavior at lower cost.
Parallel reasoning suggests that an even lower dimensional representation (not even a map at all) augmented with appropriate
heuristics would have evolved under similar cost constraints.
That is to say, given their assumption that evolution works to minimize the cost of a trait (i.e., the cost of a more complex computational system), it becomes plausible that selection would act to
produce ever less costly representational systems for navigation,
as long as those systems are capable of approximating the same
result. This would be consistent with the computationally
simpler navigational systems found by ethologists to be sufﬁcient
for animals to navigate. In our view, Jeffery et al.’s hypothesis as to
the evolutionary origins of the bicoded cognitive map suffers from
a deﬁciency common in attempts to connect the presence of a trait
with a story about selection history – that is, that mere consistency
between the presence of some trait and some hypothetical selection pressure is the sole measure for plausibility. They have provided a list of how-possibly stories (two of which they reject,
one they accept), when what is needed is a how-actually explanation that is properly grounded in the ethological evidence.
Finally, we agree that a fully volumetric map may not have
evolved, but perhaps because no cognitive map at all is needed
for an animal to navigate in a three-dimensional world.

Authors’ Response
A framework for three-dimensional navigation
research
doi:10.1017/S0140525X13001556
Kathryn J. Jeffery,a Aleksandar Jovalekic,b
Madeleine Verriotis,c and Robin Haymand
a

Department of Cognitive, Perceptual and Brain Sciences, Division of
Psychology & Language Sciences, University College London, London WC1H
0AP, United Kingdom; bInstitute of Neuroinformatics, University of Zurich, CH8057 Zurich, Switzerland; cDepartment of Neuroscience, Physiology and
Pharmacology, University College London, London WC1E 6BT, United
Kingdom; dInstitute of Cognitive Neuroscience, Alexandra House, London
WC1N 3AR, United Kingdom.
k.jeffery@ucl.ac.uk
ajovalekic@ini.phys.ethz.ch
madeleine.verriotis@ucl.ac.uk
r.hayman@ucl.ac.uk
www.ucl.ac.uk/jefferylab/

Abstract: We have argued that the neurocognitive representation
of large-scale, navigable three-dimensional space is anisotropic,
having different properties in vertical versus horizontal
dimensions. Three broad categories organize the experimental
and theoretical issues raised by the commentators: (1) frames of
reference, (2) comparative cognition, and (3) the role of
experience. These categories contain the core of a research
program to show how three-dimensional space is represented
and used by humans and other animals.

R1. Introduction
Scientists typically approach the problem of how space is
represented in the brain using the vehicle of their own preferred model species, whether pigeon, rat, human, or ﬁsh.
Therefore, it is impressive to see in the commentaries how
many issues cut across species, environments, descriptive
levels, and methodologies. Several recurring themes have
emerged in the commentators’ responses to our target
article, which we address in turn. These are: (1) Frames
of reference and how these may be speciﬁed and related,
(2) comparative biology and how representations may be
constrained by the ecological characteristics and constraints
of a given species, and (3) the role of developmental and
life experiences in shaping how representations are structured and used. In the following sections we explore each
of these themes in light of the commentators’ views, and
outline research possibilities that speak to each of these.

R2. Frames of reference
A fundamental issue in spatial representation is the frame
of reference, against which positions and movements are
compared. The concept of frame is a mathematical construct rather than a real cognitive entity, but it provides a
useful way of organizing important concepts in spatial representation. However, the crisp formalism that we have
developed in order to treat space mathematically may
bear scant resemblance to the brain’s actual representation,
which has been cobbled together using patchy, multisensory, variable, probabilistic, and distorted information.
Nevertheless, it is useful to review the ingredients of a
perfect map, before trying to understand how the imperfect and real-world brain may (or may not, as Zappettini
& Allen argue) have approximated this functionality.
Maps can be either metric or non-metric (Fig. R1), the
former incorporating distance and direction and the latter
(topological maps – see commentary by Peremans & Vanderelst) using only neighbourhood relationships without
reference to precise distances or directions. That said,
these parameters are necessarily loosely incorporated into
the map, or else the relationship with the real world
becomes too disconnected for the map to be useful. We
focused on metric maps in our analysis because of the
clear evidence of metric processing provided by the
recent discovery of grid cells. However, Peremans & Vanderelst describe how an initially topological map could
possibly be slowly metricized through experience.
A metric spatial reference frame, to be useful, needs two
features: an origin, or notional ﬁxed point within the frame,
from which positions are measured, and some way of specifying directions in each of the cardinal planes. Human
spatial maps generally fall into two classes, Cartesian and
polar (Fig. R1), which treat these two features slightly differently. A classic Cartesian map has a single plane on
which an origin is deﬁned, while directionality is imposed
on the plane via the two orthogonal x and y axes, which
intersect at this origin. Positions are speciﬁed by projecting
them onto the axes, yielding two distance parameters per
position. Directions are not explicitly represented but can
be inferred by reference to the axes. In a polar map, by contrast, direction is explicitly represented. Positions are speciﬁed by the distance from the origin and the direction with
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Figure R1. Three types of artiﬁcial map representation, two metric and one nonmetric. (a) Cartesian map, showing orthogonal axes (x
and y), an origin (black circle), and a grid with which other places on the map can be metrically speciﬁed; (b) polar map, with a speciﬁed
direction (Greenwich Meridian, GM), an origin (black circle), and a radial grid with which distances in a particular direction relative to the
GM can be speciﬁed; (c) topological (nonmetric) map – in this case, of the London Underground – in which distances and directions are
not explicitly or veridically represented, and in which positions are speciﬁed relative to other positions (e.g., “Russell Square is between
Holborn and King’s Cross”). Note that the topological map, being nonmetric, does not have an origin or a metric grid.

respect to a reference direction, again yielding two parameters, one specifying distance and one direction.
If a map is a map of the real world, then the frame of
reference of the map needs to correspond somehow (be
isomorphic) with the world. For example, in a map of the
Arctic, the origin on the map corresponds to the North
Pole and the reference direction on the map corresponds
to the Greenwich Meridian. Spatial inferences made
using the map can enable valid conclusions to be drawn
about real-world spatial relationships. However, there are
many different levels of description of the real world. If a
lookout on a ship navigating the polar waters sees an
iceberg, then she won’t shout “Iceberg, 3 km South, 20
degrees East!” but rather “Iceberg, 100 m, starboard
bow!” – that is, she will reference the object not to the
Earth’s global reference frame, but rather to the more relevant local reference frame of the ship. Thus, maps can
align with the world in many different ways.
In the cognitive science of spatial representation, the
global world-referenced frame has come to be called “allocentric,” whereas a local self-referenced frame is called
“egocentric.” As the icebreaker example shows, however,
this dichotomy is an oversimpliﬁcation: If the lookout
should then bang her elbow on the gunwale, she will complain not of her starboard elbow but of her right elbow,
which of course would become her port elbow if she
turned around – “starboard” and “port” are ship-referenced
directions and can therefore be egocentric or allocentric
depending on the observer’s current perception of either
being the ship or being on the ship. We will return to the
egocentric/allocentric distinction further on.
The ﬁnal important feature of a reference frame is its
dimensionality, which was the primary topic of the target
article. Cartesian and polar maps are usually two-dimensional, but can be extended to three dimensions. For
both frameworks this requires the addition of another
reference axis, passing through the origin and aligned vertically. Now, the position of a point in this space requires
three parameters: distance in each of x, y, and z for the Cartesian map, and beeline distance plus two directions for the
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polar map. In the polar map, the ﬁrst direction is the angle
with respect to either/both of the orthogonal directional
references in the plane of those axes, and the second direction is the angle with respect to both axes in a plane orthogonal to that.
With these concepts articulated, the question now is how
the brain treats the core features of reference frames. We
address these in the following order:
1. How are egocentric and allocentric reference frames
distinguished?
2. What is the dimensionality of these reference frames?
3. Where is the “origin” in the brain’s reference frames?
We turn now to each of these issues as they were dealt
with by the commentators, beginning with the egocentric/
allocentric distinction.
R2.1. Egocentric and allocentric reference frames

When you reach out to pick up a coffee cup, your brain
needs to encode the location of the cup relative to your
body; the location of the cup relative to the outside world
is irrelevant. The frame of reference of the action is therefore centred on your body, and is egocentric. Conversely, if
you are on the other side of the room, then planning a path
to the cup requires a room-anchored, allocentric reference
frame. The fundamental difference between these frames
lies in the type of odometry (distance-measuring) required.
If the brain’s “odometer” is measuring distance between
body parts, or movement of one part with respect to
another, then the frame is egocentric, and if the measurement is relative to the earth, then it is allocentric. The
reason that grid cells have proved so theoretically important
is that they perform allocentric odometry – their ﬁring
ﬁelds are equidistant in earth-centred coordinates – thus
proving once and for all that the brain indeed has an allocentric spatial system.
Actions in space typically require more than one reference frame, and these frames therefore need to be
related to each other. For example, in reaching for the
cup, the movements the hand needs to make are
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constrained by the position of the arm. If reaching for the
cup while also walking around the table, then the hand
and arm frames need to be updated to account for the relative motion of the cup, and egocentric and allocentric
frames must interact. It seems that large parts of the posterior cortex are devoted to these complicated computations, with the parietal cortex being more involved with
egocentric space (Andersen & Buneo 2002) and the hippocampus and its afferent cortices with allocentric space.
Where and how these systems interact is not yet known,
but as Orban notes, it may be in the parietal cortex.
In our target article we restricted our analysis to allocentric reference frames on the grounds that only allocentric encoding is fully relevant to navigation. The
importance to the bicoded model of a possible egocentric/
allocentric unity is that there is better evidence for volumetric spatial encoding in the realm of egocentric action.
If egocentric and allocentric space turn out to be encoded
using the same representational substrate, the implication
is that allocentric space, too, should be volumetric rather
than bicoded. Indeed, several commentators question the
egocentric/allocentric distinction and contest the exclusion
of egocentric spatial processing from a theory of navigation.
Orban argues that navigation uses egocentric processes
because allocentric and egocentric processing converge on
a common neural substrate in the parietal cortex – which
is true, but it does not mean they are therefore indistinguishable. Klatzky & Giudice, referring to studies of
humans, ask, “what, then, differentiates the behaviors ostensibly governed by the planar mosaic from human spatially
directed actions such as pointing, reaching, over-stepping,
and making contact?” – to which we would answer that egocentric actions, such as reaching, do not require allocentrically referenced odometry. They then say, “This exclusion
of metrically constrained behaviors from consideration is
undermined, however, by the intrinsic ambiguity of
frames of reference,” by which they presumably mean
that humans, at least, can ﬂexibly move between frames of
reference. However, movement between reference
frames does not imply that the frames are therefore indistinguishable. Klatzky & Giudice conclude that “lacking reliable
behavioral or neural signatures that would allow us to designate actions as egocentric on the basis of their metric
demands, it seems inappropriate simply to exclude them
from a theory of volumetric spatial representation.”
We of course would not want to fully exclude egocentric
factors from a complete description of navigation, but it
needs to be said that a distinction can be made. As noted
earlier, the existence of allocentric odometry, in the form
of grid cell activity, shows without a doubt that the brain
possesses at least one allocentric spatial system. Given
that there are actions that engage grid cells and others
that do not, there must be (at least) two forms of spatial
representation occurring in the brain: a primarily egocentric one in the parietal cortex that does not require
grid cell odometry and a primarily allocentric one in the
entorhinal/hippocampal system that does. The question is
whether these two systems use the same encoding
scheme and/or the same neural substrate. In our view,
both are unlikely, although in terms of neural substrate
there are clearly close interactions. Therefore, arguing for
allocentric isotropy (equivalent encoding in all directions)
on the grounds of (possible) egocentric isotropy is unwarranted – they are separate domains.

Of course, there may be more than just these two reference frame systems in the brain – there may even be many.
And we accept that the distinction may not be as clear-cut
and binary as we made out. Kaplan argues for the possibility
of hybrid representations that combine egocentric and allocentric components, and points out that the locomotorplane-referenced form of the bicoded model is in fact such
a hybrid. We have some sympathy with this view, as it pertains
to the bicoded model, but are not fully persuaded by it.
Although it is true that this plane is egocentrically referenced,
because it is always under the animal’s feet, it is also the case
that the locomotor plane is constrained by the environment.
So, one could argue that the egocentric frame of reference is
forced to be where it is because of allocentric constraints.
Thus, the mosaic form of the bicoded model, in which each
fragment is oriented according to the local surface, is arguably an allocentrically based, rather than hybrid, model.
The distinction may be mostly a semantic one, however.
The egocentric/allocentric distinction can be blurred
even in discussions of explicitly allocentric neural representation. In fact, the place cells themselves, long regarded as
the prime index of allocentric encoding, are hybrid inasmuch as a place cell ﬁres only when the rat’s egocentric
reference frame occupies a particular place in the allocentric world. Indeed, it is difﬁcult to think of any
example in the existing literature of fully allocentric encoding, in which the position of the organism is truly irrelevant
and neurons only encode the relative positions of objects
with respect to each other. There may be such neurons,
at least in humans, but if they exist, they have not been
found yet. Most encoding probably mixes allocentric and
egocentric components to a certain degree. Such mixing
can cause problems for the spatial machinery. For
example, Barnett-Cowan & Bülthoff speculate that the
combination of righting reﬂexes to maintain an upright
head posture during self-motion and object recognition,
combined with prior assumptions of the head being
upright, may interfere with the brain’s ability to represent
three-dimensional navigation through volumetric space.
Egocentric and allocentric distinctions aside, within allocentric space one can also distinguish between locally
deﬁned and globally deﬁned space, and several commentators have addressed this issue. It is relevant to whether a
large-scale representation is a mosaic, a proposal for
which Yamahachi, Moser, & Moser (Yamahachi et al.)
advance experimental support, noting that place and grid
cell studies show fragmentation of large complex environments based on internal structure (in their case, walls).
Howard & Fragaszy argue that for a sufﬁciently dense
and complex space, such as in a forest, the fragments of
the mosaic could in principle become so small and numerous that the map as a whole starts to approximate a fully
metric one. We would argue, however, that in order to
be fully metric in all dimensions, such a map would need
a global 3D directional signal, for which evidence is
lacking at present. However, future studies may reveal
one, at least in species with the appropriate ecology.
If complex space is represented in a mosaic fashion, then
what deﬁnes the local reference frames for each fragment?
Here it may be that distal and proximal environmental features serve different roles, with distal features serving to
orient the larger space and proximal ones perhaps deﬁning
local fragments. Savelli & Knierim observe that local
versus global reference frames sometimes conﬂict. They
BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2013) 36:5
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suggest that apparent impoverishment of three-dimensional
encoding may result from capture of the activity by the local
cues – the vertical odometer is, in essence, overridden by
the more salient surfaces of the local environment, which
continually act to reset it. For example, consider a helical
maze in which an animal circles around on a slowly ascending track, such as the one in the Hayman et al. (2011) study.
It may be that the surface – the track – is highly salient,
whereas the height cues are much less so, leading to
under-representation of the ascending component of the
animal’s journey. Studies in animals that are not constrained
to moving on a substrate, such as those that ﬂy, will be
needed to answer the question more generally. The
theme of capture by local cues is also taken up by Dudchenko, Wood, & Grieves (Dudchenko et al.), who
note that grid and place cell representations seem to be
local, while head direction cells frequently maintain consistency across connected spaces. The implication is that in a
truly volumetric, open space, odometry has the capacity to
operate in all three dimensions, leading to the creation of
an isotropic, volumetric map. Clearly, experiments with
other species with other modes of travel and in other
environments will be needed to answer the question of
whether three-dimensional maps can be isotropic.
R2.2. Dimensionality of reference frames

Having distinguished between egocentric and allocentric
reference frames, we turn now to the issue of dimensionality of these frames, which was the theme of our target
article. Although the earlier analysis of reference frames
drew a clear distinction between dimensions, the brain
does not necessarily respect such distinctions, as pointed
out by some of the commentators. Part of the reason for
this blurring of the boundaries is that the brain works
with information provided by the body’s limited sense
organs. Thus, it has to cope with the dimension reduction
that occurs in the transformation among the real threedimensional world, the two-dimensional sensory surfaces
(such as the retina) that collect this information, and the
fully elaborated multidimensional cognitive representation
that the brain constructs.
Since information is lost at the point of reduction to two
dimensions, it needs to be reconstructed again. An example
of such reconstruction is the detection of slope using vision
alone, in which slope is inferred, by the brain, from visual
cues such as depth. Orban explores how the primate
visual system constructs a three-dimensional representation of objects in space, and of slope based on depth
cues, in the parietal cortex. However, the reconstruction
process introduces distortions such as slope overestimation.
Orban and Ross both observe that slope illusions vary
depending on viewing distance, meaning that the brain
has a complicated problem to solve when trying to tailor
actions related to the slope. Durgin & Li suggest
that the action system compensates for such perceptual distortion by constructing actions within the same reference
frame, such that the distortions cancel.
Perception of three-dimensional spaces from a ﬁxed
viewpoint is one problem, but another quite different one
concerns how to orchestrate actions within 3D space. For
this, it is necessary to be able to represent the space and
one’s position within it – problems that are different for
egocentric versus allocentric space.
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Taking egocentric space ﬁrst: How completely threedimensional is the 3D reconstruction that the brain computes for near space (i.e., space within immediate reach)?
Several commentators argue in favour of a representation
having full three-dimensionality. Orban outlines how the
parietal cortex, generally believed to be the site of egocentric spatial encoding (Galati et al. 2010), is well specialized for representing space in all three dimensions, while
Badets suggests that the spatial dimensions may be
mapped to a common area in the parietal cortex that integrates according to a magnitude-based coding scheme
(along with other magnitudes such as number). Lehky,
Sereno, & Sereno (Lehky et al.) agree that primate
studies of the posterior cortex in egocentric spatial tasks
show clear evidence of three-dimensional encoding. They
say, “While the dimensionality of space representation for
navigation [our emphasis] in primates is an important
topic that has not been well studied, there are physiological
reasons to believe that it may be three-dimensional,”
although they do not outline what those reasons are. By contrast, Phillips & Ogeil argue that even egocentric space is
bicoded. First they appeal to evidence from perceptual illusions and neglect syndromes to show that vertical and horizontal spaces are affected differently. Then they turn to a
theoretical analysis of the constraints on integration of vertical and horizontal space, and problems such as chaotic
dynamics that can result from attempts at such integration.
It therefore seems that more research is needed to understand the representation of near space, and whether or
not it is different in different dimensions (anisotropic).
Turning to allocentric space, the issue of the dimensionality was explored extensively in the target article and again
in the commentaries. The core questions concerning
encoding of the third allocentric dimension have to do
with whether it is encoded, and if so, how, and how it
might (or might not) be integrated with the other two.
The question of whether it is encoded is addressed by
several commentators. Weisberg & Newcombe make
the important point that “vertical” comes in (at least) two
forms, orthogonal to horizontal or orthogonal to the
animal. They suggest that the different types of vertical
may have different contributions to make to the overall
encoding of the situation. For example, terrain slope may
be useful in, for example, helping orient the local environment, but this information would be lost if vertical encoding were earth-horizontal–related. They suggest that both
types of vertical may be encoded, and may or may not be
integrated.
Other commentators focus on the encoding of volumetric (rather than slanting planar) three-dimensional
space, and speculate about how such encoding may be
achieved. Powers argues, on the basis of studies in robotics
and engineering, for dimension reduction as a means of
achieving coding efﬁciency by reducing redundancy (i.e.,
what Carbon & Hesslinger call “empty cells” that
contain no information but take up representational
space). In this light, the bicoded model would seem to
offer such efﬁciency. Carbon & Hesslinger agree, arguing
that a two-dimensional map with alternative information
for the vertical dimension should sufﬁce for most things,
and they draw on comparative studies to support this.
This seems a very reasonable proposition to us. For a
surface-dwelling animal traversing, say, hilly terrain, there
is only one z-location for each x-y position, and so the
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animal could in principle navigate perfectly well by computing only the x-y components of its journey. The only
drawback would be in, say, comparing alternative routes
that differed in how much ascent and descent they
required. However, this could be encoded using some
other metric than distance – for example, effort – much
like encoding that one route goes through a boggy swamp
and the other over smooth grassland. The navigation
system does not necessarily have to perform trigonometry
in all three dimensions to compute an efﬁcient route
across undulating terrain. For volumetric space, the
problem becomes slightly less constrained because there
are unlimited z-locations for every x-y point. However,
again, it might be possible to navigate reasonably effectively
by simply computing the trigonometric parameters in the
x-y (horizontal) plane and then factoring in an approximate
amount of ascent or descent.
An interesting related proposal is put forward by
Schultheis & Barkowsky, that representational complexity could be expanded or contracted according to current
need. According to their concept of scalable spatial representations, the detail and complexity of the activated representation varies with task demands. They suggest that the
vertical dimension might be metrically encoded in situations that demand it (e.g., air trafﬁc control) but not in situations that do not (e.g., taxi driving). Dimensionality of
encoding might also be affected not just by task demands
but by cognitive load. By analogy with the effects of load
on attentional processing (Lavie 2005), one might
suppose that in conditions of high cognitive load (such as
a pilot ﬂying on instruments), the degree to which all
dimensions are processed might be restricted. Such processing restrictions could have important implications for training and instrument design for air- and spacecraft.
Wang & Street move in the opposite direction from
dimension reduction. They argue not only that the cognitive representation of allocentric space is a fully ﬂedged
three-dimensional one, but also that with the same neural
machinery it is possible to encode four spatial dimensions.
They support their assertion with data showing that subjects can perform at above-chance levels on path-completion tasks that cross three or four dimensions,
something they say should be possible only with a fully integrated volumetric (or perhaps “hypervolumetric”) map.
Our view on this suggestion is that it is a priori unlikely
that an integrated 4D map could be implemented by the
brain because this would require a 4D compass, the selection pressure for which does not exist in a 3D world. Our
interpretation of the 4D experiment is that if subjects
could perform at above-chance levels, then they would do
so using heuristics rather than full volumetric processing,
and by extension the above-chance performance on 3D
tasks may not require an integrated 3D map either. The
experimental solution to this issue would be to identify
neural activity that would correspond to a 4D compass,
but computational modelling will be needed to make predictions about what such encoding would look like.
Given general agreement that there is some vertical information contained in the cognitive map (i.e., the map has at
least 2.5 dimensions), the next question concerns the nature
of this information – is it metric, and if not, then what is it?
A fully volumetric map would have, of course, complete
metric encoding of this dimension as well as of the other
two, and Wang & Street argue for this. Others such as

Savelli & Knierim and Yamahachi et al. argue that we
will not know for sure until the relevant experiments are
done with a variety of species and in a variety of environmental conditions. A number of commentators agree with
our suggestion, however, that the vertical dimension (or, in
the mosaic version of the bicoded model, the dimension
orthogonal to the locomotor plane) is probably not encoded
metrically. There are a variety of opinions as to what the
encoded information is however. Phillips & Ogeil suggest
that the other dimension is “time” rather than altitude,
although it is not clear to us exactly how this would work.
Nardi & Bingman support the proposal that “effort” could
be a height cue. Sparks, O’Reilly, & Kubie (Sparks
et al.) develop the notion of alternative factors further –
they discuss the issue of optimization during navigation, pointing out that the shortest path is not necessarily optimal and
that factors such as energy expenditure are also important.
They suggest a “multi-coding” (as opposed to merely a “bicoding”) scheme to take into account these other factors. And as
mentioned earlier, Weisberg & Newcombe suggest that
there are two types of vertical information, a true alignedwith-gravity vertical and another that is related to terrain
slope, raising the issue of how these two forms may be
related, if at all. Thus, it appears that a variety of stimulus
types might serve to input into the encoding of vertical space.
The ﬁnal question regarding the vertical dimension is
whether – assuming it is represented at all – it is combined
with the horizontal ones to make a fully integrated, volumetric map. Burt de Perera, Holbrook, Davis, Kacelnik, & Guilford (Burt de Perera et al.) refer to studies
of ﬁsh to argue that vertical space, although in their view
coded metrically, is processed separately from horizontal
space. They suggest some experiments to explore
whether this is the case, by manipulating animals’ responses
in the vertical dimension and showing that these show evidence of quantitative encoding (e.g., by obeying Weber’s
law). However, similar results could also be found if the
animal were using some kind of loose approximation to a
metric computation (e.g., climbing to a certain level of
exhaustion), and so the experiments would need to be carefully designed so as to show operation of true odometry.
Before leaving the issue of reference frames, it is worth
brieﬂy examining the little-discussed issue of how the brain
may deﬁne an “origin” within these frames.
R2.3. The origin of reference frames

As noted in the earlier analysis of reference frames, a
metric map needs an origin, or ﬁxed point, against which
the parameters of the space (distance and direction) can
be measured. The question of whether the brain explicitly
represents origins in any of its reference frames is completely unanswered at present, although a notional origin can
sometimes be inferred. To take a couple of examples
among many, neurons in the visual cortex that respond proportionally to distance from the eye (Pigarev & Levichkina
2011) could be said to be using the retina as the “origin” in
the antero-posterior dimension, while neurons that are gain
modulated by head angle (Snyder et al. 1998) are using the
neck as the “origin” (and straight ahead as the “reference
direction”). Whether there exist origins for the other egocentric reference frame, however, is less clear.
For allocentric space, the origin becomes a more nebulous concept, although in central place forager species,
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such as rats, the central place (the nest) may constitute an
“origin” of sorts. However, it may be that the brain uses not
a ﬁxed point as its reference so much as a ﬁxed boundary.
Place and grid cells, for example, anchor their ﬁring to the
boundaries of the local environment, moving their ﬁring
ﬁelds accordingly when the boundaries are moved en
bloc. Furthermore, at least for grid cells, deformation (as
opposed to rigid translation) of these boundaries in some
cases leads to a uniform deformation of the whole grid
with no apparent focus (Barry et al. 2007), suggesting
that the whole boundary contributes to anchoring the
grid. Hence, it is not obvious that there is a single pointlike origin in the entorhinal/hippocampal representation
of allocentric space. However, it could be that the place
cells themselves in essence provide multiple origins –
their function may be to anchor spatially localized objects
and events to the reference frame deﬁned by the boundaries and grids. It may be that the simple, singular notion
of origin that has been so useful in mathematics will need
to be adapted to accommodate the brain’s far more nebulous and multifarious ways of working.
R3. Comparative studies
We turn now to the ways in which studies from different
species, with different evolutionary histories and ecological
constraints, have contributed to our understanding of
spatial encoding. Principles derived for one species may
not apply to a different species in a different environment
using a different form of locomotion. Orban points out, for
example, that rodent and primate brains are very different,
and that there are cortical regions in primates that do not
even have homologues in rodents. Hence, extrapolation
from rodents to primates must be done with care, a point
with which we agree.
The importance of comparative studies in cognitive
science lies in understanding how variations in body type,
ecological niche, and life experience correlate with variations in representational capacity. This information tells
us something about how these representations are
formed – what aspects of them are critical and what
aspects are just “add-ons” that evolved to support a particular species in a particular ecological niche. While comparative studies of three-dimensional spatial cognition are rare,
they promise to be particularly revealing in this regard.
R3.1. Studies of humans

Humans are, naturally, the species that interests us the
most, but there are important constraints on how much
we can discover about the ﬁne-grained architecture of our
spatial representation, until non-invasive single neuron
recording becomes possible. There are, however, other
means of probing encoding schemes, such as behavioural
studies. Longstaffe, Hood, & Gilchrist (Longstaffe
et al.) and Berthoz & Thibault describe the methods
that they use to understand spatial encoding in humans
over larger (non-reachable) spaces. However, Carbon &
Hesslinger point out that experimental studies need to
take into account the ecological validity of the experimental
situation, something which is sometimes difﬁcult to achieve
in laboratory studies in which natural large-scale threedimensional spaces are rare. Virtual reality (VR) will likely
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help here, and future studies will be able to expand on previous research in two-dimensional spaces to exploit the
capacity of VR subjects to “ﬂoat” or “ﬂy” through 3D
space. This could be used not just during behavioural
studies but also in neuroimaging tasks, in which the participating brain structures can be identiﬁed.
Some commentators describe the human studies in real
(non-virtual) 3D spaces that have recently begun.
Hölscher, Büchner, & Strube (Hölscher et al.) extend
the anistropy analysis of our original article to architecture
and environmental psychology, and note that there are individual differences in the propensity to form map-based
versus route-based representations. Pasqualotto &
Proulx describe prospects for the study of blind people,
whose condition comprises a natural experiment that has
the potential to help in understanding the role of visual
experience in shaping spatial representation in the human
brain. Klatzky & Giudice argue that humans are ecologically three-dimensional inasmuch as their eyes are raised
above the ground and their long arms are able to reach
into 3D space, meaning that it is adaptive to represent
local space in a fully three-dimensional manner. Indeed,
evidence supports that local (egocentric) space is represented isotropically in primates, a point made also by
Orban, though contested by Phillips & Ogeil.
A ﬁnal important facet of human study is that humans
have language, which provides insights unavailable from
animal models. In this vein, Holmes & Wolff note that
spatial language differentiates horizontal axes from vertical
axes more than it differentiates the horizontal ones from
each other, thereby supporting the notion of anisotropy
in how space is encoded. However, as discussed in the
next section, the degree to which such anisotropy could
be due to experience rather than innate cognitive architecture is still open for debate.
R3.2. Studies of nonhumans

Moving on to nonhuman animals, Carbon & Hesslinger
review the various ways in which the spatial problems faced
by animals of a variety of different ecologies reduce to a
common set of mainly surface-referenced problems.
However, not all commentators agree that a planar or
quasi-planar map is supported by comparative studies.
Orban observes that the nonhuman primate brain is much
closer to the human than to the rodent brain on which
much neurobiological work has been done, and notes that
several parietal areas in primates are specialized for spatial
representation. Howard & Fragaszy discuss the issue of
nonhuman primates moving in a dense arboreal lattice.
They suggest the use of laser scanning technology (LiDAR)
to map out the movements of primates to determine how
their movements are constrained (or at least informed) by
the structure of the complex spaces through which they move.
Nonhuman primates are relatively close to humans in
evolutionary terms, and commonalities in spatial behaviour
might reﬂect this. Useful insights can therefore be gleaned
by moving phylogenetically further away, to try and discern
which features are ancient and foundational, and which are
more species-speciﬁc. Moss advocates bats for the study of
three-dimensional spatial encoding. Not only can bats ﬂy,
and thus move through space in an unconstrained way,
but they also have a sense – echolocation – unavailable to
most mammals. This provides a tool for understanding

Response/Jeffery et al.: Navigating in a three-dimensional world
how a supramodal cognitive representation can be formed
from sensory inputs that show local (species-speciﬁc) variation. Electrolocation and magnetic sense are additional
sensory systems in other species that may also be informative here.
Moving even further away from humans, non-mammalian vertebrates, such as birds, and invertebrates have
been valuable in providing comparative data that reveal
both commonalities and differences in how different organisms represent space. Zappettini & Allen take issue with
the notion that there is a map-like representation operating
in nonhuman animals, suggesting that this is putting “the
hypothetical cart before the evidential horse.” The debate
about the operation of cognitive maps in animals is a longstanding one that is too complex to fully revisit in this
forum. However, we would argue, in defence of our proposition, that the existence of grid cells is evidence of at least
some kind of map-like process. That there are neurons in
the brain that respond to distances and directions of
travel is incontrovertible proof that rodent brains – and
therefore likely the brains of other mammals, at least –
compute these parameters. Regardless of whether one considers a representation incorporating distance and direction
to necessarily be a map, it is nevertheless valid to ask
whether encoding of these parameters extends into all
three dimensions. To this extent we hope that common
ground can be found with the map-skeptics in devising a
program of study to explore real-world spatial processing.
Zappettini & Allen also object to our use of evolutionary
selection arguments to defend the bicoded hypothesis
over the volumetric one. We agree that such arguments
are weak and serve only to suggest hypotheses, and not to
test them. However, suggesting hypotheses was the main
aim of our target article, given the paucity of hard data
available at present.
Other comparative biologists have been more relaxed
about the notion of a map-like representation underlying
navigational capabilities in nonhumans. Citing studies of
avian spatial encoding, Nardi & Bingman suggest that taxonomically close but ecologically different species would be
useful comparators – for example, chickadees (inhabiting
an arboreal volumetric space) versus nutcrackers (storing
food on the ground). Burt de Perera et al. use studies
of ﬁsh to argue that vertical space, although coded separately from horizontal space, is nevertheless encoded metrically. This ﬁnding is interesting because ﬁsh can – unlike
humans – move in an unconstrained way through 3D
space, and would in theory beneﬁt from an integrated 3D
map if such had evolved. That the ﬁsh map is evidently
not integrated in this way suggests that maybe such integrated maps never did evolve. Dyer & Rosa suggest that
study of simple organisms such as bees can help reveal
the ways in which complex behaviours can arise from
simple building blocks, particularly when plasticity is
added to the mix. They agree, however, that evidence
suggests that in bees, too, space is represented in a
bicoded fashion.
In summary, then, studies in comparative cognition may
be tremendously informative in the unravelling of the neurocognitive representation of three-dimensional space,
both by revealing which features are central and which
are peripheral “add-ons,” and by showing how different
ecological constraints and life experiences contribute to
shaping the adult form of the representation.

R4. Experience
The ﬁnal major theme in the commentaries concerned the
possible role of experience in shaping spatial representations. Note that just because experience correlates with
encoding format (bicoded, volumetric, etc.), it does not
necessarily follow that it caused that format. For example,
an animal that can ﬂy will have (perhaps) an ability to
encode 3D space, and also a lifetime’s experience of
moving through 3D space, but the encoding may have
been hard-wired by evolution rather than arising from the
individual’s own life experience. Yamahachi et al. stress
that more research is needed to determine the role of
experience in shaping the structure of the map. This
could be done by, for example, raising normally 3D-exploring animals in a restricted, 2D space to see whether the
encoding type changes.
Experience, if it affects encoding at all, can act in two
broad ways: It can operate during development to organize
the wiring of the underlying neural circuits, or it can
operate on the fully developed adult brain, via learning,
to enable the subject to acquire and store new information.
These two areas will be examined in turn.
R4.1. Developmental experience

It is now clear that infants are not blank slates on which all
their adult capacities will be written by experience, but are
born with many of their adult capacities having already
been hard-wired, under genetic control. That said, it is
also clear that developmental experience can shape the
adult brain. How experience and hard-wiring interact is a
matter of considerable interest.
Experience during ontogeny can shape development of a
neural structure by affecting neural migration and axonal
projections, or else, subsequently, by affecting dendritic
connections and synapse formation. Migration and axon
development are generally complete by the time a developing animal has the ability to experience three-dimensional
space and so are unlikely to affect the ﬁnal structure of
the spatial representation. On the other hand, dendritic
and synaptic proliferation and pruning processes are plentiful during infant development – however, they also take
place to an extent during adulthood, when they come
under the rubric of “learning.” It is evident, therefore,
that development and learning show a considerable
overlap.
Some sensory systems show critical periods in infancy
during which experience is necessary for normal brain
development, and interruption of which can cause lifelong
impairment. Vision in mammals is a prime example of such
experience-dependent plasticity: Monocular deprivation or
strabismus (squint) occurring during the critical period, but
not during adulthood, can permanently affect connection
formation in the thalamus and visual cortex, resulting in
adult visual impairment (amblyopia; Morishita & Hensch
2008). A natural question arising from studies of threedimensional encoding in animals, then, is whether infant
experience can affect the formation of the adult cognitive
representation.
Recent studies have suggested that head direction cells,
place cells, and grid cells start to operate in adult-looking
ways very early in infancy in rat pups. In two studies published together in a 2010 issue of Science (Langston et al.
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2010; Wills et al. 2010), cells were recorded from the ﬁrst
day the pups started exploring, 16 days after birth. Head
direction cells already showed adult-like ﬁring and stability
even though the pups had had very little experience of
movement and only a few days of visual experience. Place
cells were also apparent from the earliest days of exploration, although their location-speciﬁc ﬁring improved in
coherence and stability with age. Grid cells were the last
cell type to mature, appearing at about 3–4 weeks of age,
but when they did appear they showed adult-like patterns
of ﬁring with no apparent requirement for experiencedependent tuning. Thus, the spatial system of the rat
seems to come on-stream with most of its adult capabilities
already present, suggesting a considerable degree of hardwiring of the spatial representation.
Is this true for vertical space as well? The experiment of
Hayman et al. (2011) showed a defect in vertical grid cell
odometry, and perhaps this defect is due to the limited
3D experience that rats in standard laboratory cages have
had. However, if extensive experience of 2D environments
is not needed for the spatial cells to operate in the way that
they do, as is manifestly the case, then experience of 3D
environments may not be needed either. Thus, the question of whether infant experience is necessary for adult cognitive function in the spatial domain is one that awaits
further data for its resolution.
Although the experiments have yet to be done, some
theoretical analysis of this issue is beginning. Stella, Si,
Kropff, & Treves (Stella et al.) describe a model of
grid formation in two dimensions that arises from exploration combined with simple learning rules, and suggest that
this would extend to three dimensions, producing a facecentered cubic array of grid ﬁelds. We would note here
that such a structure would nevertheless be anisotropic,
because the ﬁelds do not form the same pattern when
transected in the horizontal plane as in the vertical. While
such a grid map would be metric, Peremans & Vanderelst discuss a theoretical proposal whereby a non-metric,
topological map could be built up from experience, by
recording approximate distances travelled between nodes
and using these to build a net that approximates (topologically) the real space. They note that this would look anisotropic because of differential experience of travel in the
different dimensions, even though the same rules operate
in all three dimensions. This is an interesting proposal
that predicts that animals with equal experience in all
three dimensions should produce isotropic spatial representations, something that may be tested during recordings on ﬂying animals such as bats.
R4.2. Adult experience

As noted above, there are considerable overlaps in the biological processes supporting infant development and adult
learning, because the processes of dendritic arborization
and synaptic pruning that support experience-dependent
plasticity operate in both domains (Tavosanis 2012). The
question arises, then, as to whether adult experience can
shape the structure of a complex cognitive representation
such as that of space.
Dyer & Rosa suggest that in bees, although movement
in the vertical dimension (determined using optic ﬂow) is
usually represented with a lower degree of precision,
brain plasticity could allow the experience-dependent
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tuning of responses such that precision in this dimension
could be increased. In this way, the organisms can learn
to use navigationally relevant information particular to a
given environment. This does not mean, however, that
they learn a different mechanism for combining information. Moreover, Dyer & Rosa agree that the evidence
supports the notion of a bicoded structure to spatial processing in bees, even with experience.
Experiments involving human subjects have provided
insights into how experience might constrain spatial representation. Berthoz & Thibault discuss how the learning
experience during exploration of a multilayer environment
can shape the way in which subjects subsequently tackle
navigation problems in that environment (Thibault et al.
2013). Pasqualotto & Proulx explore the effects that
visual deprivation (through blindness) can have on the
adult spatial representation that forms. They suggest that
congenitally blind individuals may not exhibit quasi-planar
spatial representation of three-dimensional environments,
positing that the absence of visual experience of the 3D
world may shape how spatial encoding occurs. This is a
matter that awaits further study, as 3D spatial encoding
has not yet been explored in subjects who are blind.
These authors suggest several ways in which such studies
might be conducted, using sensory substitution devices
(which convert visual information into tactile or auditory)
in order to create 3D virtual reality environments. The
difference between subjects who are congenitally blind
and those who had had visual experience in early life will
be particularly interesting here.
Experience may play a role in how normal-sighted subjects perceive and interpret the spatial world, too. Bianchi
& Bertamini discuss the interesting errors that human subjects make when predicting what will be visible in a mirror as
they approach it, and show that the errors are different for
horizontal versus vertical relationships. Tellingly, adults
make more errors than children. These ﬁndings suggest
that experience may play a part in generation of errors –
adults have more experience of crossing mirrors from one
side to the other than from top to bottom, and more experience of passing in front of mirrors generally than children
do. This may perhaps be a case where experience diminishes
the capacity to accurately represent a space, because adults
have enhanced ability to make inferences, which they do
(in this case) erroneously.
While it is certainly the case that experience is likely to
inform the adult cognitive representation of space, our
hypothesis is that experience is not necessary to construct
it. This is because the rodent studies described earlier
suggest a high degree of representational complexity even
in animals that have had impoverished spatial life experience. Future research in animals reared in complex 3D
environments will be needed to determine the extent to
which experience is needed for formation and reﬁnement
of the brain’s map of 3D space.
R5. Conclusion
It is apparent from the commentaries on our target article
that there are many questions to be answered concerning
the relatively nascent ﬁeld of three-dimensional spatial
encoding. The most salient questions fall into the categories
outlined in this response, but no doubt more will emerge as

References/Jeffery et al.: Navigating in a three-dimensional world
spatial cognition researchers start to tackle the problem of
representing large-scale, complex spaces. The work will
require an interplay between behavioural and neurobiological studies in animals and humans, and the efforts of computational cognitive scientists will be needed to place the
results into a theoretical framework. The end result will,
we hope, be a body of work that is informative to many disciplines involved both in understanding natural cognitive
systems and also in building artiﬁcial spaces and artiﬁcial
devices.
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